Law360 (August 31, 2026, 8:20 PM EDT) -- The Connecticut Supreme Court on Monday ordered the retrial of a man convicted for allegedly orchestrating the murder of a woman pregnant with his child, finding a prosecutor failed to correct misleading testimony that a key cooperating witness had no "deal" with the government.

Writing for the court's majority, Justice Andrew J. McDonald said Senior Assistant State's Attorney Donna Mambrino violated Napue v. Illinois , a 1959 U.S. Supreme Court case that requires prosecutors to set the record straight when juries hear testimony they know to be false or misleading. Mambrino should have corrected course when witnesses Kingsley Minto and his lawyer Richard Cohen downplayed assurances the government would inform a sentencing judge of Minto's cooperation, if Minto testified truthfully against murder and conspiracy defendant Carlton A. Bryan, the panel held.

Mambrino "told the jury that Minto had no interest in the outcome of the case," according to the opinion, "even though she knew that she had made a deal with Minto to bring Minto's cooperation with the state to the attention of his sentencing court in exchange for his testimony."

Ruling on Bryan's appeal, the justices reversed a habeas corpus court's judgment, vacated his murder and conspiracy convictions, and ordered a new trial.

"Mambrino elicited substantially misleading testimony from Minto and Cohen, failed to correct the false impressions created by their misleading testimony, and relied on the misleading testimony during closing argument," they said.

The majority criticized Mambrino's attempt during Bryan's post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings to distinguish between a "deal," which Minto testified he did not have, and an "agreement" or a "promise," which Mambrino later said existed. The justices said there was no meaningful distinction between those words, finding Mambrino's argument "perplexing."

"In ordinary parlance, and as a matter of contract law, a 'deal' and an 'agreement' are one and the same," Justice McDonald wrote.

The majority indicated Bryan's trial was built largely on Minto's testimony. For instance, Minto provided the "only evidence linking the murder weapon to the murder itself," the justices concluded.

During Bryan's criminal trial, prosecutors claimed he asked his friend Matthew Allen Hall-Davis to kill Shamari Jenkins after she declined to abort Bryan's baby. He also allegedly told Hall-Davis' cousin he wanted Jenkins dead, and he allegedly asked another man to repair a Ruger revolver authorities believed was the murder weapon.

Hall-Davis shot Jenkins through the back window of a vehicle in which she was riding with Bryan, prosecutors alleged. Bryan called 911 to report the shooting, the evidence showed.

Hall-Davis allegedly confessed to Minto that he had killed Jenkins at Bryan's request. Hall-Davis and Minto then robbed a jewelry store, allegedly with the same revolver used in the murder, the justices said. When video of the robbery circulated online, Bryan reported Hall-Davis and Minto to the police, allegedly because Hall-Davis lied about ditching the revolver.

From there, the investigation unfolded, and Bryan was accused of murder and conspiracy. At trial, Minto said he had not been promised anything in return for testifying against Bryan, the justices said. He also claimed he had not been told prosecutors would notify his sentencing judge that he cooperated with the government's efforts.

"No deal was made," Minto testified, according to a transcript cited by the justices.

However, he later clarified he had been told prosecutors would vouch for him at sentencing.

On cross-examination, Minto reaffirmed "no deals" had been made.

"Nothing had been promised to me," he testified.

On redirect, Minto agreed with Mambrino's statements that there was no "specific plea agreement." Minto claimed he was testifying "because it's the right thing to do," the justices noted.

On re-cross, Minto admitted "considerations" had been extended. Cohen testified "there was no agreement, verbal or written," but expected "there would be some consideration given" in return for Minto's testimony.

When asked to elaborate, Cohen said he hoped Minto's cooperation would result in a favorable plea agreement or a lower sentence.

"That would be the hope, perhaps, the expectation, but that's all it is," he testified.

Later, Mambrino argued none of the state's witnesses had "an interest in the outcome of this case."

After Bryan was convicted and his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Mambrino defended her actions in his habeas corpus trial. She said there had "always been an agreement" to vouch for Minto, but she differentiated a "promise" or an "agreement" from a "deal" that would have triggered responsibilities under Napue, the justices said. Mambrino also tried to distinguish between a formal plea agreement and an understanding that the government would support favorable treatment.

The justices said Mambrino's attempts to distinguish these terms, rather than clarify the facts for the jury, ultimately "enhanced Minto's credibility" during Bryan's trial. Had jurors known the truth, "the inconsistencies in Minto's testimony could have come across as self-serving embellishments connecting the petitioner to the murder weapon rather than as good faith recollections," they said.

The supreme court said Mambrino tried to rehabilitate Minto when she should have taken another course, such as stipulating to the government's understanding with Minto and asking the trial judge to instruct the jury that an agreement existed.

"The fact that Mambrino attempted to draw truthful testimony out of Minto, though laudable, is of no legal moment," the justices added, because the untrue testimony was not squarely addressed or corrected.

Citing its own 2021 decision in Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction and earlier Second Circuit precedent, the Connecticut Supreme Court said a witness' "tepid admission" of the truth "was insufficient to cure the impact of false testimony on the jury, especially when the prosecutor sought to shore up the witness' credibility."

"Mambrino's use of the Napue violations during her closing argument reflects an approach to the truth that further undermines confidence in the verdict," the justices said.

In an opinion concurring with the judgment but dissenting in part, Justice Nora R. Dannehy said she believed Bryan did not articulate a valid Napue challenge. However, she agreed to vacate the conviction and order a new trial because post-conviction Freedom of Information Act requests revealed the Manchester Police Department recorded two interviews with Minto but never disclosed them as evidence. The Manchester police deleted the recordings, but another department, the Windsor Police Department, kept copies.

According to Justice Dannehy, the first recording showed "Minto's willingness to cooperate fluctuated depending on whether the detectives suggested that his cooperation might benefit him."

The second revealed Minto had been involved with "additional robberies," Justice Dannehy said. Successive FOIA requests showed Mambrino refused to authorize arrest warrants naming him in those robberies, she said.

Justice Dannehy believed the government's failure to hand over this evidence before trial violated the 1963 Supreme Court opinion Brady v. Maryland , which requires the government to the defense evidence favorable to its case.

Justice William H. Bright Jr. joined Justice Dannehy's views on Brady, but not on Napue.

A lawyer for Bryan declined to comment Monday. A spokesperson for the Office of the Chief State's Attorney did not respond to a request for comment.

Bryan is represented by Kayla R. Stephen of the Office of the Chief Public Defender.

Connecticut is represented by Meryl R. Gersz and Christopher A. Alexy of the Office of the Chief State's Attorney, and Sharmese L. Walcott of the Hartford Judicial District State's Attorney Office.

The case is Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction, case number SC 21193, in the Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut.

--Editing by Adam LoBelia.

For a reprint of this article, please contact reprints@law360.com.