1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Jeffrey B. Maltzman, CA Bar No. 13175 Edgar R. Nield, CA Bar No. 135018 Gabrielle De Santis Nield, CA Bar No. 1 Rafaela P. Castells, CA Bar No. 290828 MALTZMAN & PARTNERS, P.A. 681 Encinitas Boulevard, Suite 315 Encinitas, CA 92024 Telephone: (760) 942-9880 Facsimile: (760) 942-9882 jeffreym@maltzmanpartners.com edn@maltzmanpartners.com gabn@maltzmanpartners.com rafaelac@maltzmanpartners.com Attorneys for Defendant, PRINCESS CF	10930		
9				
10	UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT		
11	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
12	JUISHAN HSU, individually, and as	CASE NO.: 2:20-CV-03488-DSF-JC		
13	survivor of her deceased husband, CHUNG CHEN's Estate, and as	DEFENDANT PRINCESS CRUISE		
14	Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF CHUNG CHEN, for the	LINE LTD.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' THIRD AMENDED		
15	benefit of its survivors, and VIVIAN CHEN, Individually, and as survivor of	COMPLAINT		
16	her deceased father, CHUNG CHEN'S Estate,	Detai Nassashan 16, 2020		
17 18	Plaintiffs,	Date: November 16, 2020 Time: 1:30 p.m.		
19	VS.	Judge: Hon. Dale S. Fischer Courtroom: 7D		
20	PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD.,			
21	Defendant.	Magistrate: Hon. Jacqueline Chooljian Filed: 04/15/2020		
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				

TABLE (OF CC	NTEN	ΓS

•	INTI	RODUCTION	1
I.	BAC	CKGROUND	2
II.	LEG	AL STANDARD	3
V.	MEN	MORANDUM OF LAW	3
	A.	Federal Maritime Law Applies to Plaintiffs' Claims	3
	В.	The Death on The High Seas Act is the Exclusive Remedy for All Claims Relating to Chung Chen	4
	C.	Vivian Chen and Juishan Hsu's Claims for Loss of Consortium Are Barred by Maritime Law	8
V.	CON	ICLUSION	8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>Cases</u>	

Adler v. Royal Cruise Line, Ltd., 1996 WL 438799 (N.D. Cal. 1996)8
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987)
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010)7
Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994)
Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 405 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
Cormier v. Williams/Sedco/Horn Constructors, 460 F.Supp. 1010 (E.D.La.1978)5
Cox v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 2013 WL 3233461 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013)8
Crear v. Omega Protein, Inc., 2002 WL 1941447 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2002)5
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998)
Doyle v. Graske, 579 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2009)
Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2011)7
Howard v. Crystal Cruises, Inc., 41 F.3d 527 (9th Cir.1994)4
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995)3
Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F.Supp. 1277 (W.D.Pa.1983).5
Maa v. Carnival Corp. & PLC, CV 20-6341 DSF (SKX), 2020 WL 5633425 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020)
Motts v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565 (5th Cir.2000)
Moyer v. Rederi, 645 F.Supp. 620 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
Ridley v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.1980)
Stepski v. M/V NORASIA ALYA, 2010 WL 6501649 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2005)
Touhey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1981 A.M.C. 1218 (Cal. App. Ct. 1980)5
Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1991)

Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1983)	3
<u>Statutes</u>	
46 U.S.C.A. § 30302	4
Rules	
Fed. Rule Civ Pro 12(b)(6)	3
Fed. Rule Civ Pro 12(f)	3
Local Rule 7-3	1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant, **PRINCESS CRUISE** LINES, LTD. ("Defendant" "PRINCESS"), files this Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs herein.

This motion is made following several conferences of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place between May 7, 2020 and September 16, 2020.

INTRODUCTION I.

The Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") provides the exclusive remedy for a death arising from an injury occurring on a vessel more than three nautical miles from any shore of the United States. It is by now well established that the touchstone for determining whether DOHSA applies is the location of the vessel at the time of injury. And in the specific context of COVID-19, courts in this District have confirmed that the place of injury is the location of the vessel when the decedent contracted the disease. If the vessel was more than three nautical miles from any shore of the U.S. at the time the decedent contracted COVID-19, then DOHSA applies and provides the exclusive remedy for their claims. See Maa v. Carnival Corp. & PLC, CV 20-6341 DSF (SKX), 2020 WL 5633425, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020).

These principles apply to Plaintiffs' claims related to Chung Chen and compel dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"). Plaintiffs allege that Chung Chen contracted COVID-19 while on board the Ruby Princess and that he subsequently died from the disease. But the Ruby Princess was on a roundtrip voyage between Australia and New Zealand¹, meaning that the vessel was more than three nautical miles from the U.S. at the time he contracted the disease and that DOHSA applies to all claims related to Chung Chen's death. The Court should therefore dismiss or strike all claims in the TAC related to Chung Chen's death.

¹ Cruises to Australia and New Zealand are sometimes referred to as cruises to the Antipodes or cruises in Antipodean waters, meaning relating to Australia and New Zealand.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

26

27

The Court should separately dismiss or strike Plaintiffs' request for damages related to loss of consortium related to the death of Chung Chen because they are not available under general maritime law.

II. **BACKGROUND**

The TAC makes the following allegations: Plaintiffs, including Chung Chen, were passengers on the Ruby Princess when it departed from Sydney, Australia on March 8, 2020. (TAC ¶ 12). During the cruise, the Ruby Princess experienced an outbreak of COVID-19 and "returned to Australia three days early." (TAC ¶ 20). The TAC does not allege the cruise ever came within three miles of the United States (nor could it since this was a cruise between Australia and New Zealand). The TAC clearly alleges that Chung Chen contracted COVID-19 on the vessel: "CHUNG CHEN, deceased, became ill with symptoms of COVID-19 on March 18, 2020 after contracting COVID-19 while onboard the ship, which ultimately resulted in his untimely death." (TAC ¶ 23). Chung Chen subsequently died on April 4, 2020, in Los Angeles, California. (TAC ¶ 5). In addition to Chung Chen, Plaintiffs Vivian Chen and Juishan Shu, Chung Chen's daughter and wife, respectively, allege that that they contracted COVID-19. (TAC ¶ 21-22). Vivien Chen alleges that she contracted COVID-19 and began having symptoms on March 18, 2020, while still onboard the *Ruby Princess*. (TAC \P 22). Juishan Hsu alleges she developed symptoms of COVID-19 on March 25, 2020. (TAC ¶ 21).

The TAC includes causes of action for negligence and gross negligence in connection with the death of Chung Chen. In particular, Vivien Chen and Juishan Hsu bring these claims in their individual capacities, as well as in their role as survivors of the estate of Chung Chen. Jusihan Hsu also brings these same claims in her role as personal representative of the estate of Chung Chen. In addition to seeking recovery for compensatory and punitive damages, Plaintiffs also seek to recover for their loss of consortium from the death of Chung Chen. (TAC ¶ 26).

28

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (citations omitted). "The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), "the Court may order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 405, 406 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

IV. **MEMORANDUM OF LAW**

A. Federal Maritime Law Applies to Plaintiffs' Claims

As Plaintiffs acknowledge by invoking this Court's maritime jurisdiction and stating that the case "involves a maritime tort" (TAC ¶ 3), Federal maritime law applies to Plaintiffs' claims.² Maritime law applies when "(1) the alleged wrong occurred on or over navigable waters, and (2) the wrong bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir.1983). "[V]irtually every activity involving a vessel on navigable waters" is a "traditional maritime activity sufficient to invoke maritime jurisdiction." See Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) ((quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 542 (1995))); Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1560, 1654 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1991) ("In maritime tort cases such as this one, in which injury occurs

Plaintiffs' Passage Contract applicable to their voyage similarly invokes maritime

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. The Death on The High Seas Act is the Exclusive Remedy for All Claims **Relating to Chung Chen**

The Death on the High Seas Act governs Plaintiffs' claims related to the death of Chung Chen. The Act provides that, "when the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative." 46 U.S.C.A. § 30302 (West). In other words, DOHSA applies as long as the "wrongful act, neglect, or default" that causes the death of an individual occurs "on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States."

Federal courts have "consistently interpreted DOHSA as applying to maritime incidents occurring within the territorial waters of foreign states." Ridley v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.1980); Moyer, 645 F.Supp. at 623–24. This notably includes the Ninth Circuit, which has similarly applied DOHSA in cases where the injury resulting in death occurs in a foreign nation's territorial waters. See Howard v. Crystal Cruises, Inc., 41 F.3d 527, 529-30 (9th Cir.1994) (applying DOHSA to a death which occurred within Mexico's territorial waters); see

law. See, https://www.princess.com/legal/passage_contract/plc.html at Section 1.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

also Motts v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565, 569–70 (5th Cir.2000) (recognizing application of DOHSA); Cormier v. Williams/Sedco/Horn Constructors, 460 F.Supp. 1010 (E.D.La.1978) (applying DOHSA to accident occurring in navigable river in Peru); Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F.Supp. 1277 (W.D.Pa.1983) (applying DOHSA to claim resulting from scuba death in Bahamas)).

Moreover, in determining whether DOHSA applies, the location of death and the location of the negligent act, does not control. Rather, the location of the decedent's injury controls, even if death ultimately occurs on land and even if plaintiffs allege that some negligence also occurred on land. See Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on other grounds, 866 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989); *Motts v. M/V Green Wave*, 210 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2000); Crear v. Omega Protein, Inc., 2002 WL 1941447, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2002); Touhey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1981 A.M.C. 1218, 1219 (Cal. App. Ct. 1980) ("It is clear that the place where the injury occurs is the crucial factor in determining whether or not the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction."). The Ninth Circuit has explained that DOHSA applies where "the site of an accident [is] on the high seas" regardless of where "death actually occurs or where the wrongful act causing the accident may have originated. . . . It is . . . irrelevant that decisions contributing to the [boat's] unseaworthiness may have occurred onshore or within territorial waters," Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on reh'g, 866 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989).

In cases alleging death based on an illness, the relevant site of the accident or injury is where "the decedent's illness commenced." Moyer v. Rederi, 645 F.Supp. 620, 628 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see id. ("The key operative fact ... is that the decedent's illness commenced while he was participating in the snorkeling expedition; i.e., while he was on the high seas, as defined by DOHSA" and it does not matter that the plaintiff alleged that "Defendants acted negligently both before and after the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

snorkeling expedition"). This Court has likewise recognized in COVID-19 related litigation involving wrongful death claims that that for purposes of DOHSA's application "the relevant site would be the place where [the deceased passenger] contracted COVID-19." Maa v. Carnival Corp. & PLC, CV 20-6341 DSF (SKX), 2020 WL 5633425, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020).

These principles compel application of DOHSA to all claims related to Chung Chen's death. Plaintiffs allege that Chung Chen contracted "COVID-19 while onboard the ship, which ultimately resulted in his untimely death." (TAC ¶ 23). Plaintiffs also allege that the Ruby Princess, was scheduled for a roundtrip cruise departing from and returning to Sydney Australia. (*Id.* at \P 12, 20).³ Therefore, at all times the Ruby Princess was beyond three nautical miles from any shore of the United States, and the claims relating to Chung Chen are covered by DOHSA.

The Maa case is directly on point with respect to DOHSA's application. In Maa, decedent claimed to have contracted COVID-19 onboard the Coral Princess as it sailed between Buenos Aires and Barbardos. Maa, 2020 WL 5633425, at *19. Although the Complaint did not allege the precise location of the vessel when Mr. Maa contracted COVID-19, the court concluded that a passage between Buenos Aires and Barbados was, by definition, more than three nautical miles from the United States and that DOHSA applied. Id. at *18-19. "The claims asserted on behalf of Mr. Maa are DISMISSED with leave to amend to bring an approrioate claim under DOHSA")). The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding allegations that Mr. Maa's death occurred on land and that certain acts of negligence occurred on land at Princess' offices in California. As this court made clear in Maa, such arguments are irrelevant and cannot avoid imposition of DOHSA. (Id. at *18 ("Plaintiffs ignore this binding Ninth Circuit case law and instead point to irrelevant

The Court can take judicial notice of the undisputed, and undisputably, fact that the cruise was not be within three nautical miles of any U.S. shore.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because DOHSA applies, it requires dismissal of all claims related to the death of Chung Chen. Federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have consistently held that "DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for wrongful deaths that occur on the high seas." Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that "when the incident takes place outside the three-mile limit, DOHSA and DOHSA alone controls."). When DOHSA applies ot preempts and requires dismissal of state law claims. See Helman v. Alcoa Glob. Fasteners, Inc., 637 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2011); Maa, 2020 WL 5633425, at *19. The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise explained that DOHSA precludes even survival actions: "[B]ecause Congress has already decided these issues, it has precluded the judiciary from enlarging either the class of beneficiaries or the recoverable damages. As we noted in Higginbotham, 'Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to encourage the creation of nonpecuniary supplements." Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 123 (1998).

Plaintiffs purport to bring negligence and gross negligence claims in connection with the death of Cheng Chung, but DOHSA preempts and precludes these claims. Plaintiffs likewise seek punitive and other non pecuniary damages relating to his death which are outside the bounds of those prescribed by Congress. (Id. See, TAC ¶¶ 26, 33, and the Wherefore clause p. 14). Punitive damages are not pecuniary damages and therefore they are unavailable under DOHSA. Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on reh'g, 866 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989) For these reasons, the Court should dismiss the TAC as relates to Chung Chen with leave to amend to proceed exclusively under DOHSA

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and without non pecuniary damage claims such as punitive damages.

C. Vivian Chen and Juishan Hsu's Claims for Loss of Consortium Are **Barred by Maritime Law**

The Court should also dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for loss of consortium related to the death of Cheng Chung. Plaintiffs Vivian Chen and Juishan Hsu seek recovery of loss of consortium related to Cheng Chung's death. (TAC ¶¶ 26, 33). Yet it is well established that federal maritime law does not authorize recovery for loss of consortium or loss of society. Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1408 (9th Cir. 1994) (consortium and loss of society damages are not available under general maritime law); Stepski v. M/V NORASIA ALYA, 2010 WL 6501649, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Doyle v. Graske, 579 F.3d 898, 908 (8th Cir. 2009); Adler v. Royal Cruise Line, Ltd., 1996 WL 438799, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Cox v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 2013 WL 3233461, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013). For this reason, the Court should also dismiss or strike Plaintiffs' request for loss of consortium damages..

V. **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant requests that the Court grant its Motion and dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.

DATED: October 1, 2020 **MALTZMAN & PARTNERS**

> s/ Jeffrey B. Maltzman By: Jeffrey B. Maltzman Rafaela P. Castells Edgar R. Nield Gabrielle De Santis Nield Attorneys for Defendant, Princess Cruise Lines Ltd.