Order | Filed: July 20, 2026
| Entered: July 20, 2026
BOCK v. Odner et al
Motor Vehicle | Massachusetts
Order
Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered denying 121 Objection by Daimler Trucks North America LLC. A district judge may reconsider a non-dispositive pretrial ruling of a magistrate judge, on a timely objection, only "where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(A); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also Neelon v. Krueger, 2015 WL 1037992, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2015) (citing cases). "Discovery matters are for the informed discretion of the district court, and the breadth of that discretion in managing pre-trial mechanics and discovery is very great." Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 532 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A protective order may include both factual and legal determinations. "Mixed questions of law and fact 'invoke a sliding standard of review,' with 'more fact intensive... question[s]' receiving 'more deferential... review' and 'more law intensive... question[s]' receiving less deference." Neelon, 2015 WL 1037992, at *2 (alterations in original) (quoting In re IDC Clambakes, Inc., 727 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013)). "A respect for this standard is important, given the pivotal role that magistrate judges play in overseeing the conduct of the sort of complex pretrial discovery typified by this case." Green v. Cosby, 160 F. Supp. 3d 431, 433 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Gargiulo v. Baystate Health Inc., 279 F.R.D. 62, 64 (D. Mass. 2012)). Judge Robertson denied Defendant's motion for a protective order without a limited sharing provision because Defendant did not meet its burden in showing good cause as required under Fed. R. of Civ. P. 26(c)(1). (Dkt. No. 117.) Judge Robertson declined adopting the model protective order proposed by Defendant, based on the protective order encouraged in U.S. Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Boal's session, finding that the undersigned has no model protective order for this court's session. (Dkt. No. 117 at 4-5.) Defendant, asserting that the limited sharing provision is necessary to stop Plaintiff from disclosing Defendant's information with other would-be plaintiffs, parties, lawyers, and experts in similar litigation, timely raises four objections to Judge Roberton's decision. (Dkt. No. 121.) Plaintiff did not respond to these objections. "A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending... The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,... [from] requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specialized way." Fed. R. of Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). As Judge Robertson correctly stated, "[t]he party or person seeking a protective order, including an order limiting another party's right to disseminate information obtained in discovery, has the burden of demonstrating the existence of good cause." (Dkt. No. 117 at 2 (quoting Polo v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 3:16-cv-11400-MGM, 2017 WL 2836996, at *2 (D. Mass. June 30, 2017))). "'A finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.'" (Id. (citing Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986)). Defendant's first objection is that Judge Robertson erred in even engaging in a good cause determination because the parties previously agreed on the need for a protective order. (Dkt. No. 121 at 6.) However, while the parties had previously agreed on the need for a protective order, they disagreed as to its scope, i.e., whether that protective order should include a sharing provision that would allow Plaintiff to share certain information obtained through discovery with other would-be plaintiffs and their attorneys. As Judge Robertson correctly pointed out, [w]hen there is a dispute between the parties about the scope of a protective order, the party seeking confidentiality has the burden of showing good cause for the order it seeks." (Dkt. No. 117 at 5.) This is the case here where "Plaintiff['s] agree[ment] to a protective order preventing unrestricted access to DTNA's confidential documents is not the same as his agreement that all access must be restricted." (Id. (citing Gabriel v. Superstation Media, Inc., No. 13-12787-NMG, 2014 WL 12796359, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2014))). Second, Defendant argues that even if it were required to show good cause, it met its burden because the information could "fall[] into the hands of its competitors," and that "the attorneys, experts, and non-parties with w... (truncated)