Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 11 MOTION to Enforce Judgment Habeas Order. The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s “motion to enforce judgment,” D. 11-12, in which he contends that the bond hearing provided to him by Respondents, see D. 10, pursuant to this Court’s Order, D. 9, did not comport with the due process requirements elucidated in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), because the immigration judge relied upon a criminal charge pending against Petitioner in state court and associated police report. Having reviewed Petitioner’s papers, D. 11-12, and Respondents’ opposition, D. 14, the Court DENIES the motion.Although the Court rejects Respondents’ argument, D. 14 at 1-3, 6-11, that the Court lacks jurisdiction here, see, e.g., Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019) (noting that a court retains habeas jurisdiction to review compliance with its prior order conditionally granting habeas relief); Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-13224-ADB, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026) (explaining that “courts in the First Circuit have reviewed immigration judges’ bond determinations for compliance with th[e] constitutionally mandated burden of proof [of clear and convincing evidence]”), the nature of the Court’s review at this context is “highly circumscribed.” Id. Still, as Respondents concede that there is no statutory exhaustion requirement here, see D. 14 at 12, the Court exercises its discretion to decline to impose such a requirement here. See, e.g., Miti v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-11327-BEM, 2026 WL 884639, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2026).
As to Petitioner’s argument that the immigration judge did not apply the Hernandez-Lara standard because the judge “relied solely on an unsubstantiated police report and the existence of a pending charge,” D. 12 at 4-6, the Court cannot reach such conclusion as a matter of law here based upon the record here. Here, the immigration judge relied upon a criminal charge and a detailed police report in which an officer responded to a call about an erratic driver who crossed the double lines and almost collided into oncoming traffic. D. 14-2 at 10. When the officer stopped Petitioner’s vehicle and approached, he observed the very strong order of alcohol, Petitioner’s slurred speech and glassy and bloodshot eyes. Id. Petitioner failed to place the car in park when reaching for his registration which caused the car to jerk since his foot was off the brake. Id. at 11. Although Petitioner initially denied drinking, id., he eventually admitted to drinking four beers. Id. at 15-16. He failed three field sobriety tests and was found to have.18% BAC, over the legal limit. Id. at 11-14, 16. As a result of this incident, Petitioner was charged with OUI, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, id. at 17.
“Even though the Court might, on direct review (and with the benefit of more information and context), weigh this evidence differently, it cannot say that the immigration judge’s conclusion that it amounted to clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness was ‘so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.” Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *2 (quoting Diaz Oritz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144).
The Court is also unpersuaded by Petitioner’s second argument, which appears to sound under the Administrative Procedure Act, see D. 12 at 6-9, where Petitioner has not explained the applicability of such standard here. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion, D. 11. (SEC)