Order | Filed: September 28, 2026
| Entered: September 28, 2026
Gay v. President and Fellows of Harvard College et al
Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities - Employment | Massachusetts
Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered GRANTING 10 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Sarah Gay brings this employment-discrimination action against the President and Fellows of Harvard College and Gergana Hunt, the audio-visual media operations manager at Harvards division of continuing education. Defendants move to dismiss Count V and Count VII of the complaint. With respect to the retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. in Count V, Defendants seek to dismiss such claim insofar as it is asserted against Hunt individually. The First Circuit "agree[s] with the virtually universal view that Title I of the ADA, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 'addresses the conduct of employers only and does not impose liability on co-workers.' " Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2009)). "Furthermore 'in the context of employment discrimination, the retaliation provision of the ADA, which explicitly borrows the remedies set forth in § 2000e5 [of Title VII], cannot provide for individual liability. ' "Ortiz v. Inform Diagnostics, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 3d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff acknowledges this authority but urges the court to ''buck that trend'' and adopt a different interpretation of the statute. (Dkt No. 13 at 1.) Binding First Circuit precedent forecloses that request. See Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Maine, Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2004) (''Until a court of appeals revokes a binding precedent, a district court within the circuit is hard put to ignore that precedent unless it has unmistakably been cast into disrepute by supervening authority.'') Even if the issue remains open, the court declines Plaintiffs invitation to depart from the prevailing view. Accordingly, the ADA retaliation claim against Hunt in Count V is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs claim in Count VII under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (''MCRA''), Mass. Gn. Laws ch. 12, §11I. Plaintiff concedes that the claim is preempted to the extent it rests on conduct prohibited by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, which forms the basis of Count VI. (Dkt. No. 13 at 8 n. 1.) The MCRA claim is therefore preempted to that extent.
Plaintiff also premises Count VII on Defendants alleged interference with her rights under the Massachusetts Paid Family and Medical Leave Act (PFMLA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175M, §9(a), the same conduct underlying Count III, which asserts a separate PFMLA claim. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 92; Dkt. No. 13 at 7.) The MCRA claim is therefore duplicative of Plaintiffs PFMLA claim. Accordingly, Count VII is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Defendants motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (TF)