Order | Filed: August 26, 2026
| Entered: August 26, 2026
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA v. Irvine
Truth in Lending | Connecticut
Order on Motion for Reconsideration
ORDER denying 132 Motion for Reconsideration. Local Rule 7(c) allows the filing of "[m]otions for reconsideration," but cautions that such motions "shall not be routinely filed and shall satisfy the strict standard applicable to such motions." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)1. "The standard for granting [reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-- matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019); see also D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)1; Cho v. Blackberry Ltd., 991 F.3d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (reconsideration warranted "only when the party identifies an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice"). A motion for reconsideration is "not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple." Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Defendant asserts that the Court should reconsider its order granting a two-week extension of time for ten reasons. As an initial matter, the law of the Second Circuit - which is indeed binding on this Court - clearly states that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for an extension of time is generally within the discretion of the appropriate court." In re Burger Boys, Inc. , 94 F.3d 755, 76061 (2d Cir. 1996). The Court could deny Defendant's motion for reconsideration for this reason alone. Nevertheless, the Court considers each of Defendant's arguments, and finds that they are all without merit.
Defendant's first argument is that "the Court applied Rule 7(b)(1) inconsistently with its prior application of the Rule." Defendant points the Court to its ruling in Richello v. General Insurance Company of America, Case No. 26-CV-185 (SVN), in which the Court denied a defendant's motion for extension of time in which to file a response to the plaintiff's complaint. This Court's prior rulings are not "controlling law." Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 482 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[J]ust as a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, so it need not necessarily adhere to prior rulings in a case."). Even if the Court had taken an inconsistent approach with respect to this ruling, that would not be grounds for reconsideration. And, in any event, the Court's ruling here is not inconsistent with its ruling in Richello. There, the defendant waited approximately one month to remove the case to federal court after being served with the plaintiff's complaint, then sought more than two additional months in which to file its response, stating only that counsel "required additional time" to review the pleading with no explanation for the delay. See Case No. 26-CV-185, ECF No. 1; ECF No. 24. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff's counsel timely filed a motion for extension of time only seven days after Defendant filed her motion for sanctions and offered a reason for the requested extension.
Second, Defendant points to the order at ECF No. 102 stating that deadlines would not be extended "absent truly extraordinary need." Again, the Court is not bound by its own prior orders, and this does not constitute "controlling decisions or data" warranting reconsideration. In any event, Plaintiff's deadline to respond to Defendant's motion for sanctions is not a "case deadline" as contemplated by ECF No. 102 (which set deadlines for discovery completion, fact and expert disclosures, and dispositive motions).
As to Defendant's third and fourth grounds for objection, neither have merit. The Court did not apply the wrong standard by using the word "could not" rather than "cannot." The distinction between "could not" and "cannot" is irrelevant for purposes of this order. The relevant distinction is between Defendant's reading of the Rule as imposing an "impossibility" standard, and the actual inquiry the Rule imposes, which is whether deadlines can be "reasonably" met. In this Court's view, Plaintiff's counsel demonstrated that it would not be reasonable to meet the deadline given the circumstances. Additionally, the Court did not fail to apply the "diligence" requirement. The Court interprets the rule to require consideration of what would reasonably be possible for diligent counsel to achieve, and ruled on the motion for extension of time in light of that interpretation. Accordingly, the... (truncated)