Order | Filed: August 11, 2026
| Entered: August 11, 2026
Williams v. Smith et al
Other Statutes: Administrative Procedures Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision | Connecticut
Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief
ORDER denying 227 Motion for Relief from Judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), in relevant part, permits a party to seek relief from a final judgment or order if "the judgment is void." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Rule 60(b) relief is reserved for "extraordinary circumstances." Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988). "A judgment is not void "merely because it is erroneous"; rather, it is void "only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. § 2862 (3d ed.).
Plaintiff asserts that the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued in this case on April 17, 2026, and the subsequent mandate issued on June 29, 2026, were void because the appellate judges who issued the decision had previously been sued by Plaintiff in an unrelated matter and thus ought to have recused themselves from deciding the appeal in this action. The Court disagrees. First, as the Court previously held in another of Plaintiff's matters, see Williams v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 3:24-CV-200 (SVN), ECF No. 58, the appellate judges were not required to recuse themselves from adjudicating this matter under 28 U.S.C. § Section 455(b)(5)(i), because they are not parties to this proceeding. See DiMartino v. Pulice, No. 3:16-CV-378 (AWT), 2017 WL 958391, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2017) ( recognizing that "a judge is not disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455 merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him" (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D. Conn. 1983) and collecting several other cases); see also United States v. Pryor, 960 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1992) ("It cannot be that an automatic recusal can obtained by the simple act of suing the judge.").
Second, it does not follow from the fact that the Second Circuit panel had previously been sued by Plaintiff in an unrelated action that the judges' "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See 28 U.S.C. § Section 455(a). The Second Circuit advises that the relevant questions are: "Would a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, conclude that the [relevant] judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned? Or phrased differently, would an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts, entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal?" El Omari v. Kreab (USA) Inc., 735 F. App'x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000)). "Generally, claims of judicial bias must be based on extrajudicial matters, and adverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality." Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Here, Plaintiff points to the panel's use of the word "baseless" to characterize one of his arguments as evidence of the appellate judges' bias. The panel considered the argument made by Plaintiff -- that the Second Circuit Clerk's Office had usurped the Second Circuit's Article III authority because it rejected some of his filings for failure to comply with the appropriate procedures -- and first determined it was irrelevant to the matters at issue in the appeal. See ECF No. 226 at 7, n.1. Only after assessing the argument is irrelevant did the panel characterize the argument as baseless, in any event; but this determination does not suggest that the judges' impartiality could reasonably be questioned, such that recusal would have been appropriate. Plaintiff confuses an adverse decision as bias. See Chen 552 F.3d at 227. The Court cannot find that the risk of injustice to Plaintiff or the other parties to the litigation; the risk that denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases; or the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process warranted recusal of the appellate judges under these circumstances. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863. Instead, those judges properly assessed Plaintiff's argument and appropriately rejected it on its merits. No objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts -- including Plaintiff's status as attorney who license remains administratively suspended -- would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done here, absent recusal of the appellate panel. El Omari, 735 F. Ap... (truncated)