Order | Filed: June 03, 2026
| Entered: June 03, 2026
Modise et al v. CareOne Health Services, LLC et al
Labor: Fair Standards | Connecticut
Order on Motion for Appointment of Special Process Server
ORDER granting in part 238 Motion for Appointment of Special Process Server.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1 governs service of process other than a summons or subpoena, including writs of execution. See Schneider v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 72 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1995). The rule permits service of a writ of execution "by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed for that purpose." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1(a); see also Lation v. Fetner Props., Inc., No. 17-CV-3276 (JPO), 2019 WL 1614691, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2019).
Plaintiffs request that the Court appoint William Drew, who is a Connecticut State Marshal and experienced in the service of process, to serve the issued writs of execution. The Court grants this request pursuant to its authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1(a) to "specially appoint[]" private process servers for the purpose of serving writs of execution. See id.; McPhaul v. Insight Mgmt. Partners, LLC, No. 1:19-CV-1392, 2022 WL 1607394, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 20, 2022). If Mr. Drew serves the writs of execution in this case, he will do so as a "person specially appointed" by this Court, rather than as a state officer acting pursuant to Connecticut law.
The Connecticut Minimum Wage Act authorizes an award of "costs... as may be allowed by the court." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-68(a)(1). The Court has previously awarded attorneys' fees and costs in this case, pursuant to that statute. See ECF No. 229. Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to tax Mr. Drew's private process server fees as costs, to the extent they do not exceed the fees that, were a U.S. Marshal to serve the writs, would be statutorily authorized pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1921(c)(1). See U.S. for Use & Benefit of Evergreen Pipeline Const. Co. v. Merritt Meridian Const. Corp., 95 F.3d 153, 172 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Griffith v. Mt. Carmel Medical Ctr., 157 F.R.D. 499, 50708 (D.Kan.1994) ("[T]axation of costs for special process servers is justifiable. However, such costs should be taxable only to the extent that they do not exceed the costs that would have been incurred had the Marshal's office effected service, since only the Marshal's fee amount is actually statutorily authorized.").
To the extent Plaintiffs ask that the Court place a cap on the fees Mr. Drew charges them -- which may then be recovered at least in part from Defendant as costs as set forth above -- Plaintiffs set forth no authority suggesting the Court has the authority to do so. Plaintiffs do not cite to any cases from the Second Circuit permitting a district court to place an upper limit on a private process server's fee or to endorse use of the federal fee schedule for a private process server in lieu of Connecticut's fee schedule; rather, the Second Circuit has simply indicated that such fees should not be taxed as costs beyond the statutorily authorized fee for service by U.S. Marshals. See id. And Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1 authorizes the Court to "specially appoint" a person to serve a writ of execution, but it does not suggest that the process server's fees should be limited. Nor does it authorize the Court to confer upon a private person (including a state marshal) the title of "deputy marshal" or "U.S. Marshal," as would have the effect of limiting the fees recoverable by such a process server. Indeed, district courts within this Circuit have recognized that, in general, a plaintiff who chooses to employ a private process server is responsible for paying that person's fees. See, e.g., Lation, 2019 WL 1614691, at *4 ("The Court[] sees no reason to deny the request to specially appoint a process server to serve the anticipated Writ of Execution requested. As such, if [Plaintiff] wishes to bear the cost of employing a private process server for this task, he is welcome to do so."); McPhaul, 2022 WL 1607394, at *2 ("Plaintiffs are cautioned that Plaintiffs will bear the cost of employing the private process server."). Accordingly, the Court declines to limit the fee Mr. Drew privately charges in the manner Plaintiffs have suggested. Should Plaintiffs wish to use the services of a U.S. Marshal rather than Mr. Drew to serve the writs of execution to avoid the issue, they may do so. Signed by Judge Sarala V. Nagala on 6/3/26. (JH)