Order | Filed: August 05, 2026
| Entered: August 05, 2026
Marcano Orihuen v. Garcia Cabrera
Contract: Other | Connecticut
Order on Motion for Extension of Time
ORDER granting 22 Motion for Extension of Time to File Rule 26(f) Report and Engage in Discovery. "It is well-settled that a district court has discretion to halt discovery pending its decision on a motion to dismiss." Gandler v. Nazarov, No. 94 Civ. 2272 (CSH), 1994 WL 702004, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1994). A district court's authority to stay discovery derives from Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which permits the court to issue protective orders pertaining to discovery for good cause. See Dome Tech., LLC v. Golden Sands Gen. Contractors, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1607-VAB, 2017 WL 11577923, at *1 (D. Conn. July 24, 2017). Although it is not the routine practice of this Court to stay discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss, the Court may nevertheless find good cause to stay discovery upon consideration of three factors: (1) "the strength of the dispositive motion[s]"; (2) "the breadth of the discovery sought," including the burden of responding to discovery; and (3) "the prejudice a stay would have on the non-moving party." Metzner v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 3:20-cv-784 (KAD), 2020 WL 7232551, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 12, 2020) (citation omitted). For the reasons below, the Court finds good cause to stay discovery pending resolution of Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19).
The first factor, the strength of Defendant's motion to dismiss, weighs in favor of staying discovery. Defendant's motion contains substantial arguments that, if successful, would dispose of the claims at issue in this action, or at least substantially narrow the scope of Plaintiff's claims. See Josie-Delerme v. Am. Gen. Fin. Corp., No. CV 2008-3166 (NG) (MDG), 2009 WL 497609, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2009); Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. RPost Int'l Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (staying discovery where the defendants' motion to dismiss raised "substantial arguments for dismissal of many, if not all, of the claims asserted in [the] lawsuit"); Rivera v. Heyman, No. 96 Civ. 4489 (PKL), 1997 WL 86394, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (staying discovery after concluding that resolution of a motion to dismiss might "significantly narrow, if not eliminate, the issues remaining in the case"); Metzner, 2020 WL 7232551, at *3-5 (considering the strength of the defendant's motion to dismiss). Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party, and that joinder is not feasible because the addition of that party would destroy complete diversity. ECF No. 19-1 at 7-10. Defendant further argues that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, as there is a previously filed action presently being litigated in New York state court arising from the same business relationship, and Plaintiff here seeks adjudication of substantially the same controversy. Id. at 10-17. If these arguments are successful, the case may not continue in federal court. Thus, the first factor favors granting a stay.
The second factor, the breadth of discovery sought and the burden of responding to it, weighs in favor of granting a stay. Defendant argues that discovery is likely to be substantial, and that the claims asserted before this Court overlap substantially with those already being litigated in the parallel state action in New York, such that any discovery conducted in this case is likely to duplicate discovery in the state proceeding. ECF No. 27 at 5. The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff intends to conduct substantial discovery that would unduly burden Defendant, but it is clear that resolution of the motion to dismiss may obviate the need for "potentially onerous discovery" required to defend against Plaintiff's claims. See Josie-Delerme, 2009 WL 497609, at *2. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of staying discovery. See Rivera, 1997 WL 86394, at *1 (reasoning that proceeding with discovery "would waste the parties' resources and would constitute an undue burden on defendants"); see also Spinelli v. National Football League, 13-CS-07398 (RWS), 2015 WL 7302266, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,2015) (reasoning that a stay could also "have the advantage of simplifying and shortening discovery in the event that some of plaintiffs' claims are dismissed and others survive, by limiting the scope of the parties' inquiry to claims that have been established as potentially viable.").
The third factor, the prejudice of a stay to Plaintiff, does not weigh against staying discovery. Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff has consented to the stay of discovery, so it stands to reason the prejudice will be minimal, if it exists at all. Cf. Lithgow v. Edelmann, 247 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D. Conn. 2007) (denying moti... (truncated)