The justices will also hear two cases involving the First Step Act's compassionate release provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c), and what factors district courts can consider when entertaining motions for sentence reductions.
The court will also release orders on Monday, and close Tuesday for Veterans Day.
Forced Haircut Liability
On Monday, the Supreme Court will debate whether state and local government officials can be held personally liable for alleged religious rights violations.
Louisiana man Damon Landor has asked the justices to overturn a Fifth Circuit decision affirming the dismissal of his Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA, lawsuit against guards at the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center in Cottonport, Louisiana, who allegedly violated his religious rights by forcibly shaving his head in 2020. Landor, a devout Rastafarian who follows the Nazarite Vow against cutting one's hair, claims the guards handcuffed him to a chair and shaved off his dreadlocks despite his invocation of a previous Fifth Circuit decision that found the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety's prohibition on inmates having dreadlocks was unlawfully burdensome under the act.
An unanimous three-judge panel "emphatically" condemned Landor's treatment, but found that circuit precedent from 2009 required dismissal of his claims seeking monetary damages against the guards in their individual capacities. U.S. Congress enacted RLUIPA under its spending clause power, the panel held, which means only the recipient of federal funding – Louisiana in this case – can be held liable for violating the act.
Landor, however, contends RLUIPA unambiguously authorizes lawsuits like his. The act allows a person to "assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government," which is defined to include "any other person acting under color of state law." Landor claims the Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir, which held that nearly identical language in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act allows suits against federal officials in their individual capacities, settles this case. The two acts have long been described as twin statutes and should be read the same way, he said. If RLUIPA prohibits plaintiffs from seeking monetary damages from state officials, then the statute loses a significant deterrent factor, Landor adds. Courts have consistently held that prisoners' claims for prospective relief under the act become moot once they're transferred or released from a facility, so the only viable remedy for past wrongs is monetary damages against officials in their individual capacities, he said.
The federal government agrees, noting that Landor's suggested interpretation follows Congress' policy determination that private lawsuits are important mechanisms for enforcing RLUIPA. Federal lawmakers have broad discretion when it comes to setting conditions for federal funding, the government said, and they often require state and local officials to honor certain rights and statutes as a way to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately. Additionally, nothing in the U.S. Constitution bars Congress from imposing liability on parties other than the named funding recipient, the government claims.
Louisiana counters that legislation like RLUIPA that's enacted under the Constitution's spending clause operates more like a contract, and, therefore, only the named parties can be held liable for any alleged violations. Nonparties like individual officials cannot be bound by terms of a contract they didn't agree to, the state said. The statute also doesn't clearly and unambiguously allow for suits against officials in their individual capacities or for monetary damages. While courts have held that RFRA's language allows plaintiffs to sue federal officials in their individual capacity, the fact that RLUIPA is aimed at states requires a different analysis of the language due to sovereign immunity concerns, Louisiana said.
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP partner Zachary D. Tripp will argue for Landor, Libby A. Baird, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government in favor of Landor, and Louisiana Solicitor General J. Benjamin Aguiñaga will argue for the state.
The case is Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety et al., case number 23-1197.
Derivate Immunity Appeals
Also on Monday, the justices will consider whether court orders denying government contractors derivative sovereign immunity should be immediately appealable.
The GEO Group Inc., which operates a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, has petitioned the high court to review the Tenth Circuit's dismissal of an interlocutory appeal of a district court's finding that the contractor must face claims of unjust enrichment and allegations that it violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Alejandro Menocal claims in a class action that GEO forced detainees to conduct housekeeping work with threats of solitary confinement for noncompliance and underpaid participants in a voluntary work program.
A three-judge panel dismissed GEO's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the district court's derivative sovereign immunity ruling wasn't a collateral order eligible for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. The questions of whether GEO is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity and whether the contractor is liable for the alleged allegations are based on similar fact patterns, namely whether the challenged actions were ordered by the government or not, the panel said.
GEO argues the Tenth Circuit is wrong and that decisions on derivative sovereign immunity are "final decisions" under Section 1291 and subject to an interlocutory appeal exception. District court orders denying similar Immunities, such as absolute immunity, qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, are immediately appealable because they effect whether a dispute can continue to the merits. Derivative sovereign immunity is similarly dispositive, GEO said, and can't be effectively reviewed on appeal after final judgment. Even if there is some overlap between the facts that help determine immunity and liability questions, the Supreme Court has in the past said the questions are distinct enough to trigger Section 1291's exception, the contractor said.
Menocal, on the other hand, claims GEO's interpretation would lead to piecemeal and costly litigation. Derivative sovereign immunity, despite its name, is not an immunity from liability but a defense to liability, he said, so the question of whether it applies in a particular dispute are usually fact-based ones decided by juries. In virtually every case, derivative sovereign immunity will be intertwined with the dispute's merits, making appeals of final judgments the best avenue to challenge adverse rulings, Menocal said.
The federal government mostly agrees with Menocal, but warns the Supreme Court against issuing a categorical rule. In most situations, it said, decisions on whether contractors are entitled to derivative sovereign immunity will be fact-based defenses that can be vindicated on appeal with a reversal of a final judgment. But there are certain, rare situations in which such decisions may require interlocutory appeals. The Supreme Court could rule against GEO in this case while still leaving some room for interlocutory appeals in those certain situations, the government said.
Greenberg Traurig LLP shareholder Dominic E. Draye will argue for GEO Group, Gupta Wessler LLP principal Jennifer D. Bennett will argue for Menocal, and Sopan Joshi, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government in favor of Menocal.
The case is The GEO Group Inc. v. Menocal et al., case number 24-758.
Sentence Reduction Challenges
On Wednesday, the Supreme Court will debate defendants can meet the First Step Act's compassionate release provision's "extraordinary and compelling reasons" requirement for sentence reduction by alleging grounds typically used for habeas corpus relief.
New York defendant Joe Fernandez, who is currently serving a life sentence in relation to the 2000 murders of two drug cartel members, has asked the justices to review a Second Circuit decision reversing a reduction in his sentence under the compassionate release provision. A Southern District of New York judge reduced Fernandez's sentence to 11 years of time served in 2021 after finding major issues with the sufficiency and reliability of evidence presented against the defendant at trial, including eyewitness testimony, and due to the disparities between the length of Fernandez's sentence and those of his co-defendants.
A three-judge panel reinstated Fernandez's life sentence after finding that none of those reasons rose to the level of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" required under Section 1291. Fernandez had also previously raised similar challenges under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, which allows for federal inmates to vacate constitutionally or statutorily defective sentences.
Fernandez claims the Second Circuit impermissibly limited the range of considerations that district courts can take review when deciding whether to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act. The statute's plain language, he said, imposes no "categorical" restrictions on what factors courts can review, respecting the historic tradition of granting courts wide discretion in sentencing. Fernandez said he can properly argue that the same reasons that in certain cases may warrant invalidation of a sentence under the habeas corpus statute, warrant a reduction of his sentence in this case. As long as defendants don't use the compassionate relief provision to argue for invalidation of his conviction or sentence, they are free to argue that similar grounds warrant a reduced sentence.
The federal government counters that Fernandez's interpretation of the First Step Act's compassionate release provision would allow defendants to end run the habeas corpus statute. The plain meaning of the compassionate release provision requires a defendant's reasons to be highly unique and often unforeseen. Since Congress predicted that defendants would lodge challenges to their convictions and sentences based on allegedly constitutional violations, abuse of discretion or ineffective assistance of counsel, those reasons don't amount to the "extraordinary and compelling" ones contemplated by the compassionate release provision, the government said.
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP partner Benjamin Gruenstein will argue for Fernandez, and Eric J. Feigin, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government.
The case is Fernandez v. United States, case number 24-556.
Sentence Reduction Reasons
Also on Wednesday, the justices will consider if district court's can consider disparities created by prospective changes in sentencing laws as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that warrant a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.
Defendants Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie M. Carter have petitioned the high court in consolidated cases to review the Third Circuit's determination that a 2023 rule issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which states that defendants serving "unusually long" sentences who would be subject to much shorter sentences under current law, creates an "extraordinary and compelling" reason to reduce an individual's sentence under the First Step Act's compassionate relief provision. Rutherford and Carter are currently serving more than 42 years and 70 years in prison, respectively, under now-defunct mandatory minimum statutes for armed bank robberies.
Both men challenged their sentences as unusually long and grossly disparate under the Sentencing Commission's sentence, but the Third Circuit ruled that the guidelines didn't change the fact that the First Step Act's compassionate release provision specifically forbids courts from deeming prospective changes in law as an "extraordinary or compelling" reason prompting a sentence reduction.
Rutherford argues the Third Circuit's decision contradicts a long history of giving district courts wide discretion to consider all relevant information when sentencing a defendant. What constitutes an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for sentence reduction is a case-specific inquiry that, under the plain text of the compassionate release provision, must consider a sentence's length and what would be available under present law. Congress enacted the compassionate release provision with the exact aim of alleviating unusually long sentences, he said, and the Supreme Court should not allow courts to undermine the statute's purpose.
Carter adds that Congress purposefully delegated power to the Sentencing Commission to define what types of "extraordinary and compelling" reasons would require sentence reductions. The commission's 2023 decision to allow district courts to consider prospective changes in law was well within its discretion and should receive some deference from the Supreme Court, he said.
Meanwhile, the federal government, claims guidance from the Sentencing Commission can not change the fact that Congress made sentencing reforms explicitly prospective. Lawmakers had the option to apply reforms retroactively to defendants like Rutherford and Carter, but it decided against that. The courts and the commission should respect that policy choice, the government said. Additionally, the commission's limited role is to describe what subsets of potential reasons might warrant a sentence reduction and the 2023 guidelines clearly exceed the boundaries of its delegate power.
Defendants Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie M. Carter have petitioned the high court in consolidated cases to review the Third Circuit's determination that a U.S. Sentencing Commission rule issued in 2023 state that defendants serving "unusually long" sentences
David C. Frederick, a Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel & Frederick PLLC partner, will argue for Rutherford, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP partner David A. O'Neil will argue for Carter, and Eric J. Feigin, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government.
The consolidated cases are Rutherford v. United States, case number 24-820, and Carter v. United States, case number 24-860.
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