Planning and Execution of Port Visit to Da Nang, Vietnam

Background and General Planning for the Port Visit

On November 1, 2019, Captain Brett Crozier, USN, assumed command of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) (TR).1

On January 17, 2020, TR departed San Diego, California for deployment.2

The Da Nang, Vietnam port visit was scheduled for March 5th through 9th and was the second port visit of TR’s deployment.3

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2 CNAP Statement dtd 13 May 20
3 TRNOTE 5050 TR and CVW-11 Liberty Plan dtd 22 Feb 20; CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
4. The Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF), the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Embassy Vietnam were involved in the Da Nang port visit planning.4

5. In the Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet (C7F) area of operations (AOR), the usual port visit planning process is as follows:5
   a. CPF sends a Planning Order to C7F.
   b. C7F conducts a risk assessment, determines which asset will go to which port, and determines which carrier strike group (CSG) or expeditionary strike group (ESG) will conduct the missions.
   c. C7F provides CPF with a suggested plan and CPF identifies ports for strategic engagement.

6. INDOPACOM directed that the approval for the Da Nang port visit be held at the INDOPACOM level due to the potential impact of COVID-19.6
   a. C7F provided a brief to CPF staff on the risk of the Da Nang port visit and CPF called C7F directly to ensure that all mitigation requirements from the C7F TASKORD were met, to include such measures as temperature checks and screenings.7
   b. CPF’s final risk analysis was that the Da Nang port visit was low risk based off of World Health Organization (WHO), Center for Disease Control (CDC), and Vietnamese government inputs.8
   c. On March 4, 2020, CPF forwarded a final port visit decision recommendation to INDOPACOM recommending to go forward with the Da Nang port visit based on CPF’s final risk analysis.9
   d. Commander, INDOPACOM concurred in the recommendation to move forward with the port visit.10

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4 TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
5 CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20; (S) CPF EXORD DTG 081135Z JAN 20; CPF EXORD DTG 252242Z JAN 20; (S) CPF OPORD 201, TAB A to APPENDIX 36 to ANNEX C(C-38-A-5)
6 CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20; C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20; (S) CPF COVID 19 TR VNM PVST Decision Slide 25FEB2020-1
7 C7F Vietnam Port Visit Decision Slide of 25 Feb 20; CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20
8 Email - CPF Surgeon to TR SMO and C7F Surgeon - Discussion with CDC Director dtd 26 Feb 20; INDOPACOM J07 Country Health Risk to Force for COVID-19 dtd 4 Mar 20; CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20
9 Email (SIPR) - CPF to USINDOPACOM - DECISION: Theater Posture Operations dtd 4 Mar 20; CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20
10 CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20
7. Prior to the port visit in Da Nang, TR sent an advance detachment to Da Nang to prepare for the ship’s arrival.11
   a. The Advance Detachment travel was modified to avoid layovers in Korea because Vietnam began a policy of placing all travelers from China and Korea into quarantine for 16 days as a matter of course.12
   b. Members of the Advance Detachment attended several meetings with the Da Nang People’s Committee and COVID-19 was the primary concern discussed during the course of those meetings.13
   c. The Da Nang People’s Committee showcased the steps that they had taken to mitigate COVID-19 in the country and relayed that there were no active cases of COVID-19 in Vietnam, all prior cases had been located in the northern part of the country, and that there had never been any cases of COVID-19 in Da Nang.14
   d. The Da Nang People’s Committee showcased their public health campaign that they used to educate the population on how the disease is spread, proper hygiene, and reliable sources of information.15
   e. As a precautionary measure, the Da Nang People’s Committee requested the cancellation or limitation of participation for large public gatherings.16
   f. The Advance Detachment provided daily formal updates to the TR’s Executive Officer (XO) via email and phone call. The Senior Medical Officer (SMO) was cc’d on the daily update emails.17

8. TR was the second aircraft carrier to pull into Vietnam since the Vietnam War.18
9. USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) had previously visited Da Nang in March 2018.19
10. TR’s visit commemorated the 25th anniversary of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Vietnam.20

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11 ADVON Daily Report dtd 27 Feb 20
12 ADVON Daily Report dtd 27 Feb 20; TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20
13 ADVON Daily Report dtd 27 Feb 20
14 ADVON Daily Report dtd 27 Feb 20
15 ADVON Daily Report dtd 27 Feb 20
16 ADVON Daily Report dtd 27 Feb 20
17 ADVON Daily Reports dtd 27 Feb 20, 28 Feb 20, 2 Mar 20, and 3 Mar 20; TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20
18 TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
19 TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
20 CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
11. Presence in the Pacific region is routine and has helped maintain peace for more than 70 years.\textsuperscript{21}

12. Operating in the region supports regional security, stability, and prosperity.\textsuperscript{22}

13. Operating in accordance with international laws, rules, standards, and norms across the region enables the United States to reassure our allies and partners, and keeps global trade flowing.\textsuperscript{23}

Other Coinciding Engagements

14. On February 7, 2020, TR arrived in Guam and USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) (BKH) arrived in Saipan for scheduled port visits.\textsuperscript{24}

15. On February 10, 2020, TR and BKH departed Guam and Saipan.\textsuperscript{25}

16. On February 15, 2020, Carrier Strike Group Nine (CSG-9) and USS America (LHA 6) ESG conducted Expeditionary Strike Force operations in C7F AOR.\textsuperscript{26}

17. Between February 22, 2020 and March 8, 2020, the USS America, the USS Green Bay (LPD 20) (GBY), and the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) (BLR) were in Thailand to support COBRA GOLD, a multinational combined joint training exercise.\textsuperscript{27}

18. At the time of COBRA GOLD, Thailand was rated “yellow” by the INDOPACOM risk matrix signifying moderate risk where COVID-19 cases occur in the community without known contacts or exposures and/or with small outbreak clusters, swiftly handled by public health interventions that limit disease transmission.\textsuperscript{28}

19. Over 4,500 personnel were involved in COBRA GOLD. None of the personnel who participated in COBRA GOLD contracted COVID-19 as a result.\textsuperscript{29}

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\textsuperscript{21} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{22} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{23} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{25} Email - CCGS-9 BWC - TR Command Investigation dtd 12 May 20
\textsuperscript{28} C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20; PACFLT Country Public Health Risk for COVID-19 dtd 27 Feb 20; PACFLT Operational Risk Matrix for COVID-19 dtd 27 Feb 20
\textsuperscript{29} Email - C7F COVID Response Cell - Inquiry Into 7th FLT Port Visits dtd 15 May 20; C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
20. The week prior to the Da Nang port visit, CPF cancelled all South Korea port visits due to the outbreak of COVID in Korea.\(^{30}\)

21. On March 14, 2020, BLR arrived for a port visit in Singapore.\(^{31}\)

22. At the time of BLR’s arrival in Singapore, Singapore was rated “yellow” by the INDOPACOM risk matrix signifying moderate risk where COVID-19 cases occur in the community without known contacts or exposures and/or with small outbreak clusters, swiftly handled by public health interventions that limit disease transmission.\(^{32}\)

23. No BLR Sailors contracted COVID-19 as a result of the Singapore visit.\(^{33}\)

**Planning and Preparation for COVID-19 Prior to Da Nang Port Visit**

24. On December 31, 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission in China, reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, Hubei Province which was eventually identified as novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).\(^{34}\)

25. On January 13, 2020, officials confirmed a case of COVID-19 in Thailand, the first recorded case outside of China.\(^{35}\)

26. On January 20, 2020, TR XO sent an email to TR leadership reminding them that only six weeks remained on the Da Nang port visit.\(^{36}\)

27. On January 23, 2020, there were two confirmed COVID-19 cases reported in Vietnam.\(^{37}\)

28. C7F began tracking COVID-19 planning and socialization began at the end of January. On January 25, 2020, C7F began sharing their COVID-19 quad slide with all CTF surgeons.\(^{38}\)

29. Around January 26, 2020, COVID-19 information began being included on the CSG-9 daily intelligence brief.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{30}\) CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20

\(^{31}\) Email – C7F COVID Response Cell– Response to RFI dtd 15 May 20

\(^{32}\) Email – C7F COVID Response Cell– Response to RFI dtd 15 May 20; C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20; INDOPACOM J07 Country Health Risk to Force for COVID-19 dtd 4 Mar 20; PACFLT Operational Risk Matrix for COVID-19 dtd 27 Feb 20

\(^{33}\) C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20


\(^{36}\) Email - TR XO to TR Leadership - Vietnam Planning dtd 20 Jan 20


\(^{38}\) C7F Surgeon Statement dtd 23 May 20

\(^{39}\) CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
30. On January 30, 2020, the WHO Director General declared the COVID-19 outbreak a "Public Health Emergency of International Concern."\(^{40}\)

31. Between February 2, 2020 and February 22, 2020 TR had an outbreak of norovirus.\(^{41}\)

32. Noroviruses are very contagious and are the most common cause of gastroenteritis in the U.S. – symptoms include diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, and stomach cramping.\(^{42}\)

33. Sometime soon after February 2, 2020, due to the norovirus outbreak, TR began a "bleach-a-palooza" campaign aimed at the eradicating the norovirus, which included education through the Departmental Leading Chief Petty Officers (DLCPO) and the TR SMO about hand washing, cleaning the hard surfaces with bleach twice a day, and distributing hand sanitizers throughout the key areas on the ship, including the galleys.\(^{43}\)

34. On February 4, 2020 INDOPACOM directed CPF to execute its pandemic plan in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in the INDOPACOM AOR and the C7F Fleet Surgeon provided CPF a COVID-19 concept of operations (CONOP).\(^{44}\)

35. In early February, the C7F Chief of Staff (COS) established a COVID-19 working group in the maritime operations center that dealt with nothing but COVID-19 issues.\(^{45}\)

36. In February, C7F had begun planning for a COVID-19 outbreak on a ship operating in the C7F AOR:\(^{46}\)
   a. Okinawa, Yokosuka, and Guam were discussed as options for ships to pull in to port if needed.\(^{47}\)
   b. White Beach in Okinawa was deemed the best choice by C7F, but C7F identified that it would be difficult politically to bring a ship with COVID-19 cases to Okinawa.\(^{48}\)

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\(^{41}\) TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20; Email: CSG-9 – Response to RFI dtd 17 May 20

\(^{42}\) NTRP 4-02.10

\(^{43}\) TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20

\(^{44}\) Naval Message (SIPR): USINDOPACOM, Response To Novel Coronavirus EXORD DTG 040649Z FEB 20

\(^{45}\) C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20

\(^{46}\) C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20

\(^{47}\) C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20

\(^{48}\) C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
c. Yokosuka was deemed to have limited capacity in the ability to bring people on and off of the ships.49

d. C7F determined that Guam was a good candidate, but would also be difficult politically to pull a ship with COVID-19 cases into Guam.50

e. However, C7F determined that Guam was the only location in the C7F AOR where an aircraft carrier could pull into port if that aircraft carrier had COVID-19 outbreak.51

37. On February 13, 2020, C7F Surgeon provided the C7F Force Health Protection against COVID-19 CONOP to the CPF Surgeon Office.52


39. As a result of the TASKORD, TR Medical Department prepared a CSG brief and routed it to TR leadership.54

40. On February 16, 2020, C7F published Fragmentary Order 001 to TASKORD 20-057, revising disease surveillance and screening requirements due to updated country risk.55

41. On February 19, 2020, C7F Surgeon provided a Guam-specific COVID-19 Shipboard Case Scheme of Maneuver to CPF Surgeon Office.56

42. On February 22, 2020, TR issued an initial liberty plan for Da Nang with no mention of COVID-19.57

43. As of February 25, 2020, there had been 16 confirmed cases of COVID-19 reported in Vietnam, all located 30 miles outside of Hanoi, and more than 450 miles from Da Nang and all individuals had successfully recovered and had been discharged from the hospitals.58

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40 C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
41 C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
50 C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
51 C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
52 Email - C7F COVID Response Cell – Response to RFI dtd 15 May 20
53 Email - C7F COVID Response Cell - Response to RFI dtd 12 May 20
54 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
55 Email - C7F COVID Response Cell - Response to RFI dtd 12 May 20
56 Email - C7F COVID Response Cell - Inquiry Into 7th FLT Port Visits dtd 15 May 20
57 TRNOTE 5050 TR and CVW-11 Liberty Plan dtd 22 Feb 20
44. On February 25, 2020, Vietnam suspended entry for all travelers from COVID-19 affected areas.59

45. On February 26, 2020, the CPF Surgeon had a discussion with the U.S. CDC Country Director in Vietnam (USCDCVN) who informed the CPF Surgeon that there was no direct or indirect evidence to suggest an undetected COVID-19 outbreak in the country and that the USCDCVN believed that the port visit was “low risk.”60

46. On February 27, 2020, Vietnamese media reported that the CDC removed Vietnam from its list of areas experiencing widespread or sustained community transmission of COVID-19.61

47. In preparation for the growing pandemic, on February 29th, C7F requested support from Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit (NEPMU) teams, with equipment from Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC) for forward deployable preventative medicine units to mitigate the potential outbreak of COVID-19 aboard America Expeditionary Strike Group (AMA ESG) and CSG-9 ships. Based on this assessment C7F concluded that COBRA GOLD was a higher risk than Vietnam and the medical support was deployed to BLR and AMA ESG.62

48. Utilizing the Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 4-02.10, CSG-9 conducted a tabletop exercise on COVID-19 to determine how CSG-9 would respond to a COVID-19 case aboard TR.63

49. Prior to the Da Nang port visit, TR crew received training on COVID-19:
   a. The SMO directed the medical training officer, who is the ICU nurse, to draft basic guidance for COVID-19 to be included in the updated liberty brief.64
   b. The Medical Department presented the script, recorded the guidance, and drafted the slides in the brief utilizing CDC guidance, Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center's (NMCPHC) Guidance for Underway Evaluation and Management of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus and C7F guidance.65

60 Email - CPF Surgeon to TR SMO and C7F Surgeon - Discussion with CDC Director dtd 26 Feb 20
62 Email - C7F COVID Response Cell - Response to RFI dtd 12 May 20; C7F Surgeon Statement dtd 23 May 20
63 CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20; CSG-9 COS Statement dtd 18 May 20
64 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
65 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
c. The liberty brief was promulgated throughout the ship prior to the arrival in Da Nang via the ship’s closed-circuit television (CCTV) channel and in-house magazine.\(^6^6\)

d. The liberty brief had two slides on COVID-19 outlining that: COVID-19 is a virus spread mainly person to person when an infected person coughs or sneezes; 82% of COVID-19 cases are classified as a mild illness; it directed any Sailor experiencing fever, body aches, cough, [or feels] sick to report to “medical” at Fleet Landing prior to boarding the ship; and that the CDC does not recommend that people who are well wear a facemask to protect themselves from COVID-19."\(^6^7\)

e. Concerns about COVID-19 were also discussed at various meetings, including Heads of Department (HOD)/DLCPO meetings and quarters, as well as in emails that went out to the entire crew.\(^6^8\)

50. The Medical Department created a plan, although not a formal instruction that prepared for the possibility individuals would return to the ship from the Da Nang port visit who were infected with COVID-19.\(^6^9\)

a. The plan was outlined in a PowerPoint brief that the TR SMO discussed with the TR XO, TR CMC, the HODs, and the TR Supply Officer.\(^7^0\)

b. The Medical Department scouted out places that would function as quarantine or isolation berthing onboard the ship with a goal to locate areas that had two hatches between the main area of the ship and the isolation or quarantine area.\(^7^1\)

c. Once an area was identified as a potential isolation or quarantine area, the Medical Department had briefings with the affected HOD should medical have to utilize those spaces over which that HOD has control.\(^7^2\)

d. The Medical Department then identified the “flow” of services to the spaces and determined how medical personnel would proceed to and from those spaces, how food would be delivered, and how laundry would be cleaned.\(^7^3\)

\(^{66}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\(^{67}\) TR Da Nang PVST Crew Brief dtd Mar 20
\(^{68}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\(^{69}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\(^{70}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\(^{71}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\(^{72}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\(^{73}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
e. The TR SMO emailed the COVID-19 Fleet Forces Screening Form and the TR COVID-19 screening plan to HODs and DLCPOs, which outlined that all personnel boarding the TR will be screened for COVID-19 symptoms prior to boarding the ship, and again seven days after getting underway.74

f. The TR Da Nang Medical Treatment Plan called for inbound carrier onboard delivery (COD) personnel to receive department-level screening in which anyone who screened positive for flu-like illnesses were sent to medical for evaluation immediately.75

g. The TR leadership (TR XO, TR Command Master Chief (CMC), and TR SMO) made initial preparations for potential quarantine quarters aboard ship by identifying appropriate berthing compartments and discussing the general plan for execution.76

h. The three quarantine options discussed were:
   (1) DV Row: six rooms (two-person racks), cots for additional patients
   (2) Berthing: Chief Overflow Berthing (aft mess deck); admin male berthing; medical quiet room (4 racks-isolated head)
   (3) Brig: up to 20 individuals, not the most ideal.77

51. TR CO cancelled all planned medical and culinary professional exchanges scheduled for the Da Nang port visit as a result of recommendations of the TR Medical Department due to the potential risk of COVID-19 and exposure to high risk areas like hospitals or commonly used galleys both ashore and onboard the TR.78

52. On March 2, 2020, U.S. media outlets reported the first two U.S. deaths as a result of complications due to COVID-19, that some individuals can be asymptomatic, and that for the majority of individuals who do show symptoms of the virus, their symptoms tend to be mild fatigue and a low fever.”79

53. At the time of the port visit, there were no State Department, DoD, or CDC travel restrictions for U.S. citizens to Vietnam.80

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74 Email - TR SMO to HODs and DLCPOs – COVID-19 Screening for CSG-9 Sailors After a Port Visit dtd 03 Mar 20
75 Da Nang Medical Treatment Plan
76 TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
77 TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
78 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
79 “America Has Suffered Its First Coronavirus Deaths-and First Infections of Health Care Workers.” Advisory Board- Daily Briefing (02 Mar 20) https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2020/03/02/corona-deaths
80 INDOPACOM J07 Country Health Risk to Force for COVID-19 dtd 4 Mar 20
54. The March 4, 2020 INDOPACOM Country Health Risk to Force for COVID-19 indicated that Vietnam’s current risk status was “yellow,” signifying moderate risk where COVID-19 cases occur in the community without known contacts or exposures and/or with small outbreak clusters, swiftly handled by public health interventions that limit disease transmission. The risk level was projected, in seven days, to be “green,” signifying low risk classifying countries with no reported cases of COVID-19, or countries that have cases that were imported from another country, or countries that have isolated transmission exclusively attributed to travel, household contacts or healthcare settings.\(^{81}\)

55. On March 5, 2020, all reported cases of COVID-19 in Vietnam were reported as clear.\(^{82}\)

**The Da Nang Port Visit**

56. On March 2, 2020, TR’s prospective XO arrived aboard TR via a COD in order to effect turnover with the outgoing XO.\(^{83}\)

57. On March 3, 2020, TR facilitated two distinguished visitor (DV) daylight only embarks.\(^{84}\)
   a. The first DV embark was for 17 Vietnamese nominated by the Government of Vietnam.\(^{85}\)
   b. The second DV embark was for 14 U.S. country team members who planned the carrier port visit.\(^{86}\)
   c. TR sent medical representatives to screen the DVs who disembarked from the COD flights.\(^{87}\)
   d. The medical team used the COVID-19 Fleet Forces Screening Form that primarily asked about symptoms and recent travel.\(^{88}\)

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\(^{81}\) INDOPACOM J07 Country Health Risk to Force for COVID-19 dtd 4 Mar 20; PACFLT Operational Risk Matrix for COVID-19 dtd 27 Feb 20
\(^{83}\) TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
\(^{84}\) TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\(^{85}\) TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\(^{86}\) TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\(^{87}\) TR OPSO Statement dtd 18 May 20
\(^{88}\) TR OPSO Statement dtd 18 May 20
e. The DVs received a tour of the hangar bay, an aircraft elevator ride to the flight deck, a tour of the flight deck, and an aircraft elevator ride back to the hangar bay before departing.\textsuperscript{89}

f. Both of the DV tours lasted less than one hour.\textsuperscript{90}

58. On March 5, 2020 TR and BKH arrived in Da Nang.\textsuperscript{91}

59. The pilot wore a mask and gloves when he came aboard TR.\textsuperscript{92}

60. Upon arrival, a Vietnamese delegation formally received the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, CPF, Commander, Carrier Strike Group NINE (CCSG-9), TR CO, and the Commanding Officer, BKH – and the group posed for a photo pier side next to the BKH.\textsuperscript{93}

61. The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs then moderated the 60-minute press conference that was attended by more than 100 reporters and focused on the visit’s historical significance, the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral relationship, and naval operations in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{94}

62. The U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, CPF and CCSG-9 participated in the press conference with the Vietnamese Director of Da Nang Department of Foreign Affairs and the Vice Chairman of Da Nang People’s Committee.\textsuperscript{95}

63. The U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, CPF, and CCSG-9 attended office calls with the Chairman of the Da Nang People’s Committee and Vietnamese Commander of Navy Region 3.\textsuperscript{96}

64. TR was unable to support boat operations due to heavy swell in the harbor. As a result, approximately 1,000 people toured the BKH instead.\textsuperscript{97}

a. BKH implemented basic self-report screening procedures designed to turn away anyone who felt ill.\textsuperscript{98}
b. BKH did not use temperature checks of the individuals who toured the ship. 

c. Approximately 65 reporters received one hour of access to BKH for filming standups and capturing still imagery and b-roll footage.

d. Reporters toured BKH bridge, hangar bay, foc'sle, and aft missile deck.

e. Outlets in attendance included Reuters, Channel News Asia, Dat Viet Newspaper, Tuoi Tre Newspaper, VN Express, and Da Nang Newspaper.

65. The sea state in Da Nang made it difficult for the crew to depart and return to TR and many of the scheduled liberty boat trips between TR and Da Nang had been cancelled.

a. The unprotected harbor of Da Nang at anchorage caused difficulties with loading the crew on liberty launches.

b. Due to the sea state, the First Lieutenant had to collapse his duty sections into a port and starboard team to safely conduct stern barge operations.

c. High sea-states limited the ability of TR Sailors to maximize liberty events, resulting in many cancelled tours and community relation events.

d. Some morale, welfare, and recreation tours, professional exchanges and all sporting events were cancelled.

e. The U.S. Pacific Fleet band modified their performance schedule to support Vietnamese direction to refrain from large public gatherings due to concerns with COVID-19.

f. The band performed at the Vietnamese hosted dinner followed by the Charity Center Community Relations Project (COMREL), U.S. Pacific Fleet hosted reception, Hoa Mai Orphanage COMREL, and the Nguyen Huu Dinh Opera Theatre.
g. All three planned professional exchanges (air traffic controller, firefighting and meteorology) involving tours of TR were cancelled due to sea state and/or COVID-19 concerns.110

66. There were many precautions taken as a result of the heightened awareness of COVID-19 in Vietnam:
   a. Liberty boats and piers were disinfected by the Vietnamese government prior to being turned over to TR and BKH for use.111
   b. Vendors on the pier were curtailed and food vendors were cancelled.112
   c. TR and BKH Sailors were limited to Embassy-vetted locations and hotels.113
   d. Every crew member leaving the ship was screened by medical personnel and Vietnamese personnel conducted passive temperature checks using temperature scanners of anyone leaving TR outside of the liberty pier.114
   e. In Da Nang, there were signs at some of the businesses indicating they were closed due to “virus” or “closed due to staff illness.”115
   f. The Vietnamese government instituted temperature checks prior to going into some hotels and upon checking into some hotels.116

67. More than 100 CSG personnel and country team members fulfilled all the other COMREL obligations that had not been cancelled, included interacting with residents at the Vocational Charity Center, Dorothea’s Project Legacy Charity Center, Agent Orange Victims Center, Hoa Mai Orphanage and Dong A University.117

68. On March 7, 2020, the U.S. Pacific Fleet hosted a formal reception for approximately 400 guests.118
   a. The reception was originally scheduled to be held aboard TR, but due to concerns with safely transferring guests to and from the carrier because of an increased sea state – C7F approved the relocation to the Da Nang Golden Bay Hotel.119

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110 TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
111 TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20
112 TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20
113 TRNOTE 5050 TR and CVW-11 Liberty Plan dtd 22 Feb 20; TR SUPPO Statement dtd 18 May 20
114 TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20
115 TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20; TR Nurse Statement dtd 18 May 20
116 TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20
117 TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
118 CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
119 TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20; SUPPO Stmt dtd 18 May 20
b. If the reception had been held aboard TR, the guest list would have included approximately 600 attendees.\textsuperscript{120}

c. The hotel instituted self-screening measures and selective temperature checks outside of the hotel.\textsuperscript{121}

d. All staff at the hotel wore surgical-style masks.\textsuperscript{122}

e. CPF, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, and the Vice Chairman of the Da Nang People’s Committee provided formal remarks during the ceremony.\textsuperscript{123}

f. The Navy Band sang the Vietnamese national anthem as well as popular Vietnamese songs.\textsuperscript{124}

69. On March 7, 2020, a select group of 30 reporters still in the area were brought via liberty boat to TR for a tour of the hangar bay and flight deck. This was the only group able to get out to TR for a tour of the ship during port visit.\textsuperscript{125}

70. On March 8, 2020, the Government of Vietnam cancelled shipboard tours for 100 additional guests due to COVID-19 concerns.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{Notification of Close Contact (March 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th})}

71. On March 8, 2020, the U.S. Embassy notified TR/CSG-9 that Sailors may have been exposed to COVID-19 during a hotel stay in Da Nang where two British citizens tested positive for COVID-19.\textsuperscript{127}

72. On March 8, 2020, at the request of Da Nang city government, TR and BKH suspended liberty for remainder of the day.\textsuperscript{128}

a. An initial email was sent to the crew members that recalled all crew members to the TR.\textsuperscript{129}

b. A follow-up email went out that clarified that the recall was cancelled, but that once returning to TR, no one would disembark.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{120} CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
\textsuperscript{121} BKH CO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\textsuperscript{122} TR JUDGE Statement dtd 11 May 20; CCSG-9 Stmt dtd 15 May20
\textsuperscript{123} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{124} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{125} CSG-9 COS Statement dtd 18 May 20
\textsuperscript{126} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{127} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{128} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{129} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{130} TR AAR For 5-9 March Vietnam PVST dtd 17 Mar 20
73. On March 8, 2020, all tours/professional engagements were cancelled.\footnote{131}
74. On March 8, 2020, an emergency command center was set up in Strike Operations.\footnote{132}
75. On March 8, 2020, information was gathered to form a list of people who stayed at or had interactions with the Vanda Hotel grounds.\footnote{133}
76. TR leadership identified the location of 37 Sailors known to have been at the hotel and possibly come within six feet of the British citizens for more than 10 minutes.\footnote{134}
   a. Of the 37, 11 TR Sailors identified as having stayed, and still present, at the hotel were screened, tested on site and upon receipt of their negative test were released to TR for quarantine.\footnote{135}
   b. The 26 other TR Sailors identified as having stayed at the hotel were removed from TR to the pier, screened, tested on the pier by the Vietnamese Ministry of Health, and upon receipt of their negative test, returned to TR for quarantine.\footnote{136}
   c. Two additional Sailors reported to TR medical staff that they had also visited the hotel and were also tested by the Vietnamese Ministry of Health, and upon receipt of their negative test, returned to TR for quarantine.\footnote{137}
77. Upon returning to TR, all other crewmembers were screened via a verbal questionnaire.\footnote{138}

**Actions during Transit to and Arrival in Guam Departing Da Nang until the First Confirmed Case of COVID-19**

78. On March 9\textsuperscript{th}, TR got underway from anchorage in Da Nang Bay, Vietnam.\footnote{139}
79. As TR departed Da Nang, the 39 Sailors remained sequestered from the rest of the crew.\footnote{140}
80. TR CO addressed the decision to quarantine Sailors over the ship’s public address system (1MC); emphasizing that the quarantined Sailors were being monitored and there was no cause for alarm.  

81. TR Supply Department obtained food and water for the quarantined Sailors.

82. TR increased cleaning measures, including twice-daily use of a shipboard approved bleaching solution.

83. The crew generally referred to these cleaning evolutions as “bleach-a-palooza.”

84. The TR XO delivered daily reminders via 1MC to wash hands, maintain social distancing, and to avoid face touching.

85. The TR CO delivered reminders via 1MC to wash hands, maintain social distancing, and to avoid face touching every second day.

86. The TR XO passed COVID-19 mitigation effort information to the HODs for dissemination to the crew.

87. The TR Medical Department created a COVID-19 video, which played on loop on CCTV.

88. After departing Vietnam, the Medical Department directed departments to send Sailors to medical if they were experiencing influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms.

89. On March 9, 2020, the TR CO restricted self-service on the main galley lines. Self-service remained an option for other food selections including the salad bar. Specifically, no seats were removed, lines continued to form without six feet of separation between Sailors and condiments were available for common use.

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141 TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20
142 TR PAO Interview Summary dtd 23 May 20
143 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; AT1 Statement dtd 22 May 20
144 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20; HM3 Statement dtd 15 May 20; CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20; AT1 Statement dtd 22 May 20
145 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR RO Statement dtd 18 May 20
146 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR RO Statement dtd 18 May 20
147 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
148 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
149 CVW-11 Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20; TR PA Statement dtd 18 May 20
150 AME1 Statement dtd 13 May 20; CSC Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR SUPPO Statement dtd 18 May 20; CVW-11 Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20; Email - TR SMO to TR CO – Follow Up dtd 9 Mar 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
90. Following the Da Nang port visit, gyms, the main ship store, library, barbershops, and chapel services remained open for common use.\(^{151}\)

91. From the time the ship left Da Nang on March 9\(^{th}\) until March 23\(^{rd}\), seven COD flights originating out of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines brought a total of 29 passengers and COD detachment personnel to the carrier.\(^{152}\)

92. Utilizing the screening protocols required by the February 23, 2020 C7F Fragmentary Order, every individual arriving on TR via COD initially screened negative for COVID-19 symptoms.\(^{153}\)

93. Personnel arriving via COD to TR were required to stay on the flight deck and maintain physical distance with the ship’s crew.\(^{154}\)

94. NAVADMIN 064/20 issued on March 12, 2020, required social distancing wherein individuals were required to remain out of congregate settings, avoid mass gatherings, and maintain six feet or two meter distance from others when possible.\(^{155}\)

   a. The TR CO and TR XO believed guidance within relevant COVID-19 NAVADMINs translated little to deployed aircraft carriers.\(^{156}\)

   b. Social distancing was not observed on TR during the transit from Da Nang to Guam.\(^{157}\)

   c. The TR CO, TR XO, and TR SMO believed that social distancing would be impossible onboard an aircraft carrier.\(^{158}\)

   d. CCSG-9 did not provide formal, supplementary guidance to TR regarding COVID-19 mitigation.\(^{159}\)

95. Upon leaving Da Nang, BKH took the following steps:

   a. Sailors self-monitored for 14 days and were instructed to report to ship’s medical staff upon presentation of ILI symptoms.\(^{160}\)

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\(^{151}\) AME2 Statement dtd 16 May 20; CMC statement dtd 17 May 20; TR SUPPO statement dtd 18 May 20

\(^{152}\) COD Completed Travel Log/Manifest

\(^{153}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; COD Completed Travel Log/Manifest (Four Sailors later tested positive for COVID-19 on March 27th, March 28th, April 14th, April 21st.)

\(^{154}\) CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20

\(^{155}\) NAVADMIN 064/20 Navy Mitigation Measures in Response to Coronavirus Outbreak dtd 12 Mar 20

\(^{156}\) Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20

\(^{157}\) CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR RO Statement dtd 18 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; CSC Statement dtd 17 May 20; AT1 Statement dtd 22 May 20

\(^{158}\) TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20

\(^{159}\) Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; CVW-11 CAG Statement; CSG-9 COS Statement

\(^{160}\) Email - CSG-9 – Response to RFI dtd 24 May 20
b. Cleaning efforts were increased with focus on disinfecting high-contact touch areas with bleach and other cleaning solutions.  

c. Messaging was provided via the Plan of the Day, emails, and site TV on proper personal hygiene  

d. A COVID-19 response plan instruction was developed and the ship conducted an onboard outbreak response exercise  

96. BKH did not implement any social distancing measures onboard following the Da Nang port visit.  

97. On March 11, 2020, CAPT completed turnover with CAPT and officially assumed the role as TR XO.  


100. On March 11, 2020 personnel from the Biological Defense Research Directorate (BDRD) of the Naval Medical Research Center embarked on TR with specialized laboratory equipment for testing and diagnosing respiratory pathogens.  

101. On March 12, 2020, A-SN issued guidance on COVID-19 preventive measures, and restricted official and personal travel and PCS orders to, from, or through CDC Travel Health Notice (THN) Level 3 locations.  

102. On March 12, 2020, OPNAV issued guidance on preventive measures, travel, PCS, and liberty restrictions to CDC Level 3 locations, and reporting requirements.  

103. On March 13, 2020, the TR CO sent letters to family members indicating the ship had begun COVID-19 testing for select individuals.  

104. On March 13, 2020, OSD issued an order to stop travel within CONUS for all DoD military, civilians, and families.
105. On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States declared the COVID-19 outbreak a national emergency.\(^{173}\)

106. On March 14, 2020, the acting Secretary of the Navy (A-SN) issued a stop movement order for all DON personnel beginning March 16, 2020.\(^{174}\)

107. On March 14, 2020, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) issued a stop movement order for Permanent Change of Station and temporary duty orders, and authorized local leave only.\(^{175}\)

108. On March 14, 2020, members of the Navy Forward-Deployed Preventive Medicine Units and Naval Medical Research Center embarked TR, BLR and AMA to help combat the risk of COVID-19 and provide laboratory batch testing capability while at sea.\(^{176}\)

109. On March 14, 2020, medical personnel tested the 39 quarantined TR Sailors and each tested negative.\(^{177}\)

110. On March 14, 2020, BLR arrived in Singapore for a previously scheduled port visit.\(^{178}\)

111. On March 14, 2020, the Government of Guam issued a state of public health emergency.\(^{179}\)

112. On March 15, 2020, the TR SMO emailed the entire TR crew, clarifying screening requirements after port visits, explaining self-monitoring, and passing reminders about hand sanitization, hand washing, and cough etiquette.\(^{180}\)

113. On March 16, 2020, the TR SMO emailed the entire TR crew updates about COVID-19, including guidance for personnel arriving and/or leaving by COD. Specifically, the email provided, “Personnel arriving via COD - HODs/DLCPOs are notified (by TR Medical Department using the Air Transport Officer manifest) of those


\(^{174}\) ALNAV 026/20 Official and Personal Domestic Travel Guidance for Department of the Navy (CONUS Travel Guidance) dtd 14 Mar 20

\(^{175}\) NAVADMIN 065/20 Navy Mitigation Measures in Response to Coronavirus Outbreak Update 1 dtd 14 Mar 20


\(^{177}\) Email – TR SMO - Post-Danang Update dtd 18 Mar 20

\(^{178}\) Email – C2F COVID Response Cell – Response to RFI dtd 15 May 20

\(^{179}\) Government of Guam Executive Order 2020-03

\(^{180}\) Email - TR SMO to All Officers, All CPOs, All E-6 and below - 14 days of screening following port visits dtd 15 Mar 20
individuals that require screening after arrival on a COD. Same screening concept except that their 7+7 days of screening starts the day they arrive on the ship and results are emailed to CAPT Ashman.”  

114. As TR transited to Guam, the C7F Fleet Surgeon and the TR SMO increased communications.  


116. On March 17, 2020, the TR CO emailed the Commanding Officer (CO), Naval Base Guam (NBG) CO to propose three possible courses of action (COAs) for liberty during the TR’s upcoming Guam port visit:  
   a. Full Guam liberty, similar to the previous port visit,  
   b. NBG liberty with base access (busses to Navy Exchange (NEX), beach, etc.), and limited off-base liberty (golf, small group tours, etc.), or  
   c. Pier liberty with limited access to NBG (busses to NEX, beach, etc.) and MWR pier support (food/beer/entertainment/wifi).  

117. The NBG CO stated that only COA #3 was appropriate and that further mitigation measures were needed to afford TR Sailors access to the NEX and that TR medical personnel would be required to assist in screening and sanitization inspections.  

118. On March 19, 2020, the U.S. Department of State added Vietnam to the list of countries on the Global Level 4 Health Advisory, recommending against traveling there.  

119. By March 20, 2020, Guam had 12 confirmed cases of COVID-19.  

120. The TR XO and the TR Operations Officer were concerned that Sailors would congregate elsewhere so TR’s gyms remained open until the ship arrived in Guam. 

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181 Email - TR SMO - Coronavirus screening - Update dtd 15 Mar 20  
182 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20  
184 Email - NBG CO to TR CO - TR PVST dtd 20 Mar 20  
185 Email - NBG CO to TR CO - TR PVST dtd 20 Mar 20  
187 Email - NBG CO to TR CO - TR PVST dtd 20 Mar 20  
188 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20
121. On March 22, 2020, the TR CO requested via email limited access to NBG locations such as the NEX, Liberty Center, movie-theater, gym, ballfields, and hiking areas.\textsuperscript{189}

122. CO, NBG responded to the TR CO that his first priority was the safe mooring of the ship and proper husbanding while in port, all while ensuring that the ship and crew remained “clean.” CO, NBG stated further that “once we have that locked in we will focus on the quality of life.” Additionally, CO, NBG attached the general schematic for Kilo Wharf (Figure 2) and the potential Force Health Protection Enclave (FHPE) that would be employed to enable the required separation for TR Sailors to base support personnel.\textsuperscript{190}

123. On March 22, 2020, 14 days after they had been placed in quarantine, all 39 close-contact Sailors were asymptomatic, tested negative and released from quarantine.\textsuperscript{191}

124. On March 23, 2020, the CDC reported the Diamond Princess and Grand Princess cruise ships had more than 800 total COVID-19 cases, including 10 deaths.\textsuperscript{192}

125. On March 23, 2020, the Secretary of Defense raised the Health Force Protection Condition Level to Charlie for all DoD installations.\textsuperscript{193}

126. On March 23, 2020, the Navy published definitions of quarantine and isolation, derived from CDC guidance.\textsuperscript{194}

127. On March 23, 2020, TR stopped receiving COD flights from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{195}

128. The TR CO stated that due to the increasing number of COVID-19 cases in the Philippines, an internal decision was made to re-route all future outbound passengers and parts to Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) or Anderson AFB in order to avoid further flights to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{189} Email – NBG CO to TR CO - RE TR PVST dtd 23 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{190} Email – NBG CO to TR CO - RE TR PVST dtd 23 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{191} C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20;; Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; C7F Surgeon Statement dtd 23 May 20
\textsuperscript{192} Update Public Health Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 outbreak - United States (24 Feb 20)
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6908e1.htm
\textsuperscript{193} Statement by Department of Defense on Additional Access Restrictions for the Pentagon Reservation dtd 23 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{194} NAVADMIN 083/20 Restriction of Movement (ROM) Guidance 23 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{195} COD Completed Travel Log/Manifest
\textsuperscript{196} Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
129. Between the period of March 9 to March 23, 2020, 9 patients presented to TR Medical with ILI.197
   a. The embarked BDRD personnel screened all ILI cases using the BioFire Respiratory Panel-2 (RP-2) to rule out the most common respiratory pathogens.198
   b. In all cases tested using the BioFire RP-2, a common respiratory pathogen was identified and the diagnosis process halted.199

130. On March 24th, prior to Sailors testing positive for COVID-19 aboard TR, three Sailors reported to the CVW-11 Surgeon that they had experienced a loss of taste and/or smell and that they had been experiencing those symptoms for approximately one week and had no other symptoms.200
   a. The CVW-11 Surgeon had learned that day that there was the possibility that the loss of taste and/or smell were a symptom of COVID-19, but determined that evidence was anecdotal and was not predominant in COVID-19 literature at the time.201
   b. The Sailors informed the CVW-11 Surgeon that there were one or two other Sailors who had the same symptoms and the CVW-11 Surgeon requested these Sailors report to the Medical Department.202
   c. All Sailors who presented with the loss of taste and/or smell presented with no other symptoms.203
   d. Because these individuals had no other symptoms, the CVW-11 Surgeon determined that these Sailors’ loss of taste and/or smell were not a diagnostic symptom.204
   e. The CVW-11 Surgeon directed these Sailors not to return to their work center and contacted the Industrial Hygienist onboard to inspect their work center.205
   f. The Industrial Hygienist ran a RAD-57 test which demonstrated a normal CO level.206
The CVW-11 Surgeon believes that three of the Sailors eventually tested positive for COVID-19.\textsuperscript{207} 

Subsequent investigation of the ship’s Sick Call Log revealed no patients presented to TR Medical with a loss of taste or smell prior to the first confirmed positive COVID-19 case.\textsuperscript{208}

First Confirmed Case of COVID-19 until Arriving at Guam

In the early morning of March 24, 2020, TR confirmed three Sailors tested positive for COVID-19; two from CVW-11 and one from the Reactor Department.\textsuperscript{209}

The first three TR Sailors to test positive for COVID-19 were not close contacts of the initial 39 Sailors quarantined on March 9\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{210}

Within 24 hours of positive cases, the TR SMO began basing initial projections for the spread of COVID-19 aboard TR on similar circumstances on cruise ships, but in “negative fashion” since cruise ships have individual berthing.\textsuperscript{211}

After Sailors aboard TR tested positive for COVID-19, C7F considered directing TR to Hawaii or San Diego; however, C7F ruled these ports out due to the limited medical evacuation coverage of responding aircraft.\textsuperscript{212}

TR was originally scheduled to execute a port visit to Guam from April 3 to April 10, 2020.\textsuperscript{213}

On March 24, 2020, TR sailed for Guam at BKH’s best speed based on maximum allowable fuel burn rate for the planned transit.\textsuperscript{214}

Guam had previously denied entry to cruise ship MS WESTERDAM on February 7, 2020, over COVID-19 concerns, even though there were no known COVID-positive passengers on the ship.\textsuperscript{215}

On March 24, 2020, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Operations, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) informed C7F that the “crew of TR will not leave

\textsuperscript{207} CVW-11 Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20
\textsuperscript{208} TR Sick Call Log 5 Mar to 23 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{209} Email - TR SMO to CCSG-9 - COVID-19 Update dtd 24 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{210} CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
\textsuperscript{211} TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\textsuperscript{212} C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
\textsuperscript{213} Email - CSG-9 – Response to RFI dtd 20 May 20
\textsuperscript{214} Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR RO Statement dtd 18 May 20
\textsuperscript{215} Guam denies entry to ship over coronavirus concerns, USA Today (07 Feb 20)
pier, with the exception of Sailors testing positive for COVID-19, who will be sequestered in base berthing facilities.”

139. On March 24, 2020, C7F suggested to CCSG-9 that TR use the ship’s hangar deck for segregated berthing and to consider moving the CSG-9 Command Element to a command ship.

140. On March 24, 2020, C7F considered flying CVW-11 off TR to Anderson AFB, Guam.

141. CTF 75 offered C7F tents with air conditioning and cots for 400 Sailors to be available on the pier in Guam if needed.

142. After the third Sailor tested positive for COVID-19, TR CO conducted a 1MC call informing the crew that antiseptic wipes and hand sanitizer were available throughout the ship, “bleach-a-palooza” would occur twice daily, dental services were limited, and self-service was secured on the mess decks, the Chief Petty Officers’ mess, and wardrooms.

143. C7F was aware of the preventive measures taken aboard TR.

144. On March 24, 2020, the Pentagon confirmed its first case of COVID-19.

145. On March 24, 2020, USA Today reported TR had up to eight Sailors aboard who tested positive for COVID-19.

146. On March 24, 2020, TR Safety Officer stood up a COVID-19 Awareness Council (CAC), which included dental staff, the TR’s staff judge advocate, and various CVW-11 representatives. The purpose of the CAC was to manage messaging. Specifically, the CAC aimed to convert CDC and NAVADMIN guidance into a format easily accessible and usable across the entire ship.

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216 Email (SIPR) - C7F to OPNAV N3/N5 - RE: (U//FOUO) FOR INFO: TR Recovery and Disposition Plan dtd 27 Mar 20
217 Email (SIPR) – C7F to CCSG-9, C7F CoS, CSG-9 CoS – RE: (S) Positive COVID tests on TR (Update #2) dtd 24 Mar 20 2313 (Guam time)
219 Email – (SIPR) CTF 75 to C7F – COVID-19 Commander’s perspective 22 Mar dtd 24 Mar 20
220 Email – TR PAO to Crozier, B. CAPT – RE: TRSG RTQ dtd 24 Mar 20
221 Email – C7F PAO to TR PAO – FWD: Proposed Statement dtd 26 Mar 20
222 First Case of COVID-19 at the Pentagon dtd 25 Mar 20
223 Eight sailors from USS Theodore Roosevelt have coronavirus, raising concerns about pandemic's strain on military, USA Today (24 Mar 20) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/03/24/coronavirus-3-sailors-test-positive-military-readiness-affected/2910165001
224 TR Safety Officer Statement dtd 17 May 20
147. TR spent most of March 24th in condition River City (limited communications on and off the ship).225

148. Within the first 48 hours of TR’s first COVID-19 positive cases, the TR SMO distributed the NTRP relating to shipboard isolation and quarantine to each of the HODs.226

149. The TR CO stated that after March 24th, he was sleeping 4-5 hours a night.227

150. After the outbreak, the TR SMO had daily communication with C7F surgeon, CPF surgeon, Naval Hospital Guam (NHG) CO, and 3D MEB.228

151. After March 24, 2020, the TR Surgeon cancelled routine operations and began screening patients.229

152. Positive crew members initially remained in ship’s Medical unless the member was an officer with a single stateroom. Positive cases were then isolated and contact tracing identified additional Sailors to segregate.230

153. At the time, NAVADMIN 083/20 defined a person under investigation (PUI) as an individual with either a pending COVID-19 test or for whom a test would have been ordered/conducted if one had been available.231

154. Close contacts were identified as having 10 minutes of contact or more within 20 feet of a positive case.232

155. The COVID-19 treatment plan included over-the-counter medications.233

156. The Medical Department was running low on testing kits, so anyone with a common cold but no fever were treated for what the Medical Department suspected.234

157. Following positive cases of COVID-19, the TR Medical Department ceased routine care, including mental health. The TR psychologist responded to routine patients and handled “fleet administrative tracking” where COVID-19 test results were recorded when known.235

225 TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20
226 TR Safety Officer Statement dtd 17 May 20
227 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
228 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
229 TR Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20
230 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
231 NAVADMIN 083/20 Restriction of Movement (ROM) Guidance dtd 23 Mar 20
232 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
233 TR PA Statement dtd 18 May 20
234 TR PA Statement dtd 18 May 20
235 TR Psychologist Statement dtd 18 May 20
158. On March 25, 2020, TR transferred ashore the first four Sailors who tested positive for COVID-19 via rotary wing.236

159. The TR XO stated he believed TR largely adhered to NTRP 4-02.10 guidance prior to Sailors testing positive.237

160. The TR XO stated, “We were absolutely aware of the CPF and C7F OPORD and FRAGORDs -- but as we got closer to Guam and cases increased, it appeared CPF and C7F were not in alignment on NAVADMIN 083 – specifically the need for isolated berthing. They continued to direct us to attempt group quarantine methods that were not in compliance. We were getting a 10,000-yard screwdriver from BLR. We did it, but it was frustrating.238

161. Once TR Sailors tested positive for COVID-19, the TR SMO routinely sent CCSG-9 updates and numbers, including prediction models for the virus’ spread.239

162. The TR SMO relied upon observations and data from the cruise ship Diamond Princess sequestered in Japan, which had a different demographic than that of the TR.240

163. The TR CO acknowledged studies about cruise ships influenced his decision-making.241

164. On March 25th, the TR CO sent letters to family members indicating “a few Sailors” had tested positive for COVID-19, were been placed in isolation, and work was in progress to fly those Sailors off the ship as soon as possible.242

165. Once Sailors aboard TR tested positive for COVID-19, TR closed the barbershop and gyms but permitted PT in the hangar bay. Cooks served salad and self-serve food options were removed from the mess deck. ATMS, vending machines, and the ship’s store remained open (with a limited number of patrons at a time). Self-serve laundry closed. TR XO implemented mandatory facemask wearing.243

237 TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20 Addendum
238 TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
240 Email - TR SMO to Warfare Commanders – Diamond Princess Article dtd 28 Mar 20
241 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
242 Email – Crozier, B. CAPT to TR Ombudsmen – (none) with Letter to TR Families and Friends dtd 27 Mar 20
243 TR SUPPO Statement dtd 18 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
166. While in transit to Guam, the TR CO authorized the use of damage control flash hoods as face coverings because the ship lacked a sufficient number of face coverings for the entire crew.\textsuperscript{244}

167. Despite receiving direction to plan for using on-base resources, CCSG-9 believed that using Guam hotels was still an option.\textsuperscript{245}

168. On March 25, 2020, CO, NBG compiled a scheme of maneuver brief that detailed 150 isolation and 493 quarantine beds available in gyms and open bay berthing.\textsuperscript{246}

169. On March 25, 2020, the CSG-9 COS notified C7F COS of the need for 4,000 rooms to house Sailors in single isolation for two weeks.\textsuperscript{247}

170. On March 25\textsuperscript{th}, CCSG-9 requested 4,000 CDC-compliant rooms and believed higher headquarters was working their request.\textsuperscript{248}

171. CCSG-9 received feedback that obtaining 4,000 CDC-complaint rooms was not an option because A-SN had stated publicly that TR will be pierside in Guam and no one on the crew would be allowed to leave other than pierside and that 100 percent testing of the crew will occur to ensure that COVID-19 is contained.\textsuperscript{249}

172. On March 25, 2020, Commander, Joint Region Marianas (CJRM) notified the Governor of Guam that TR had three COVID-19 Sailors onboard and they were being evacuated to NBG. The following day, CJRM notified the Governor of Guam an additional 21 Sailors would be evacuated to NBG from TR.\textsuperscript{250}

173. CJRM stated, "As the situation onboard the ship became more serious and the medical response evolved [from March 27-29] my conversations with the Governor became more frequent."\textsuperscript{251}

174. On March 26, positive COVID-19 cases aboard TR rose from eight to 33.\textsuperscript{252}
175. On March 26, 2020, CCSG-9 informed C7F that TR would run out of quarantine/isolation space ashore in Guam.253

176. On March 26, 2020, A-SN stated publicly that TR would not need assistance from Guam and that TR’s crew will stay on the pier upon arrival.254

177. On March 26, 2020, CCSG-9 issued outbreak Commander’s Guidance for arrival in Guam expressing the following priorities: (1) move all COVID-positive Sailors to isolation quarters; (2) identify key groups needed to operate ship at sea in near-term; (3) move key reactor supervisory personnel into isolation following testing; and (4) if additional quarantine racks remain, prioritize personnel by function.255

178. On March 26, 2020, the TR XO sent an email to all officers and all Chiefs outlining a plan to disembark TR’s crew upon arrival in Guam.256

179. On March 26, 2020, CPF sent the first of a series of TR Recovery and Disposition Plan email updates to INDOPACOM and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). CPF reported to CNO that the plan was to test the entire TR crew for COVID-19.257

180. On March 26, 2020, C7F emailed DCNO (N3/N5) recommending Echelon I engagement and support for additional resources for testing 100 percent of the TR crew.258

181. The C7F COS stated that testing before moving to quarantine was not required and that C7F was clear to CCSG-9 that the intent was to move Sailors ashore as fast as possible.259

182. On March 24, 2020, C7F emailed CCSG-9 providing testing protocol and the TR Triage and Disposition Plan, a flow chart for testing all Sailors.260

183. On March 28, 2020, C7F corrected CCSG-9 in an email regarding testing protocol and mandating him to “start over” with testing.261

184. At the request of CNO, it was CPF’s intention to test 100 percent of TR’s crew.262
185. In response, C7F stated that “100 percent [testing] was desired but likely not possible.”

186. In the same email thread the DCNO (N3/N5), who was responsible for Navy’s overall plan to combat COVID-19, replied to C7F that the “Crew of TR will not leave pier, with the exception of positive Sailors, who will be sequestered in base berthing facilities.”

187. The CNO stated that he understood CPF’s intent to test 100 percent of TR’s crew.

188. During a discussion with C7F, the Commanding General of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) offered up to 5,000 rooms for potential TR crew occupancy in Okinawa.

Arrival in Guam

189. On March 27, 2020, TR arrived in Guam and moored pierside.

190. As TR arrived in Guam, the ship had 36 COVID-19 positive cases.

191. As of March 27, 2020, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) had three COVID-19 positive cases.

192. The TR SMO requested assistance from Navy Medicine upon arrival in Guam.

193. The C7F and CPF Fleet Surgeons concurred with the TR SMO that as TR arrived in Guam, “[A]nyone who is defined as [having influenza-like illness symptoms] is a presumptive [positive for] COVID-19 and should be treated as such.”

194. The TR medical team used the batch testing method to test Sailors for COVID-19.

195. A batch test does not individually diagnose Sailors.

196. As of March 27, 2020, TR was limited to 40 diagnostic tests per day.

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263 Email (SIPR) - CNO to CPF - FOR INFORMATION: TR Recovery and Disposition Plan dtd 26 Mar 20, 2014
264 Email (SIPR) - CNO to CPF - FOR INFORMATION: TR Recovery and Disposition Plan dtd 26 Mar 20, 2014
265 Email (SIPR) - CNO to CPF - FOR INFORMATION: TR Recovery and Disposition Plan dtd 26 Mar 20, 2014
266 C7F Statement dtd 18 May 20
267 Facebook Post - Family and Friends of the Rough Riders, Crozier, B. CAPT (27 Mar 20)
https://www.facebook.com/USSTheodoreRoosevelt/photos/a.489137065779/10156700551025780/?type=3&theater
268 Email (SIPR) - C7F COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
269 Email (SIPR) - C7F COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
270 Email – TR SMO to CPF and C7f surgeons - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 18 May 20
271 Email – CPF Surgeon to C7F surgeon and TR SMO - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 24 Mar 20
272 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
273 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
274 Email – TR SMO to CPF and C7f surgeons - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 24 Mar 20
275 Email – CPF Surgeon to C7F surgeon and TR SMO - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 24 Mar 20
276 Email (SIPR) - C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
277 Email (SIPR) - C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
278 Email – CCPM to CPF Surgeons - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 24 Mar 20
279 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
280 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
281 Email – CCPM to CPF Surgeons - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 24 Mar 20
282 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
283 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
284 Email – CCPM to CPF Surgeons - WARNORD for BUMED dtd 24 Mar 20
285 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
286 Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F - CC9 COVID daily CDRs update (26 Mar) dtd 27 Mar 20
197. NAVADMIN 092/20 urged commands to “continue random urinalysis specimen collection from Sailors during the COVID-19 pandemic to the greatest extent possible,” but also afforded Commanding Officers the approval authority to pause collections in response to the strict enforcement of social distancing measures.\(^{275}\)

198. Subsequent to TR’s arrival in Guam, TR’s Command Urinalysis Program continued with assigned times for each department to report for urinalysis screening.\(^{276}\)

199. As TR pulled into Guam, C7F’s priority was keeping TR mission capable.\(^{277}\)

200. As the TR arrived in Guam, C7F was “crystal clear” to CCSG-9 that C7F wanted as many Sailors off the ship as quickly as possible.\(^{278}\)

201. According to C7F COS, CPF directed 100 percent testing of TR’s crew because CPF believed a lab in Korea could test 1,000 samples a day. C7F COS stated he believed Korea was never able to test 1,000 TR Sailors in one day.\(^{279}\)

202. TR leadership prioritized removing COVID-19 positive Sailors first, key reactor watchstanders second, and PUIs last.\(^{280}\)

203. The TR XO planned to keep approximately 700 Sailors aboard TR to run the ship.\(^{281}\)

204. According to the C7F COS, after TR arrived in Guam, the goal became scattered: CPF wanted testing, C7F wanted Sailors off the ship, and TR wanted single rooms.\(^{282}\)

205. According to the C7F COS, Guam later required testing before Sailors could enter hotels.\(^{283}\)

206. On March 28, 2020, the C7F COS informed the CSG-9 COS that TR was not following “protocol” because Sailors were going into quarantine without batch tests to determine if the virus was present.\(^{284}\)
207. According to CCSG-9, securing hotel rooms in Guam was initially not an option because A-SN stated publicly that the Navy would not require assistance from Guam.\textsuperscript{285}

208. C7F believed that should hotels become available in Guam, Sailors would need to test negative for COVID-19 before exiting NBG.\textsuperscript{286}

209. As of March 27, 2020, the C7F COS explained to CSG-9 that testing was required before personnel disembarked.\textsuperscript{287}

210. On March 27, 2020, the TR SMO distributed “TR’s Triage and Disposition Plan” promulgated by C7F, which contemplated 200 COVID-19 tests per day.\textsuperscript{288}

211. Because Guam declared a Public Health State of Emergency on March 14, 2020, the C7F COS believed asking Guam for help was a “big ask.”\textsuperscript{289}

212. TR CO stated, “Testing had to be done before Sailors were allowed to debark the ship.”\textsuperscript{290}

213. The TR XO stated that testing requirements “seemed to change daily.”\textsuperscript{291}

214. The TR SMO stated, “There was some initial confusion as to whether or not the Sailors had to be tested before they went to on-base facilities rather than the hotels out in town.”\textsuperscript{292}

215. The TR XO stated the information flow between C7F, CSG-9, and TR was “off” and that TR XO believed the TR was “making decisions without the benefit of full information.”\textsuperscript{293}

216. The TR CO stated that “[the Warfare Commanders] had no information on the matter, but had we been aware then, that housing Sailors individually in hotels in Guam was a viable and realistic COA, we may have had less concerns because we knew at our level that moving Sailors ashore into hotels was the quickest and most effective way to combat the spread of COVID-19.”\textsuperscript{294}

\textsuperscript{285} CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
\textsuperscript{286} C7F Statement (Addendum) dtd 19 May 20; C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
\textsuperscript{287} Email – (SIPR) COS C7F to COS CSG-9 – Triage and procedure dtd 28 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{288} Email – TR SMO to CSG-9 Staff – Testing Planning Factors dtd 27 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{289} C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20; Email (SIPR) - CSG-9 COS to C7F COS – HOTEL OPTION dtd 25 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{290} Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
\textsuperscript{291} TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
\textsuperscript{292} TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\textsuperscript{293} TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
\textsuperscript{294} Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
217. The TR SMO stated he was not fully aware of a Guam hotel plan and was not briefed on the plan.295

218. CCSG-9 was aware of ongoing efforts by higher headquarters to negotiate for the use of hotels on Guam and “by March 31, [we knew we] were making progress.”296

219. According to C7F, “the TR CO was briefed on the [hotel] option and the support, voiced no concerns when asked, (but then sent his letter the same or following day, 29 or 30 March).”297

220. The TR SMO stated he did not get much sleep between March 24th and April 2nd.298

221. The TR CO did not attend C7F COS COVID-19 working group meetings. As a result, C7F was generally unaware of what was actually happening on the ship during the first two days in Guam.299

222. As TR Sailors came ashore, complaints about available accommodations and food arose.300

223. Sailors expressed their concerns on social media and this was relayed to the TR CO and TR XO.301

224. The CSG-9 COS stated that in “daily meetings with the C7F Crisis Action Team, we stated food supply was insufficient, and available racks were not spread out far enough. C7F seemed concerned only with filling beds ashore. Ongoing dialogue between C7F and CCSG-9 was contentious.”302

225. The TR SMO did not consistently attend or send a representative to the daily C7F medical synchronization meetings.303

226. The TR CO stated that it was a constant balancing act between keeping the crew in close quarters on the ship and sending the crew out to inadequate facilities where they lacked proper living necessities and medical care.304
227. The TR XO expressed concern sending “thousands of Sailors off the ship if there were no acceptable showers, bathrooms, or food available.”

228. The TR SMO stated the NHG public health emergency officer expressed to him concerns over “communal berthing” on land.

229. NBG does not have a galley. NBG CO coordinated with MWR (Club), NEXCOM, and DoDEA cafeteria in order to serve 5000 - 6000 daily meals.

230. On March 28, 2020, TR received new COVID-19 testing kits, but they required 12-14 days of preparation before use.

231. On March 28, 2020, C7F, JRM COS and CJRM began initial discussions about increasing isolation capacity via hotels. The same day, CJRM began discussing the availability of hotel rooms with the government of Guam.

232. On or about March 28, 2020, the Governor of Guam told CJRM, “we (Guam) need to support the people who defend us. This is the humanitarian thing to do.”

233. The Governor of Guam indicated to the CJRM COS that a formal request from CPF or INDOPACOM would be necessary to secure hotels.

234. After the initial concept of operations was developed the Guam Hotel and Restaurant Association (GHRA) identified the first hotels for use by TR personnel and a unified “walkthrough” of partner hotels was arranged between April 1st and 2nd at various sites.

235. On March 28th, CCSG-9 decided to move people off ship as quickly as possible and test later.

236. On March 28th, the TR SMO wrote an email to C7F and U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) Surgeons stating the need to move 4,500 personnel into individual berthing with single heads.

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305 TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
306 TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
307 NBG CO Statement dtd 18 May 20
308 Email – (SIPR) CNO to CPF – INFO TR recovery and disposition update 27 Mar 20 dtd 28 Mar 20
309 Email - CJRM – Follow Up to 13 May 20 Phone Call
310 Email - CJRM – Follow Up to 13 May 20 Phone Call
311 C7F Statement dtd 18 May 20; Email - CJRM – Follow Up to 13 May 20 Phone Call
312 Email (SIPR) - C7F to CCSG-9 – SUBJ: (S) 28 Mar TB - follow-up dtd 28 Mar 20
313 Email - TR SMO to C7F and CPF Surgeons – Reality dtd 28 Mar 20
237. As positive cases mounted aboard TR, the TR CO stated that he relayed his concerns about the ship’s inability to adhere to COVID related NAVADMINs to CCSG-9. \(^{315}\)

238. On March 28, 2020, the TR XO acknowledged TR was not in compliance with applicable guidance and believed quarantining Sailors in aft berthing aboard TR was “only making the problem worse.” The TR XO recommended to the TR CO to end segregated berthing on board the ship and declare the entire crew and embarked staff as ‘Close Contact[s].’ \(^{316}\)

239. On March 28, 2020, the TR SMO sent an email to CCSG-9 noting 44 total Sailors had tested positive by midday. In an evening update, the TR SMO verified two more Sailors tested positive, bringing the total to 46 total positive cases aboard TR. \(^{317}\)

240. On March 29, 2020, the TR SMO sent an email to CCSG-9 noting 50 total Sailors had tested positive by midday. In an evening update, the TR SMO verified three more Sailors tested positive, bringing the total to 53 positive cases aboard TR. \(^{318}\)

241. On March 29, 2020, the TR SMO sent an email stating “we have lost” regarding COVID-19 on TR. \(^{319}\)

242. The TR XO suggested that the Ship Emergency Command Center (ECC) data demonstrated the ship’s segregated berthing plan was making the rate of transmission worse. \(^{320}\)

243. During this time, C7F tasked CCSG-9 and TR to develop plans to airlift crew members to Okinawa. \(^{321}\)

244. C7F had arranged for III MEF to vacate their barracks in Okinawa located at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Marine Corps Base Butler and outlying camps. \(^{322}\)

245. On March 29, 2020, the TR CO emailed Commander, Fleet Activities Okinawa (CFAO), to “get some fidelity on the latest proposal to get the TR 5,000 barracks rooms

\(^{315}\) Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20

\(^{316}\) TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20


\(^{318}\) Email – TR SMO to CCSG-9 – COVID-19 update 29 March - Mid-day update 29 Mar 20; Email – TR SMO to CCSG-9 – COVID-19 update 29 March - Evening update dtd 29 Mar 20; Email – (SIPR) CPF to C7F – Evening Ops Update and COVID 29 Mar dtd 29 Mar 20

\(^{319}\) Email - TR SMO to C7F and CPF Surgeons – Reality dtd 28 Mar 20

\(^{320}\) TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20

\(^{321}\) CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20

\(^{322}\) Email – C7F COVID Response Cell – RFI Follow-Up dtd 20 May 20
in Okinawa.” CFAO replied, “Long story short, we don’t have 500p [sic] rooms but will do whatever we can to support.”

246. The TR CO discussed his conversation with CFAO with the TR XO and senior Warfare Commanders. The group believed the C7F staff had wasted their time on a non-viable COA. The TR CO did not attempt to verify the accuracy of this information up the chain of command.

247. The TR CO stated the Okinawa COA “was discounted as a viable COA due to logistical challenges, distance from THR, and likelihood of insufficient isolation rooms.

248. The TR CO and CSG-9 Warfare Commanders later stated that they were unaware of the intended movement of III MEF.

249. On March 29, 2020, CPF rejected C7F’s plan for movement of the TR crew to Okinawa based on the risk of accelerating infection spread on the aircraft during the 9-hour flight to Okinawa, and complications with the government of Japan.

250. CPF directed that no Navy personnel leave Guam until he personally reviewed and approved that plan.

251. On March 29, 2020, CO, NBG and C7F COS acknowledged that if they could not achieve better social distancing, more Sailors would contract the virus.

252. As of March 29, 2020, the testing rates for TR were 120/day max and there were 4,389 untested crewmembers. At that rate, the TR SMO estimated it would take 37 days to test the entire crew.

253. On March 29, 2020, there were 1,150 racks available on Guam with 535 racks occupied.

254. CSG-9 COS stated the TR SMO pushed hard for individual rooms. CSG-9 COS stated C7F understood this, but pushed to quarantine Sailors 150-200 at a time.
255. On March 29, 2020, the TR’s Afloat Recreation Specialist closed all gyms aboard TR.\textsuperscript{333}

256. On March 29, 2020, with over 1,000 members of the crew onboard in quarantine, the TR CO released 900-1,000 Sailors in aft quarantine based on the recommendation of the TR SMO, TR XO, and TR CMC.\textsuperscript{334}

257. The TR CO stated he felt it became prudent to begin considering all Sailors as COVID-19 positive.\textsuperscript{335}

258. The TR XO stated by March 29, 2020, there was “true human suffering” in aft berthing.\textsuperscript{336}

259. The TR SMO stated that a decision to quarantine large numbers of Sailors in aft berthing was ineffective.\textsuperscript{337}

260. CCSG-9 was not involved in the decision to break TR’s aft quarantine. The TR CO informed CCSG-9 after he had already lifted the quarantine order.\textsuperscript{338}

261. After TR SMO notified CCSG-9 of the COVID-19 positive Sailors aboard TR, CCSG-9 asked C7F for assistance in securing individual isolation rooms in compliance with applicable NAVADMINs. At the time, CCSG-9 requested 200 rooms, but expected that the number would grow.\textsuperscript{339}

262. On March 29, 2020, TR CO established a policy that no Sailors would leave the ship until guarantee of sufficient meal service was available. Additionally, the CO requested the ability for ship’s company to inspect isolation/quarantine facilities for suitability prior to moving Sailors (e.g., adequate meal service, heads, physical separation).\textsuperscript{340}

263. TR’s leadership was concerned about the practicality of the temporary open-bay facilities because open bay facilities were not CDC compliant and did not allow for appropriate social distancing.\textsuperscript{341}

\textsuperscript{333} Email – TR Afloat Rec Specialist – Gym’s Secured dtd 29 Mar 20
\textsuperscript{334} TR XO Response to RFI dtd 6 Apr 20
\textsuperscript{335} Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
\textsuperscript{336} TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20
\textsuperscript{337} TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20
\textsuperscript{338} CSG-9 COS Statement dtd 18 May 20
\textsuperscript{339} Email (SIPR) - CCSG-9 to C7F and C3F - POSITIVE COVID-19 TESTS ON TR (initial report) dtd 24 Mar 20; CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
\textsuperscript{340} Email – TR CO to NBG CO – NBG CMC Tour dtd 29 Mar 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR CMC Statement dtd 17 May 20
\textsuperscript{341} Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; CVW-11 CAG Statement dtd 19 May 20
264. TR CO communicated regularly with CO, NBG, TR CMC and TR Chaplain about conditions ashore.\textsuperscript{342}

265. C7F believed that the TR CO and CSG-9 were resisting sending the crew ashore because available facilities were not fully CDC-compliant.\textsuperscript{343}

266. C7F did not view the temporary facilities at NBG as inadequate as C7F felt they were a short-term improvement over shipboard conditions that would provide a bridge to a longer-term solution.\textsuperscript{344}

267. On March 30, 2020, TR Supply Officer acknowledged a gym was available pierside for all hands.\textsuperscript{345}

268. On March 30, 2020, TR CO halted the transfer of Sailors to off-ship berthing because available rooms were not single occupancy.\textsuperscript{346}

269. According to C7F COS, TR CO turned down short term cots in less than desirable places like storerooms and warehouses.\textsuperscript{347}

270. The pier area around TR had been designated a Force Health Protection Boundary (FHPB), restricting movement of those Sailors beyond the pier.\textsuperscript{348}

271. TR CO stated that he intentionally left C7F off his email “TR request for assistance”.\textsuperscript{349}

272. In addition to CCSG-9, the TR CO, CVW-11 CAG, CDS-23, and CSG-9 COS were regular attendees at C7F Commander’s Update Briefs conducted via VTC regularly during the deployment.\textsuperscript{350}

273. On March 30, 2020, A-SN COS advised TR CO that A-SN would not visit the ship so TR “may focus on the health and welfare of [the] Sailors.”\textsuperscript{351}

274. On March 31, 2020, five members of the TR Medical Department signed a letter advocating for disembarkation of all TR Sailors from the ship and expressed an intent to release it to the public.\textsuperscript{352}
275. On March 31, 2020, the President of GHRA passed along a string of emails wherein an unknown person was looking to book hundreds of rooms in Guam for the TR.  

276. When informed of the third party attempt to secure hotel rooms, the TR XO emailed all leadership on TR to ask personnel to stop, as this was “counterproductive” as Guam political leaders were “under tremendous pressure from their constituents to contain [the TR COVID cases] to the base” and noted that currently there was “little local support for moving” TR Sailors into hotels on the island.  

277. On March 31, 2020, CPF formally requested Guam hotel options and negotiations commenced for an undetermined number of hotel rooms.  

278. On or about March 30, 2020, eight local community groups sent a letter to Guam Governor Leon Guerrero urging action to keep military patients on-base until the virus was defeated.  

279. On March 31, 2020, the TR CO received an email from the TR Ombudsman expressing concern about “the overwhelming lack of medical treatment or check in for Sailors who have been moved off the ship [and for their] basic living necessities . . . whether it be medicine, toiletries, etc.”

Development of and Response to Commanding Officer Letter of March 30, 2020 Warfare Commanders White Paper

280. On March 29, 2020, the CVW-11 CAG drafted a white paper, collaborating between the other CSG-9 Warfare Commanders, presenting a COVID-19 analysis and suggested courses of action for CSG-9 Warfare Commanders and TR senior leadership review and revision with the intent of providing the final product to CCSG-9.  

282. CCSG-9 directed the Warfare Commanders to distill the white paper into four executable courses of action and CVW-11 CAG responded with four executable courses of action:
   a. 4,500 Sailors into individual isolation; 500 Sailors to remain onboard
   b. 2,500 crewmembers into individual isolation; 2,500 crewmembers to remain onboard and in group berthing off-ship
   c. Maintain the status quo – utilizing group berthing off-ship using available NBG facilities
   d. Immediately get underway

283. After preparing the four courses of action, the Warfare Commanders provided them to CCSG-9.

284. CCSG-9 did not consider using the Guam hotels as a viable option but kept the use of Guam hotels as an available option.

285. On the morning of March 30th, CCSG-9 recommended to C7F that the removal of 4,500 crewmembers to individual isolations rooms was the CCSG-9 recommended course of action.

286. C7F acknowledged the recommendation, but directed to continue batch testing, identification of “clean” group, and development of a plan to get a “clean” ship.

Development of CAPT Crozier's Letter and Email

287. TR CO was unaware of any promises the U.S. Government had made to Guam about the use of local resources to aid in the care of TR crewmembers.

288. The TR CO acknowledged that the A-SN COS understood TR needed more cots on base and attributed the acceleration of that delivery to his interaction.

289. A-SN COS had not taken any action to accelerate the delivery of cots.

360 Email – CVW-11 CAG to CCSG-9 – PROPOSED PAPER / COURSE OF ACTION FROM WARFARE COMMANDERS dated 29 Mar 20
361 Email – CVW-11 CAG to CCSG-9 – PROPOSED PAPER / COURSE OF ACTION FROM WARFARE COMMANDERS dated 29 Mar 20
362 CCSG-9 Statement dated 15 May 20
363 CVW-11 CAG Statement dated 19 May 20
364 CCSG-9 Statement dated 15 May 20; C7F Statement dated 18 May 20
365 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dated 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dated 16 May 20
366 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dated 15 May 20
367 Email – TR CI Team 3 Lead to TR CI CoS – TELECON with (b)(6) dated 18 May 20
290. The CVW-11 CAG outlined that NBG facilities were insufficient to isolate personnel in accordance with the TR SMO’s guidance, and securing hotels for the entire TR crew was impractical upon arrival; however, the Warfare Commanders were careful to ask for isolation, not specifically for hotel rooms.\(^{368}\)

291. On March 30\(^{th}\), the TR CO and TR XO expected a phone call from the CNO; that phone call did not occur.\(^{369}\)

292. CNO did not attempt to contact TR directly, nor did he intend to do so at any time relevant to this investigation as he trusted the leadership in the TR chain of command to discuss the immediate issues of the ship with the TR CO.\(^{370}\)

293. The report of an incoming phone call from CNO to the TR CO was a miscommunication resulting from CNO’s Battle Watch Captain (BWC) calling TR to ask if the previous A-SN COS call had been completed.\(^{371}\)

294. The TR CO directed the TR XO to draft TR CO’s letter based on input from the Warfare Commanders’ White Paper.\(^{372}\)

295. The TR CO reviewed the document and the email cover letter, signed it, scanned the letter, attached the letter to his email and sent the letter to CPF, Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP), and CCSG-9. The TR CO stated that his intent in sending the letter was to stop the administrative bureaucracy and bring focus back to what he thought was the best course of action to get people off the ship. He described the email and letter as a “red flare.”\(^{373}\)

296. C7F was not included on the email from the TR CO to CPF and CNAP.\(^{374}\)

297. The TR CO received calls and emails from A-SN’s COS on March 30\(^{th}\) discussing an April 1\(^{st}\) visit by A-SN to the TR; they did not discuss an immediate need for 4,000 beds fully in compliance with CDC and Navy guidelines and the TR CO did not specify that the current plans were not acceptable.\(^{375}\)

\(^{368}\) CVW-11 CAG Interview dtd 19 May 20

\(^{369}\) Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20

\(^{370}\) Email - CNO Former EA to TR CI Senior Legal Advisor – TR Investigation dtd 20 May 20

\(^{371}\) Email - CNO ABWC PTGN to BWC PTGN RE: Hot RFI.THEODORE ROOSEVELT RFI dtd 30 Mar 20; Email - CNO EA to BWC PTGN FW: TR dtd 29 Mar 20

\(^{372}\) Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20

\(^{373}\) TR CO Email and Ltr - Request for Assistance in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic dtd 30 Mar 20; Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20

\(^{374}\) TR CO Email and Ltr - Request for Assistance in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic dtd 30 Mar 20

\(^{375}\) Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
298. On March 30th at 1348, the TR CO sent an email with the letter drafted by the TR XO to ten recipients on an unclassified network. The email was sent to CPF, CNAP, CSG-9, and copied to CVW-11 CAG, TR XO, CVW-11 Deputy CAG, Commander, Destroyer Squadron (CDS) 23, TR SMO, CPF COS, and CNAP COS. The TR CO stated that in hindsight that there was likely a higher risk of the letter being released to press after being sent on the unclassified network, but at the time he did not realize this risk or intend for the letter to be released to the press.  

299. The TR CO requested “all available resources to find NAVADMIN and CDC-complaint quarantine rooms for my entire crew as soon as possible.”

300. CSG-9 did not have prior knowledge that TR CO was going to send this email and was surprised that the CO did not talk to him about the email first.

301. CNAP, CPF, and CJRM responded to the CO’s email.

302. The TR SMO forwarded the TR CO email with attachment to his personal email account.

303. The TR SMO also later forwarded the responses to the TR CO email from CNAP, C7F, and CJRM to his personal email.

304. CNAP and TR CO spoke on the phone following the email.

305. CPF and CSG-9 spoke on the phone following the email; TR CO was present for this conversation.

**Reactor Officer Letter**

306. The TR Reactor Officer (RO) discussed with the TR CO concerns about the safety of the Reactor Department watch supervisors and the increase of positive COVID-19 cases in berthing in the gym.

307. On March 26th, the TR RO sent an email via the classified network to CNAP Force Nuclear Propulsion Officer and the Special Assistant to the Director of Naval

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376 Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
377 TR CO Email and Ltr - Request for Assistance in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic dtd 30 Mar 20
378 CSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20; Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20
379 See Email - CNAP to TR CO - RE: TR request for assistance dtd 30 Mar 20; Email - CPF to TR CO and CSG-9 - RE: TR request for assistance dtd 30 Mar 20
380 Email – TR SMO to Personal email account - FW: TR request for assistance dtd 29 Mar 20 (forwarding the TR CO original email to SMO’s personal email account)
381 Email – TR SMO to Personal email account - FW: TR request for assistance dtd 6 Apr 20 (forwarding the responses to the TR CO original email to SMO’s personal email account)
382 CNAP Statement dtd 13 May 20
383 CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20; CSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
384 TR RO Statement dtd 18 May 20
Reactors for Carrier Operations outlining the current situation and way ahead for operations.\footnote{Email (SIPR) - TR RO to SA to NR for CVN Ops - CVN 71 COVID-19 Roll Up and Way Ahead dtd 26 Mar 20; TR RO Statement dtd 18 May 20}

308. On March 30\textsuperscript{th}, the TR RO drafted and sent a classified email to the TR CO requesting off ship isolation rooms with separate bathroom facilities; the TR CO sent the TR RO’s email to CNAP.\footnote{TR CO Email and Ltr - Request for Assistance in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic dtd 30 Mar 20}

### Medical Department Letter

309. Junior Medical Department personnel drafted a letter and presented it to the TR SMO, who was the last to sign it.\footnote{TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20}

310. In the letter, the signatories outlined their concerns over the situation on TR, detailed the possibility of 50 fatalities onboard the TR based on their assessment of published COVID-19 mortality rated at the time, and threatened to release their letter to the media.\footnote{Medical Department Letter dtd 31 Mar 20}

311. Not all members of the Medical Department signed the letter.\footnote{See e.g., CVW-11 Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20 , (“We didn’t take the letter to the media and never intended to, and we certainly had no reason to after what happened with [TR CO]’s memo.”), but also TR PT Statement dtd 18 May 20 (“I believed only two things would drive the Navy to act, the death of a Sailor or public opinion.”)}

312. The TR SMO and the other signers of the Medical Department letter presented the Medical Department letter to the TR XO.\footnote{TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 16 May 20}

313. The TR XO requested the signers not send the letter, and believed the letter was not helpful, and the tone was unprofessional and overly combative.\footnote{See e.g., Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20; TR Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20; CVW-11 Surgeon Statement dtd 18 May 20}

314. The TR SMO and the other signers of the Medical Department letter then presented the Medical Department letter to the TR CO.\footnote{TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20}

315. The TR CO asked the signers not to send it to the media because he had sent his email, with the attached letter, up the chain of command and thought it would address their concerns.\footnote{TR XO Statement dtd 16 May 20; TR SMO Statement dtd 17 May 20}
316. The TR SMO sent the Medical Department letter via email to the Surgeon General copying CPF and C7F Surgeons and a few other senior leaders within Navy medicine.394
317. Approximately three minutes later, the TR SMO sent the Medical Department letter via email to over 160 recipients, none of whom were in TR’s operational or administrative chain of command.395

**Media Release and Subsequent Actions**

318. As early as March 30th, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle received a copy of the TR CO’s letter and subsequently contacted OSD Public Affairs for comment.396
319. On April 1st, the San Francisco Chronicle posted a story entitled “Exclusive: Captain of aircraft carrier with growing coronavirus outbreak pleads for help from Navy.” The TR CO’s letter was included in this article.397
320. On April 1, 2020, the Governor of Guam permitted the entrance of TR personnel into Guam, subject to certain limitations. The Governor had intended to voice her support during a press conference on April 1st, in order to convey the well-managed and thoughtful civil-military response to the situation on TR. Publication of the TR CO’s letter affected the Governor’s opportunity to shape the public narrative of Guam’s partnership with the Navy398
321. The TR CO’s email and letter of March 30th, did not increase support from CPF. CPF stated, “I took no new actions as a result of Crozier’s email or memo because we had already been examining all options to get Sailors off the ship safely, get them tested quickly, and moved into appropriate locations efficiently.”399
322. The TR CO’s email and letter of March 30th, did not increase support from C7F. C7F stated, “I can’t see how the letter didn’t slow things down.”400

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394 Email - TR SMO to Navy Surgeon General - Letter from Medical Department on USS Theodore Roosevelt dtd 31 Mar 20
395 Email – TR SMO – Guam dtd 30 Mar 20
396 Email - TR PAO - FW: Urgent Media inquiry: USS Theodore Roosevelt COVID outbreak dtd 30 Mar 20
398 Governor of Guam ltr to CJRM, Subject: USS Theodore Roosevelt, dtd 1 Apr 20; CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20
399 CPF Statement dtd 17 May 20
400 C7F Statement dtd 18 May 20
323. The TR CO’s email and letter of March 30th, did not increase support from CCSG-9. CCSG-9 stated, “The letter had no impact on what echelon I, II, or III were doing. The letter did have negative impact on our progress, which was frustrating.”

324. On April 1, 2020, TR XO expressed to CJRM the need for surgical masks, stating “1000’s [were] on order.” Without surgical masks, TR XO directed Sailors wear flash hoods, bandanas, or some other face covering. He also mentioned Sailors were restricted to their rooms and asked if Chaplains, CMCs and OICs could perform health and wellness checks.401

325. On or about April 1, 2020, personnel transporting TR Sailors to hotels in Guam denied entry of two TR Sailors onto transport trucks because the two presented with COVID-19 symptoms.402

326. On April 2, 2020, Fleet Logistics Center Pearl Harbor approved 4,000 hotel rooms in Guam for use by TR personnel.403

327. On April 2, 2020, the TR CO and CO, NBG coordinated transportation of over 300 TR personnel to hotel rooms.404

328. On April 2, 2020, TR XO distributed quarantine and release plan to all hands.405

329. On April 2, 2020, A-SN COS offered TR CO a “direct line to SECNAV.”406

330. During a phone call with CCSG-9, A-SN asked CCSG-9 whether or not the TR CO should be fired; CCSG-9 stated he felt pressured to agree with A-SN and stated to A-SN that the TR CO should be fired.407

331. Immediately after that phone call with A-SN, CCSG-9 called C7F to voice his concern.408

332. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) called CCSG-9 and directed him to relieve the TR CO for cause by order of A-SN.409

333. On April 3rd, the TR CO was relieved by A-SN for “loss of confidence.”410

401 Email - TR XO email to JRM COS – SUBJ: Confidential dtd 1 Apr 20; C7F COS Statement dtd 21 May 20
402 Email - CJRM to TR CO – SUBJ: Day 1 dtd 1 Apr 20
403 Email - NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center Pearl Harbor to TR Suppo – TR Lodging Awarded dtd 2 Apr 20, 1506
404 Email - NBG CO to TR CO - RE: 300 PAX (sic) tonight and other dtd 2 Apr 20
405 Email - TR XO to TR All Hands, CSG-9, CVW-11, and COMDESRON 23 leadership - COVID-19 QUARANTINE PLAN dtd 2 Apr 20 1627
406 Email - SECNAV COS to TR CO – RE:TR Family Letter dtd 2 Apr 20
407 CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
408 CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
409 CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
410 Transcript: DON Press Briefing with Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. Modly and CNO Admiral Gilday dtd 2 Apr 20; Crozier, B. CAPT Statement dtd 15 May 20; CCSG-9 Statement dtd 15 May 20
334. CCSG-9 ordered that no CSG-9 personnel were permitted to make any digital recordings of individuals in quarantine or isolation.\textsuperscript{411}

335. After TR CO was relieved, TR XO notified the TR HODs of the time TR CO was to depart the ship.\textsuperscript{412}

336. TR Sailors recorded TR CO departing the ship and posted the recordings to social media. Nearly 2,000 Sailors congregated in close proximity, with only a few wearing face masks and without regard to social distancing, to send off the former TR CO. Despite mandated use of face coverings, video of the former TR CO departing the ship shows only a small number of Sailors complied.\textsuperscript{413}

337. When C7F saw the video, he later stated to the crew that, “Our jobs just got a lot harder,” referring to the crew’s complete disregard for social distancing.\textsuperscript{414}

338. Forty-five Sailors who had been sent ashore were admitted to NHG for treatment of COVID-19. Of these Sailors, six required oxygen support and one was placed on a ventilator for respiratory failure. The majority were admitted for close observation and did not require additional intervention.\textsuperscript{415}

339. On 5 April 5\textsuperscript{th}, a 41 year-old Aviation Ordnanceman was evaluated at Naval Hospital Guam Emergency Room and discharged the same day back to isolation at Naval Base Guam. Member had tested positive for COVID-19 March 30\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{416}

340. On April 9\textsuperscript{th}, a 41 year-old Aviation Ordnanceman was found unresponsive during one of his twice daily medical checks while in isolation on Naval Base Guam and was immediately transferred to Naval Hospital Guam Intensive Care Unit.\textsuperscript{417}

341. On April 13\textsuperscript{th}, a 41 year-old Aviation Ordnanceman died due to COVID-19 related complications.\textsuperscript{418}

342. NHG treated, at most, 10-11 TR Sailors simultaneously.\textsuperscript{419}
343. On April 6th, A-SN traveled to Guam, where he spoke with members of the TR crew via the 1MC and met with the former TR CO who was at the time in quarantine as a result of his positive test for COVID-19. 420

344. A-SN’s remarks over the 1MC were recorded by members of the crew and released to the press by means of a written transcript followed by the actual audio recording. 421

345. The transcript was released on the internet through various news sources and appears to be a true and accurate representation of A-SN’s comments as heard on the recording. These remarks were also widely reported. 422

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