In a 7-2 decision, the justices held that courts may not take into account the so-called retributive considerations — the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law and provide just punishment. Those are among the so-called 3553(a) factors that federal judges must take into account when sentencing defendants for primary offenses.
Writing for the majority, Justice Amy Coney Barrett said supervised release isn't a punishment in lieu of incarceration, but instead "fulfills rehabilitative ends" and "provides individuals with postconfinement assistance."
"So when a defendant violates a condition of supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution," Justice Barrett said.
In the appeal of Esteras v. U.S. and two associated cases, Edgardo Esteras, Timothy Jaimez and Toriano Leaks were sentenced to prison for supervised release infractions. They argued the lower courts wrongly included 3553(a)'s retributive factors in considering their sentences, since those factors are omitted from the statute outlining sentencing considerations for supervised release violations.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed their convictions, joining four other appeals courts in finding that judges can take into account all the 3553(a) factors in sentences for violating supervised release, and adding to a deep circuit split. The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari on Oct. 21.
The case is Esteras et al. v U.S., case number 23-7483, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
--Editing by Robert Rudinger.
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