Brutality of crime informs sentencing, appeal in B.C decision

Law360 Canada (December 5, 2025, 9:03 AM EST) --

John L. Hill

Criminologists might use “strain theory” to explain crimes committed by individuals who grew up in deprivation and are unable to reach their goals through legitimate means. While such individuals deserve sympathy, how far should an appellate court go in reducing sentences when the crime was brutal? That was the issue facing the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Heinrichs, 2025 MBCA 101.

On May 21, 2020, Amy Doll Heinrichs and three others visited a residence in Winnipeg, where they found the victim and her boyfriend in the garage belonging to one of the others. Heinrichs had previously warned the victim to stay away. Angered by her presence, the accused punched, beat and strangled the victim with a shoelace, then covered her face with her shirt and forced her into a vehicle.

During the drive, Heinrichs continued to assault and strangle the victim, carved numbers into her back with a knife and threatened to kill her. The group drove to a rural road, where Heinrichs again strangled the victim, dragged her from the car and stabbed her in the neck, leaving her on the roadside.

At around 4 a.m., the severely injured victim, half-naked and bleeding, reached a nearby home and received emergency assistance. She was hospitalized for 23 days with a deep stab wound to her neck and extensive bruising.

Heinrichs is an Indigenous woman from Peguis First Nation. She was 39 at the time of the offences and 43 at the time of sentencing. Her background included intergenerational trauma, family substance abuse and experiences of bullying and childhood sexual abuse. She also dealt with early and ongoing struggles with alcohol and drug addiction, a challenging relationship with her mother (a residential/day school survivor), losing her home in 2014 due to flooding and being unable to return because of a lack of housing. Her brother was murdered in 2002. She had a limited criminal record, primarily for impaired driving and property offences. She has four children and one grandchild.

After nearly 20 months in pre-sentence custody, she was granted judicial interim release with residency at the Elizabeth Fry Society. There, she completed programs, participated in Indigenous cultural practices, joined a church and was described as doing “exceedingly well.” She spent over two years on release without incident and, after her conviction, an additional three months in custody before sentencing. At sentencing, both parties agreed that the kidnapping and aggravated assault formed one continuous transaction, warranting concurrent sentences.

The Crown highlighted several aggravating factors and maintained that deterrence and denunciation should be the primary principles. Referencing the “no-free-ride principle” from R. v. McLean, 2022 MBCA 60, it requested 14 years for kidnapping and eight years to run concurrently for aggravated assault.

While acknowledging the accused’s factors under R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and her efforts at rehabilitation, the Crown argued she had not achieved “complete reformation” and still posed a risk because alcohol remained a destabilizing influence.

The Crown also addressed the harm caused to the victim. The victim could not be located for trial, but her father reported that she had deteriorated, especially in her drinking, and was believed to be homeless. At the preliminary inquiry, the victim described experiencing anxiety, nightmares, physical pain and ongoing fear for her safety.

Heinrichs claimed no memory of the offences due to intoxication but expressed remorse and acknowledged that her actions contributed to the victim, also an Indigenous woman, becoming homeless. Defence counsel requested time served (about two years) and an additional two years, arguing that extensive Gladue factors greatly reduced moral blameworthiness and that the accused’s exceptional rehabilitative progress warranted a sentence outside the usual range.

The sentencing judge considered the accused’s prospects for rehabilitation and the principle of restraint, acknowledging the significant efforts she made while on bail to “turn her life around.” After reviewing her progress evidence, the judge found she posed a lower-than-high risk of reoffending and had “good rehabilitative potential.” However, in line with R. v. Cook, 2014 MBCA 29, he reasonably placed more weight on deterrence and denunciation, and less on rehabilitation.

Heinrichs argued on appeal that, although the judge acknowledged her Gladue factors, she failed to consider them properly. Moreover, she did not analyze how those factors impacted her moral culpability and neglected to examine the interaction between her Indigenous background and her rehabilitative efforts.

The court dismissed these arguments. It reaffirmed that Indigenous offenders’ circumstances are the key context for sentencing, as established in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, and discussed in R. v. Kehoe, 2023 BCCA 2. Sentencing judges must clearly consider these circumstances and explain whether they influence the offender’s blameworthiness (Ipeelee; R. v. Napesis, 2014 ABCA 308; R. v. Savard, 2014 ABCA 219; R. v. Fontaine, 2014 BCCA 1).

Appellate deference applies to a judge’s consideration of Gladue factors. As explained in R. v. St. Paul, 2021 MBCA 31, it is not within the power of appellate courts to reweigh sentencing factors (R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9).

The trial judge explicitly considered the accused’s Indigenous background, trauma history, substance abuse issues, exposure to racism, prior sexual abuse, family dynamics and her mother’s experience at a residential school. He concluded that her Indigenous experiences did influence her moral culpability but still found her conduct “reckless and highly morally blameworthy.” The appellate court determined that this was a correct and reasonable application of Gladue and Ipeelee.

The offences were severe. Kidnapping is punishable by life imprisonment and is considered a “grave and heinous crime” requiring emphasis on denunciation and deterrence (R. v. Cook (N.), 2014 MBCA 29). The offence also involved the “insidious feature” of forcible movement. Although the confinement was not lengthy or premeditated, it was severe: the accused and others forcibly confined the victim, transported her outside the city, brutally assaulted her and left her bleeding by the roadside.

Aggravated assault involved weapons (a knife and ligature), gratuitous violence, and caused severe, lasting injuries, all enhancing the gravity of the offence (see R. v. Kravchenko, 2020 MBCA 30). The victim was vulnerable, suffering significant physical injuries and psychological impacts.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly balanced all relevant factors and committed no judicial error, emphasizing that appellate review is not an exercise in dissecting reasons for minor imperfections (R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29).

The court concluded that the sentences, nine years for kidnapping and seven years concurrent for aggravated assault, were not demonstrably unfit, although at the high end of the range. They met the guiding authorities for kidnapping (R. v. Cook (N.)) and aggravated assault (Kravchenko). Further, under the “no-free-ride principle” in R. v. McLean, the judge was entitled to increase the kidnapping sentence because a serious violent offence was committed during the kidnapping.

The sentence respected the fundamental principle of proportionality.

John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. His most recent book, Acts of Darkness (Durvile & UpRoute Books), was released July 1. Hill is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books) and The Rest of the (True Crime) Story (AOS Publishing). Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com.

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