The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Thursday that defendants can benefit from lighter sentences under the First Step Act if they were sentenced prior to the 2018 criminal justice reform law but later resentenced after their original sentences were tossed.

The court's narrowly split decision directly affects about two dozen defendants and could have ramifications down the road for many other defendants who were sentenced before the FSA's enactment and are appealing their convictions and sentences, according to statements from a government attorney during oral arguments in January.

The ruling settled a circuit split and hinged on whether an initial sentence that had been vacated still met the definition of "imposed" under the FSA. The law states, in part, that defendants can qualify for relief under FSA for offenses committed before the law's enactment "if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment."

The holding applies to first-time offenders convicted of violating a law that criminalizes possessing a firearm while committing other crimes.

"The question presented here concerns an edge case: What penalties apply when a §924(c) offender had been sentenced as of the act's enactment, but that sentence was subsequently vacated, such that the offender must face a post act resentencing?" Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote in the majority opinion. "We hold that, under that circumstance, a sentence 'has not been imposed' for purposes of §403(b). Thus, the First Step Act's more lenient penalties apply."

Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in all but two parts of the majority opinion that hinged on Congress' intent in enacting the FSA, while Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elana Kagan joined in the entire opinion.

In his dissent, Justice Samuel Alito contended that the majority's interpretation of the First Step Act "unpools" the law's "carefully wound retroactivity command to mean that any defendant whose sentence is vacated at any time and for any reason may claim the benefit of the act's reduced mandatory minimum.

"But nothing in the text or broader context supports such a boundless interpretation," he continued. "Indeed, the portions of today's decision that command the votes of only three justices give the game away. Animating the court's atextual interpretation is a thinly veiled desire to march in the parade of sentencing reform. But our role is to interpret the statute before us, not overhaul criminal sentencing."

Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett joined in Justice Alito's dissent.

Counsel in the case did not immediately respond to comment requests.

Both the government and the defendants in the two consolidated cases before the high court — three men convicted in Texas of charges tied to bank robberies — agreed that the FSA should apply to post-enactment resentencings.

Still, the government had objected to the Supreme Court hearing the case, asserting that the circuit split over whether the FSA applies to post-enactment resentencings was insignificant. The government further asserted that Congress could resolve ambiguities in the law and its application.

The justices' decision reversed a Fifth Circuit panel's ruling that the three Texas defendants could not benefit from the FSA when they were each resentenced to more than 100 years in prison in 2022 through a practice known as "sentence stacking," a harsh penalty that the FSA scrapped.

An attorney for the defendants, Michael B. Kimberly of Winston & Strawn LLP, told the justices during oral arguments that a vacated sentence should be "treated as though it was never imposed" and that the "rules of statutory construction do not require the court to turn a blind eye to common sense."

Because the government agreed with the defendants, the justices tapped Michael H. McGinley, a partner at Dechert LLP, to argue in support of the Fifth Circuit's ruling, which tracked with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the FSA but conflicted with rulings from the Third, Seventh and Ninth circuits.

McGinley contended that the "most natural, commonsense understanding of the statute's text read as a whole" shows that it does not apply to defendants who have been sentenced before the law was enacted, even if their sentences were later vacated.

The government is represented by Masha Hansford of the Solicitor General's Office.

Hewitt and Duffey are represented by Michael B. Kimberly of Winston & Strawn LLP. 

The consolidated cases are Hewitt v. United States, case number 23-1002, and Duffey et al. v. United States, case number 23-1150, in the Supreme Court of the United States.

--Editing by Alyssa Miller.