Notice | Filed: September 29, 2026
| Entered: September 29, 2026
Suzanne et al v. Nouma et al
P.I.: Other | New York Eastern
Notice(Other)
NOTICE by Patrice B. Nouma re Order Adopting Report and Recommendations,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Order on Report and Recommendations,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Set Aside Default,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (Bhatia, Satish)
Order | Filed: September 29, 2026
| Entered: September 29, 2026
Suzanne et al v. Nouma et al
P.I.: Other | New York Eastern
Order Adopting Report and Recommendations Order on Report and Recommendations Order on Motion to Set Aside Default
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: On August 29, 2025, the clerk entered default against defendant Nouma pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Plaintiff Suzanne did not subsequently move for default judgment, and in early 2026, defendant moved to vacate the entry of default. In a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) dated 8/3/2026, Magistrate Judge Shields determined that the entry of default is void ab initio and that in the alternative, ineffective service of process alone satisfies the “good cause” requirement of Rule 55(c), and the defendant otherwise satisfies the Second Circuit’s criteria for “good cause.”
Plaintiff timely filed an 25 objection. Because a motion to vacate entry of default is nondispositive, Nash v. FOXO Techs. Inc., 348 F.R.D. 210, 215 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), the court must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Clear error will be found only when, upon review of the entire record, the Court is left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “[D]efaults are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions.” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). “[W]hen doubt exists as to whether a default should be granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party.” Ibid.
Even assuming service was proper, the R. & R.’s determination that defendant demonstrated “good cause” to vacate the entry of default is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. In determining whether to vacate a default, courts consider “(1) the willfulness of default, (2) the existence of any meritorious defenses, and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party.” Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Local 2, Albany, N.Y. Pension Fund v. Moulton Masonry & Constr. LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Willfulness. Plaintiff claims the R. & R. erred in finding the default was non-willful, contending that earlier interactions provided notice of this lawsuit to defendant. But plaintiff has not shown that the earlier interactions identify this action. That defendant was in the building when the process server attempted service and refused to respond to the receptionist does not establish that any communication between the receptionist and defendant referred to this lawsuit. A March 2025 message that plaintiff points to likewise does not identify the action. And though plaintiff appears to have emailed defendant at the correct email address, defendant avers that he “never received any email relating to this case,” Def.’s Mot. to Vacate ¶ 5 (Dkt. #22-4). Even if defendant missed the email, that is at most negligence, which does not sustain an inference of willfulness. Bricklayers, 779 F.3d at 186. The R. & R.'s non-willfulness finding is not clearly erroneous.
Meritorious defense. Plaintiff next contests the existence of meritorious defenses and argues that the R. & R. applied the wrong standard. Defendant’s sworn statement that he does not even know plaintiff is a specific factual assertion that, if credited, would make it less likely that he made the allegedly defamatory statements about plaintiff. Moreover, defendant presented evidence of other defenses, Def.’s Mot. 11–13, including lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, which constitute meritorious defenses, Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Safe Chain Solutions, LLC, 21-CV-4106 (AMD) (JAM), 2026 WL 1899866, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2026). Defendant's arguments in support of these defenses are “above conclusory denials which a factfinder could evaluate,” ibid. (citation omitted), and thus meet the low threshold for this factor.
Prejudice. Finally, plaintiff identifies no prejudice beyond ordinary delay, which alone is insufficient. Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
In light of the ambiguities in the record, the R. & R. properly resolved doubts in favor of the defaulting party. The R. & R.’s good-cause determination is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court overrules plaintiff's objection, adopts the R. &... (truncated)