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ROBERT GAMMILL, and

15 ANTHONY LOPEZ

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

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18 VSTYLES, INC.,

Plaintiff 19

20 v.

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER & CO. INSURANCE

22 BROKERS OF CALIFORNIA, INC.,

RONALD ZAPPELLI, 23

ROBERT GAMMILL,

ANTHONY LOPEZ, AND 24

DOES 1 THROUGH 25, INCLUSIVE,

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Defendants.

Case No. RIC2003415

The Honorable John W. Vineyard Department 7

GALLAGHER DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with Declaration of Brian Nisbet, Request for Judicial Notice, and Proposed Order

Date: March 18, 2021 03/25/2021

Time: 8:30 am

Dept.: 7

Confirmation No.: RES243928

Action Filed: August 28, 2020

Trial Date: None Set

TO THE COURT, PLAINTIFFS, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 18, 2021, at 8:30 am, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in Department 7 of the Riverside Superior Court, Riverside Historic Courthouse, located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, CA 92501, the Honorable John W. Vineyard presiding, Defendants Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Insurance Brokers of California, Inc., Ronald Zappelli, Robert Gammill, and Anthony Lopez will and hereby do demur to the Third Cause of Action in the amended complaint filed by Plaintiff VStyles, Inc.

The demurrer to the amended complaint is brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e), on the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action and that defects and objections to this cause of action appear on the face of the complaint and amended complaint.

The demurrer will be based on the complaint, amended complaint, this Notice of Demurrer, the Demurrer, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently filed Request for Judicial Notice, and on such Court records, pleadings, and arguments of counsel as may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Dated: February 16, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

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DEMURRER TO THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

1 2 Defendants Gallagher, Zappelli, Gammill, and Lopez demur to the third cause of action on 3 the ground that Plaintiff admits facts defeating its cause of action and fails to allege facts sufficient 4 to constitute a cause of action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e). 5 6 Dated: February 16, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 7 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 8 9 Amanda L. Groves (SBN: 187216) agroves@winston.com 10 Shawn R. Obi (SBN: 288088) sobi@winston.com 11 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor 12 Los Angeles, CA 90071-1543 Telephone: 213-615-1700 13 Facsimile: 213-615-1750 14 Stephen V. D'Amore (pro hac vice) sdamore@winston.com 15 Scott P. Ğlauberman (pro hac vice) sglauber@winston.com 16 Brian Nisbet (pro hac vice) bnisbet@winston.com 17 Katherine D. Hundt (*pro hac vice*) khundt@winston.com 18 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 35 West Wacker Drive 19 Chicago, IL 60601-9703 Telephone: 312-558-5600 20 Facsimile: 312-558-5700 21 Attorneys for Defendants Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Insurance Brokers of 22 California, Inc. Ronald Zappelli 23 Robert Gammill Anthony Lopez 24 25 26

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Like businesses around the world, Plaintiff's businesses shut down due to the sudden global outbreak of COVID-19. This caused a loss of revenue that Plaintiff sought to recoup by making a claim on its property insurance policy. The insurance company denied the claim, and Plaintiff sued.

Plaintiff's original complaint asserted two claims. First, the insurance company breached the policy because the policy covers losses caused by a virus. Second, in the alternative, if the policy does *not* cover losses caused by a virus, then Gallagher negligently performed its duties as Plaintiff's insurance broker, by helping Plaintiff obtain a policy without that coverage.

The Court (Stamen, J.) sustained Defendants' demurrers, holding that the policy did not cover losses caused by a virus, and Gallagher was not responsible for advising Plaintiff to obtain a policy to cover such losses. The Court's decision recognized that brokers generally do not have a duty to advise about additional or different insurance coverage. That duty can arise in only three limited circumstances, but none were present here. One is when a broker misrepresents a policy's coverage. There was no such allegation. Another is when the insured requests a particular type of coverage, but the complaint admitted that Plaintiff and Gallagher *never* discussed coverage for viruses. The third is when the broker takes on additional duties by agreement or by holding itself out as having special expertise. Gallagher never agreed to advise Plaintiff about insuring losses a pandemic could cause, and the statements Plaintiff identified as amounting to claims of special expertise were too vague and general to create a duty to obtain coverage for pandemic losses.

In short, Gallagher could not be liable for failing to predict a once-in-a-century global pandemic so unexpected and terrible that it hobbled the world economy, or for failing to advise Plaintiff to insure against it. All Plaintiff requested was a common property insurance policy, which Gallagher helped Plaintiff obtain, so there was no professional negligence.

Plaintiff has now re-pleaded, but the amended complaint is no better than the original. To give the appearance of change, some allegations were moved from one paragraph to another, and some words were replaced by synonyms. Other, previously insufficient allegations were simply made more prominent, or copied into the amended complaint from Plaintiff's (also insufficient)

opposition to Gallagher's prior demurrer. For example, the amended complaint tries to create an additional duty by referring repeatedly to Gallagher's generic statement to Plaintiff that it has "thousands of specialists who understand your diverse exposures." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 96, 92, 127.) But that allegation already appeared in the complaint (¶ 80), and its (lack of) significance was already argued by the parties in connection with Gallagher's prior demurrer. Repeating an inadequate allegation that the Court has already considered cannot help Plaintiff overturn the Court's ruling.

In the amended complaint as a whole, nothing of substance has changed to show that the Court's ruling should change. Plaintiff never inquired about coverage for viruses, and Gallagher was not required to advise about or obtain that coverage. This second demurrer should be sustained.

That conclusion is reinforced by an important new decision that became available after the Court decided Gallagher's prior demurrer. The two decisions address remarkably similar allegations in the same way. As in the present case, the plaintiffs in *Casa Colina v. Hartford Fire Ins.* sued their insurer for denying coverage of COVID-19 losses, and their broker in the alternative for not securing that coverage. And, like Plaintiff here, the plaintiffs in *Casa Colina* "never discussed" with the broker the topic of coverage for viruses. Applying California law, which also governs here, the court rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to impose on the broker any duty beyond procuring the policy that the plaintiffs themselves requested. The present case should end with the same result.

Plaintiff also again tries but fails to allege that Gallagher caused Plaintiff any loss, a topic the Court's earlier decision did not have to reach. In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that its prior policy, for 2019, covered losses from viruses, which Plaintiff wanted to keep, and Gallagher's negligence was in securing a policy with *less* coverage for 2020, thereby creating a "massive fissure" in the coverage. In its first demurrer, Gallagher proved that allegation false: the prior policy had an explicit *exclusion* for losses caused by viruses. Now, in the amended complaint, Plaintiff has simply deleted all allegations about the prior policy, but that does not change the reality. Their presence in the original complaint continues to show that Gallagher caused no loss, because Plaintiff would have had the same coverage even without Gallagher's supposed negligence.

In addition, Plaintiff still has never alleged that a specific policy with virus coverage was available in the marketplace and fit within Plaintiff's insurance budget, apparently because those

allegations cannot truthfully be made. Without them, Gallagher cannot be faulted for failing to obtain an apparently non-existent policy. For that reason as well, the amended complaint fails to allege that Gallagher caused any loss, and the demurrer should be sustained.

After two tries, Plaintiff has now demonstrated beyond doubt that it cannot state a claim of negligence against Gallagher. With perfect hindsight, Plaintiff may wish that it had requested, purchased, and paid for a very different policy with very different coverage, if such a policy could even be obtained. But the amended complaint admits that never happened. As the Court's prior decision explained, and as everyone unfortunately knows, COVID-19 was an unexpected calamity that caught the whole world unprepared. This lawsuit, contending that Gallagher should have predicted it and protected Plaintiff against it, should now come to its final end. The Court should sustain this demurrer without further leave to amend.

II. BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS

A. Plaintiff's insurance coverage and claim

VStyles is a corporation that owns and operates hair salons. (Am. Compl. $\P\P$ 1, 12, 20.) In 2019, with Gallagher as its insurance broker, Plaintiff bought property insurance from Continental Casualty. (*Id.* \P 2.) The policy covers business interruptions caused by "direct physical loss of or damage to property." (*Id.* \P 27.) It excludes coverage for losses caused by a "microbe." (*Id.* \P 62.)

Plaintiff closed the salons due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (*Id.* ¶ 53.) Plaintiff then made a claim under the policy for business interruption losses, but Continental denied it. (*Id.* ¶¶ 58-59.) Continental gave two reasons: (1) COVID-19 did not cause a direct physical loss of or damage to property, and (2) the microbe exclusion or other exclusions might also preclude coverage. (*Id.* ¶ 60.)

Plaintiff sued Continental for breach of contract. (*Id.* ¶¶ 111, 116.) Plaintiff alleges that COVID-19 *does* cause a direct physical loss of or damage to property. (*Id.* ¶ 36.) Plaintiff also alleges that the microbe exclusion does not apply. (*Id.* ¶ 117.) If Plaintiff wins its breach of contract claim against Continental, it will have the coverage it wants, and this entire case will be over. But to

hedge against a loss, Plaintiff also asserted an alternative claim against Gallagher and three of its employees¹ for professional negligence. (*Id.* ¶ 99.)

Most of Plaintiff's allegations about Gallagher are from the period in 2019 when Plaintiff was considering whether to use Gallagher as its insurance broker. The aim of some of those allegations is to try to show their relationship was so "special" that Gallagher owed Plaintiff duties that insurance brokers ordinarily do not owe their clients. (*Id.* ¶¶ 2, 9, 98, 124.) As discussed in detail below, those allegations show nothing of the sort.

But most of the allegations about Gallagher are filler with no conceivable relevance to Plaintiff's claim or this case. For example, during a presentation, "Gallagher represented to Plaintiff that its 'Shared Values + Passion for Excellence = Promises Delivered." (*Id.* ¶ 76.) That is the entire allegation. No part of that innocuous equation is alleged to have been misleading or caused Plaintiff any injury. Nor does Plaintiff explain why, for example, it alleges that the same presentation says Gallagher will "be a leader in 'Great Clips' through a better Value proposition." (*Id.* ¶ 77.) That is the amended complaint's only mention of Great Clips, which is the name of the hair salon franchises Plaintiff operates. These and other irrelevant allegations fill much of the body of the complaint.

This blizzard of meaningless allegations appears to be designed to obscure one key fact, which lies buried on the twenty-second page of the amended complaint. There, Plaintiff *admits* that during their courtship, and during the time they worked together to secure insurance for 2020, Gallagher and Plaintiff "*never* … *discussed coverage about viruses or communicable diseases*." (*Id.* ¶ 102 (emphasis added).) They also "never discussed … that the company should ensure it was covered for any type of shutdown." (*Id.* ¶ 105.) In other words, Plaintiff never asked Gallagher to find coverage for business interruptions caused by a virus or pandemic and never had reason to believe that Gallagher found or was searching for that coverage.

B. The Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Gallagher

Gallagher demurred to Plaintiff's complaint. After the parties filed briefs, the Court (Stamen, J.) issued a tentative decision, heard oral argument, and then sustained Gallagher's

¹ For ease of reference, this Memorandum uses "Gallagher" to refer to Gallagher and the three of its employees who were named as Defendants. Plaintiff asserts the same claim against all of them.

demurrer. A copy of the tentative decision, later made final, is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

The Court recognized that, "[a]s a general rule, an insurance agent does not have a duty to advise an insured to procure additional or different insurance coverage." (Ex. A at 4.) The agent's sole duty is "to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured." (*Id.* at 5.) The agent takes on an additional duty in only three circumstances.

The first is when "the agent misrepresents the . . . coverage being offered." But "Plaintiff does not allege that Gallagher made any misrepresentation." (*Id*.)

The second is when "there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular type or extent of coverage." But Plaintiff never "specifically requested that Gallagher procure coverage to protect against business income loss due to an epidemic or pandemic." (*Id.*)

The third is when the parties reach an "express agreement" or the agent "hold[s] himself out as having expertise in a given field of insurance being sought by the insured." (*Id.*) Plaintiff argued for an express agreement based on Gallagher's sales pitch about identifying coverage gaps and the like. But "[n]othing in Gallagher's sales pitch . . . amounts to an express agreement to assume duties greater than an insurance agent's general duties. . . . An agreement to monitor risks and update coverage would not implicate a duty to advise Plaintiff of the potential loss that could arise out of a pandemic." (*Id.*)

Plaintiff also argued that Gallagher held itself out "as having expertise in insurance and risk management and as having expertise in uncovering and closing coverage gaps." (*Id.*) But those allegations are "too vague to trigger a duty to procure a policy that would cover business income loss arising out of a pandemic. . . . There are no factual allegations that demonstrate Gallagher either knew that a pandemic was on the horizon or that coverage for such an eventuality was indicated for Plaintiff's business. Thus, even to the extent that Gallagher's alleged representations created an additional duty with respect to procuring coverage for business interruption, there are no allegations that extend that additional duty to procuring coverage for loss arising out of the pandemic." (*Id.* at 6.) The Court cited and quoted a few of the many court decisions finding that the COVID-19 pandemic is "unprecedented" and "the entire world" was unprepared for it. (*Id.*)

C. The amended complaint

The Court gave Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, but most of the amendment² lacks any substance at all. Some allegations were simply moved. Other changes were meaningless word substitutions: "Gallagher boasted" became "Gallagher represented"; "Gallagher bragged" became "Gallagher affirmed"; and "Gallagher touted" became "Gallagher affirmatively stated."

Plaintiffs also added vague and generic assertions about what Gallagher supposedly "should have known." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 93.) The amended complaint alleges that in light of "Zika, Ebola, MERS, and SARS," as well as a 2006 publication by a private insurance consultancy (the Insurance Service Organization, which is not alleged to have any connection to Gallagher), Gallagher should have known about "the potential of a pandemic causing significant losses to businesses," including hair salons. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44, 82-83, 86-91, 93.) Gallagher also allegedly should have known that unidentified "insurance products" that covered losses due to viruses were "available." (*Id.* ¶¶ 84-85, 120.)

The amendment did make one substantive change. Plaintiff's theory of this case, as admitted in the original complaint, is that Plaintiff was pleased with its *prior* property insurance policy, which supposedly covered business interruption losses due to viruses, but Gallagher steered Plaintiff to the Continental policy and thereby "created a massive fissure in Plaintiff's property coverage," by providing "less coverage to Plaintiff than Plaintiff already had with its prior broker and policy." (Compl., Ex. B, ¶¶ 56, 99.) That theory suffered from the flaw of being completely false. As Gallagher explained in its first demurrer, Plaintiff's prior policy contained an explicit *exclusion* for losses caused by "[a]ny virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease." (Demurrer, Ex. C, at 1, 5-7.) Plaintiff was *never* covered for losses caused by viruses, so Gallagher did Plaintiff no harm by helping it obtain the Continental policy, which at least does *not* contain an explicit *exclusion* for viruses.

² For the Court's convenience, the original complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit B, Gallagher's original Demurrer is attached as Exhibit C, and Plaintiff's Opposition to Gallagher's original Demurrer is attached as Exhibit D.

The amended complaint does not apologize for the original complaint's false statements to the Court. In fact, the amended complaint does not mention the prior policy at all. Plaintiff has simply deleted it. But Plaintiff is still—inexplicably—pursuing a claim against Gallagher. Even though Plaintiff did not previously have coverage for viruses, and never discussed with Gallagher any interest in obtaining new coverage for viruses, Plaintiff still contends it was Gallagher's job to get a policy that covered viruses.

III. ARGUMENT

A plaintiff must make allegations that are "factual and specific, not vague or conclusory" to establish each element of a cause of action. *Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians' Serv.*, 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 43, 44 (2000). The elements of a professional negligence claim are (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached it, and (3) the breach caused the plaintiff an injury and (4) damages. *Jones v. Grewe*, 189 Cal. App. 3d 950, 954 (1987). The amended complaint fails to plead both breach and causation of an injury.

A. Gallagher did not breach any duty.

1. Gallagher procured the insurance Plaintiff requested.

As the Court's decision recognized, "Insurance brokers owe a limited duty to their clients, which is only 'to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in *procuring the insurance requested by an insured*." Pac. Rim Mech. Contractors v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. W., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1278, 1283 (2012) (emphasis added). This limited duty of care "does *not* include the obligation to procure a policy affording the client complete liability protection." Jones, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 956 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff asked Gallagher to procure a property insurance policy. Plaintiff admits that Gallagher did. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) Gallagher therefore fulfilled its limited duty under California law.

Plaintiff alleges that Gallagher should have known of the risk of a pandemic, and of the harm a pandemic might do to the business of a hair salon. But an insurance broker has "no duty to affirmatively advise an individual seeking insurance about different or additional coverage," Murray v. UPS Capital Ins. Agency, 54 Cal. App. 5th 628, 639 (2020) (emphasis added), or to "advise insureds regarding the sufficiency of their coverage." Casa Colina v. Hartford Fire Ins., 2020 WL 7388426, *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020). The preposterous idea that Gallagher should

have predicted COVID-19, which the Court's decision already rejected, is irrelevant to Gallagher's limited duty under the law.

The limits of the duty under California law can be seen clearly in the Court of Appeals' decision in *Fitzpatrick*, which held that an insurance broker "does not have a duty to volunteer to an insured that the latter should procure additional or different insurance coverage." *Fitzpatrick v. Hayes*, 57 Cal App. 4th 916, 927 (1997). In *Fitzpatrick*, the plaintiffs claimed their agent had a duty to advise about umbrella coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. They had worked with the agent for 20 years, they "relied on [the agent] to advise [them] concerning adequate coverage," and the agent said the plaintiffs' automobile policy limits "should be about right." *Id.* at 919, 928. In addition, the agent knew the plaintiffs qualified for an umbrella policy that would have increased policy limits without substantially increasing the premium. *Id.* at 919. But the court nonetheless held the agent had *no* duty to advise on extra coverage. *Id.* at 927-28.

The insurance agent in *Fitzpatrick knew* that cheap umbrella coverage was available and *knew* that drivers always risk accidents, but that did not alter the agent's duties under California law. Similarly, Gallagher was not responsible for telling Plaintiff to consider *any* particular coverage, much less to recommend coverage for a pandemic that this Court's decision acknowledges is without precedent.³

If a duty were placed on insurance brokers to advise about every possible risk, and brokers were then held liable for anything within human imagination that was left off the list, it would turn brokers into insurers for risks that insureds *never* thought were covered and *never* paid to cover. An unprecedented pandemic is no time to entertain a "theory of relief [that] is a major departure from established California [insurance] law." *Plan Check Downtown III*, 2020 WL 5742712 at *7; see

³ If this indisputable fact requires additional citations, they are easy to find. *E.g., Rowan v. Kirkpatrick*, 54 Cal. App. 5th 289, 296 (2020) ("we acknowledge the unprecedented nature of the circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic"); *Plan Check Downtown III v. Amguard Ins.*, 2020 WL 5742712, *7 (C.D. Cal.) (recognizing COVID-19 as an "unprecedented pandemic"); *United States v. Garcia-Morales*, 2020 WL 2218955, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Cal.) ("The Court recognizes that the COVID-19 pandemic presents significant and unprecedented public health concerns"); *Rao v. Apple*, 2020 WL 3616317, at *3 (N.D. Cal.) ("The COVID-19 pandemic has had far-reaching and unprecedented consequences globally").

also Jones, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 957 (rejecting a duty that "would in effect make the [broker] a blanket insurer for his principal."). Gallagher was responsible only for helping Plaintiff secure a property insurance policy—policies that courts routinely hold do not cover business interruption losses from COVID-19⁴—and that is what Gallagher did. Plaintiff cannot allege Gallagher breached its limited duty, so this demurrer should be sustained.

2. Gallagher owed Plaintiff no additional duty.

Plaintiff asserts that Gallagher owed an additional duty of care beyond the limited duty that brokers ordinarily owe. "Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law for the court." *Jones*, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 954. A complaint that fails to allege facts sufficient to show that a duty of care is owed is "fatally defective." Id.

As the Court's decision recognized, an insurance broker owes an additional duty "when—but *only when*—one of the following three things happens": (1) "the agent misrepresents the nature, extent or scope of the coverage being offered or provided"; (2) "there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular type or extent of coverage"; or (3) "the agent assumes an additional duty by either express agreement or by 'holding himself out' as having expertise in a given field of insurance being sought by the insured." Fitzpatrick, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 927 (emphasis added). None of those situations are present here.

(a) Gallagher made no misrepresentation.

⁴ E.g., Pappy's Barber Shops v. Farmers Grp., 2020 WL 5500221, at *6 (S.D. Cal.) (no direct

at *5 (C.D. Cal.) (impaired economic use of property is not physical loss or damage); Henry's Louisiana Grill v. Allied Ins., 2020 WL 5938755, at *6 (N.D. Ga.) (Governor's order closing

physical loss or damage); Hillcrest Optical v. Continental Ins., 2020 WL 6163142, at * 6-8 (S.D.

Ala.) (same); Seifert v. IMT Ins., 2020 WL 6120002, at *3 (D. Minn.) (COVID-19 losses "fail to fall within the permissible realm of 'direct physical loss'"); 10E v. Travelers Indem., 2020 WL 5359653,

The Court held that the original complaint "does not allege that Gallagher made any misrepresentation about the coverage being offered under the subject Policy." (Ex. A at 5.) Plaintiff did not add to the amended complaint any allegation about a misrepresentation. Instead, the amended

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not cause a direct physical loss).

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restaurant did not create a direct physical loss); Infinity Exhibits v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2020 WL 5791583, at *5 (M.D. Fla.) (no direct physical loss or damage); Malaube v. Greenwich Ins., 2020 WL 5051581, at *9 (S.D. Fla.) (civil authority orders to close restaurant did

complaint, like the original complaint, alleges that Gallagher "never provided Plaintiff with details of, or explained any aspect of coverage, limits, or exclusions" in the Continental policy, and it admits the parties "never ... discussed coverage about viruses or communicable diseases." (Am. Compl. ¶ 102; see also Compl. ¶ 85.) Those are clear admissions that Gallagher never made any misleading statement of fact about the policy or its coverage. Casa Colina, 2020 WL 7388426, at *3 (dismissing broker negligence claim because plaintiffs admitted "they never discussed with [their broker] whether their insurance would provide coverage for a pandemic-induced closure").

(b) Plaintiff did not request coverage for viruses.

Plaintiff alleges that Gallagher "failed to disclose" the policy's lack of coverage for viruses and "failed to advise" Plaintiff about it. (Am. Compl. ¶ 123.) But for Gallagher to have an additional duty to advise, as this Court held, Plaintiff must have made "a request or inquiry ... for a particular type or extent of coverage." *Fitzpatrick*, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 927. "[I]n the ordinary case, the onus is . . . squarely on the insured to inform the agent of the insurance he requires." *Wallman v. Suddock*, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1288, 1309 (2011).

In order to state a claim, Plaintiff "would need to allege that [it] specifically requested a policy that would require coverage in the event [its] business was interrupted by a viral outbreak, or directly inquired about whether their policy provided such coverage." *Casa Colina*, 2020 WL 7388426, at *3 (dismissing because the insured and the broker "never discussed the specific topic"). Here, just as in *Casa Colina*, Plaintiff and Gallagher "never ... discussed coverage about viruses or communicable diseases." (Am. Compl. ¶ 102.) Gallagher therefore had no duty to obtain coverage for viruses or advise about it.

(c) Gallagher did not take on any additional duty.

An insurance broker may also take on an additional duty by expressly agreeing to or by holding itself out as an expert in a particular, specialized field of insurance. The amended complaint fails to allege either one.

The Court's decision explained, "[e]xpress agreements are generally associated with a broker's agreement to service a policy by keeping coverage in force and notifying the insured of a cancellation." (Ex. A at 5.) The amended complaint does not allege any such agreement between

Plaintiff and Gallagher. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Gallagher's sales pitch "expressly stated" Gallagher "conducted a coverage and limit review, analyzed Plaintiff's risk retention—Coverage Gaps, and promised . . . it would create coverage checklists and conduct loss analysis." (Am. Compl. ¶ 81.) In other words, the amended complaint simply repeats the very same failed allegations from the original complaint. (Ex. A at 5 (quoting Compl. ¶ 77).) As the Court's decision explained, "An agreement to monitor risks and update coverage would not implicate a duty to advise Plaintiff of the potential loss that could arise out of a pandemic." (*Id.*) Once more, Plaintiff and Gallagher "never ... discussed coverage about viruses or communicable diseases" (Am. Compl. ¶ 102), so they cannot possibly have reached an agreement on that subject.

The amended complaint also alleges that Gallagher "held itself out" as an expert "in business insurance and risk management" and "in ensuring there were no gaps in the coverage." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 128; see also id. ¶¶ 9, 124.) But as the Court's decision explained, "expertise in insurance and risk management and in 'uncovering and closing coverage gaps' is too vague to trigger a duty to procure a policy that would cover business income loss arising out of a pandemic." (Ex. A at 5.) The Court of Appeals has likewise held that allegations about a broker's "general superior knowledge regarding coverages" are insufficient to show that the broker can be "deemed a specialist" that owes an additional duty. Murray, 54 Cal. App. 5th at 648. A broker that holds itself out "as an expert in insurance matters" owes no more than the limited duty that all insurance brokers owe. Wallman, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1300–01; see also Hartford Casualty Ins. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 220 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ("isolated, generalized statements are not the type of 'holding out' for which California law imposes an elevated duty of care on insurance agents").

Under California law, to create an additional duty, a broker must hold itself out as expert in a *specialized area of insurance*. The Court of Appeals has, for example, recognized the possibility of an additional duty that arises out of claims of expertise in marine inland insurance, or in the insurance needs of dealerships that install spray-on linings for pickup truck beds. *Murray*, 54 Cal. App. 5th 628; *Williams v. Hilb, Rogal & Hobbs Ins. Servs. of Cal.*, 177 Cal. App. 4th 624, 637 (2009); *see also Casa Colina*, 2020 WL 7388426, at *4 ("customized insurance packages specifically for rehabilitative and medical-surgical facilities"). By contrast, Plaintiff does not allege

that Gallagher held itself as being a specialist in procuring a specific type of insurance for hair salons. Plaintiff wanted, and Gallagher agreed to help it find, an ordinary property insurance policy.

The amended complaint tries to distract from its inability to make the required allegations by asserting repeatedly that Gallagher said it would provide Plaintiff with "[g]lobal access to thousands of specialists who understand your diverse exposures." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92, 96, 127.) But that allegation comes straight out of the original complaint (¶ 80), and Plaintiff emphasized its significance when opposing Gallagher's demurrer (Opp., Ex. D, at 3, 5 (twice), 7), so repeating it in the amended complaint cannot overcome the Court's ruling. In addition, that statement was made on a generic presentation slide (Am. Compl. Ex. A at second-to-last page) that had nothing to do with hair salons or particular types of insurance. It was exactly the sort of generalized statement of insurance expertise that the Court of Appeals held in *Murray* and *Wallman* could not establish a broker owed any additional duty. And even if Gallagher *had* held itself out as having expertise that created a heightened duty, "this expertise would not allow them to predict Plaintiff[] would require coverage for a once-in-a-lifetime viral pandemic." *Casa Colina*, 2020 WL 7388426, at *4.

Finally, the amended complaint alleges that Gallagher should have known the COVID-19 pandemic was coming, because there have been other viral outbreaks, such as Ebola and SARS—none of which shut down businesses across the U.S. or around the world. The amended complaint also relies on a 2006 document by an insurance consultancy (with no alleged connection to Gallagher), which proposes that insurers use insurance policy language to explicitly exclude coverage for losses caused by viruses. *All* of those allegations, about the other diseases and the 2006 document, come out of Plaintiff's opposition to Gallagher's prior demurrer—the demurrer the Court's ruling sustained—so it is not new material in the amended complaint.

Plaintiff also misunderstands the significance of the 2006 document. It states that "insurers employing such [property insurance] policies may face claims [for losses caused by viruses] in which there are efforts to expand coverage and to create sources of recovery for such losses, contrary to policy intent." (Am. Compl. ¶ 89 (emphasis added).) The point of proposing an explicit exclusion for viruses was to prevent policies from being misread to cover losses that they were never intended or understood to cover. For all of these reasons, this demurrer should be sustained.

B. Gallagher caused Plaintiff no injury.

The amended complaint also fails to plead that Gallagher caused any injury. As explained above, Plaintiff admitted in its original complaint that it was pleased with its prior insurance policy, and it attempted to pin liability on Gallagher for creating a "massive fissure" in coverage by not obtaining that same great coverage. (Compl. ¶ 56.) But the truth is now known: the prior policy was clearly worse for Plaintiff than the Continental policy on the subject of viruses, because it had an explicit exclusion for losses they cause. Thus, in helping Plaintiff obtain the Continental policy, Gallagher cannot have harmed Plaintiff. The amended complaint tries to hide this massive fissure in Plaintiff's case by simply deleting all of the original complaint's admissions.

Although an amended pleading may supersede a prior pleading, "a well-established exception to this general rule applies 'where an amended complaint attempts to avoid defects set forth in a prior complaint by ignoring them." Foxen v. Carpenter, 6 Cal. App. 5th 284, 295 (2016). That is exactly what happened here. The Court may therefore "examine the prior complaint to ascertain whether the amended complaint is merely a sham" because "[a] pleader may not attempt to breathe life into a complaint by omitting relevant facts which made his previous complaint defective." Id.; see also Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber, 158 Cal. App. 4th 950, 957 (2008) ("A plaintiff may not discard factual allegations of a prior complaint, or avoid them by contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading."). Even though Plaintiff now prefers to forget its admissions from the original complaint, this Court should recognize that they show Gallagher caused no injury.

The lack of injury is also shown by Plaintiff's failure to allege facts showing that even if Gallagher had suggested coverage for viruses, there were identifiable, affordable policies that would have covered Plaintiff's losses. Gallagher made this argument in its demurrer to the original complaint, which alleged only that "such coverage would have been specifically available to Plaintiff." (Compl. ¶ 108.) The Court did not need to reach the issue in its decision, and the amended complaint adds just one allegation: "Such products include, but are not limited to, specific pandemic coverage policies, communicable disease coverage extensions, and crisis event management coverage extensions." (Am. Compl. ¶ 84.) That still vague and conclusory assertion cannot help

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Plaintiff state a claim. Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43-44; George v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 201 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1120 (2011).

The amended complaint still does not identify a single specific property insurance policy that would have covered Plaintiff's losses, much less one that fit within Plaintiff's insurance budget. If one existed, it should be easy to find, but as explained above numerous courts have found that ordinary property insurance policies simply do not cover business interruption losses from COVID-19. Plaintiff's continued failure to "allege that any such insurance coverage for pandemic-related government closures existed prior to March 2020" is fatal to its claim. Soundview Cinemas v. Great Am. Ins. Group, Slip Op. at 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021) (attached to Gallagher's Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A). Without that allegation, the amended complaint fails to plead that Gallagher caused Plaintiff any injury by not securing a specific, affordable policy, and this demurrer should be sustained.

C. Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend.

Plaintiff has already amended the complaint, after the Court's clear ruling identifying the defects in the original. As explained above, the amended complaint is no better. Plaintiff has now proved it cannot state any claim against Gallagher, so this demurrer should be sustained without further leave to amend. Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, 42 Cal. 3d 481, 486 (1986).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should sustain this demurrer and enter final judgment for Gallagher.

Dated: February 16, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

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