Order | Filed: July 27, 2026
| Entered: July 27, 2026
In Re: Ho Wan Kwok
Bankruptcy Withdrawal | Connecticut
Order on Motion to Withdraw Reference
ORDER granting in part 1 Motion to Withdraw the Reference. Through the underlying adversary proceeding, and many others, the Trustee has alleged that the Debtor, through one or more of his alter ego shell companies, fraudulently transferred property to Defendant(s) either Pre-Petition, Post-Petition, or in some cases, both. As such, the Trustee seeks to claw back such purportedly fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the Estate, pursuant to Sections 544, 548, and/or 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. The parties refer to these adversary proceedings generally as "Avoidance Cases." To prevail on these claims, the Trustee acknowledges that as a threshold matter, he must establish that the subject transferor entities are indeed alter egos of, and/or beneficially owned by, the Debtor. In certain of the Avoidance Cases, the identified transferor has already been adjudicated as an alter ego of the Debtor, and is thus, an "Adjudicated Alter Ego." Other Avoidance Cases identify transferors whose status as an alter ego (or not) has yet to be adjudicated ("Non-Adjudicated Alter Egos"), or a combination of transferors who are Adjudicated Alter Egos and Non-Adjudicated Alter Egos. Indeed, currently pending before the Bankruptcy Court are two "Omnibus Alter Ego Actions," which seek declaratory judgments as to numerous of the Non-Adjudicated Alter Egos. Here, the underlying adversary proceeding involves Adjudicated Alter Egos, that is, Lamp Capital LLC and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. ("Lexington") have already been adjudicated to be either alter egos of or beneficially owned by the Debtor. Now pending before this Court is Movant Phillips Nizer LLP's Motion to Withdraw the Reference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), following the conclusion of pre-trial proceedings in the underlying adversary proceeding.
Movant Phillips Nizer LLP contends that it is entitled to a jury trial on both the fraudulent transfer claims and the threshold issue of whether the transferors were alter egos of or beneficially owned by the Debtor, and that good cause otherwise supports their timely request for withdrawal of the reference. The Trustee has objected, arguing that: (1) withdrawal of the reference based solely on Movant's right to a jury trial is unpersuasive where, as here, the proceeding is not yet trial ready; and (2) in any event, Movant is not entitled to a jury trial either on any Post-Petition Section 549 claim, or on the Trustee's alter ego claim insofar as the Trustee is not seeking a money judgment. The Court agrees with Movant in part.
The Court first concludes that Movant is entitled to a jury trial on the Trustee's Pre-Petition fraudulent transfer claim, but is not entitled to a jury trial on the Trustee's Post-Petition fraudulent transfer claim. It does not appear that the Trustee contests that Movant is entitled to a jury trial on the Pre-Petition fraudulent transfer claim raised in the underlying adversary proceeding. And for good reason, because in cases, as here, where defendants have not submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate, they are entitled to a jury trial in an action to recover fraudulent monetary transfers pursuant to Section 548, even if such proceedings are otherwise statutorily core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989). Regarding the Post-Petition claim, however, the Court agrees with the Trustee that the Section 549 claim does not give rise to a right to a jury trial, see In re Belmonte, 551 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016), and finds Movant's argument to the contrary unpersuasive.
Lastly, as to the alter ego question, the Court repeats that the transferors in this case, Lamp Capital LLC and Lexington, have already been adjudicated alter egos of the Debtor. See Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al., No. 23-AP-5013, ECF No. 297 at 4 ("at all times [Lexington] [was an] alter ego[] of the Debtor."); Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al., No. 23-AP-5023, ECF No. 66 at 4 ("[A]t all times Lamp Capital was an alter ego of the Debtor."). The Court does not decide whether Movant is entitled to re-litigate this issue before a jury in conjunction with the Pre-Petition transfer claim, or whether the determination will have "law of the case" force and effect.
Turning to the timing of withdrawal, it is true that "[c]ourts in this Circuit have held consistently that a party's entitlement to a jury trial alone is insufficient to compel immediate withdrawal of the reference." In re Enron Corp., No. 04-CV-509 (MBM), 2004 WL 2149124, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2004). Yet, crucially, Movant here is not seeking immediate withdrawal of the reference. Rather, they seek withdrawal at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. ... (truncated)