Order | Filed: August 21, 2026
| Entered: August 21, 2026
Manywa v. Wesling et al
Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee | Massachusetts
Order
Judge Richard G. Stearns: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 12 Response, filed by Jonas Serugo Manywa.
Petitioner Jonas Serugo Manywa is a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo who is currently detained at Plymouth County Correctional Facility, in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Manywa was granted Withholding of Removal by the Chelmsford Immigration Court, see Dkt #1-3, and released on an Order of Supervision (OSUP) on February 3, 2025. Dkt # 1-4. Manywa resides in Maine with his spouse and children who are United States citizens born in Maine. Manywa states that his OSUP was revoked without notice to him and after he was detained by U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities on August 4, 2026. He has been told that ICE intends to remove him to Cameroon. Manywa contends that the manner of the revocation of his OSUP violates his statutory, regulatory, and due process rights by revoking his OSUP and detaining him pending deportation without abiding by their own regulations. See Pet. Response (Dkt # 12) at 4-6.
It is undisputed that 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 governs how respondents may revoke an OSUP and detain a noncitizen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Before revoking an OSUP and re-detaining a non-citizen who has not violated the conditions of OSUP, ICE must determine that, based on changed circumstances, removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 8 C.F.R. §241.13(i)(2)). ICE must make that determination in the first instance, rather than the court. See Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 619-620 (1st Cir. 2023). The government bears the burden of demonstrating that ICE properly made such a determination. Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150 (D. Mass. 2025). That regulation requires an official, such as the Field Office Director, to determine that revocation of a noncititzen's release is in the public interest and provide that noncitizen with an adequate opportunity to rebut that determination. Regulatory violations have been found where ICE states that circumstances have changed without providing any specific support for that assertion. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 directs Respondents to make certain findings prior to revoking an OSUP. Here, there is no evidence that the acting Field Office Director made such findings prior to the revocation or that Respondents afforded Manywa a meaningful opportunity to rebut such findings. See Dkt. # 1 at 5. Other district courts have ruled that the agencys failure to follow its own regulations in revoking an OSUP constitutes a violation of Due Process that must be remedied by immediate release. See, e.g., Doe v. Wesling, 2026 WL 1815424, at *2 (D. Mass. June 24, 2026); Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152-153 (2025) Munagi v. McDonald, 813 F. Supp. 3d 225, 229 (D. Mass. 2025); Arostegui-Campo v. Noem, 2025 WL 3280886, at *4 (E. D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (holding that the unsupported statement by the declaring officer that "there is a significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future" does not satisfy respondents' burden). Further, the changed circumstances that make an alien's removal likely in the foreseeable future must have existed at or before the OSUP revocation; post-hoc justifications are inadequate.
The court orders Respondents, within the next seven days (by August 28, 2026), to demonstrate that ICE has complied with its own internal regulations or show cause why petitioner should not be immediately released as a consequence of its failure to do so.
(MZ)