Case Activity (525)

1. Misc | Filed: October 01, 2026 | Entered: October 01, 2026 Valdez v. Uber Technologies, Inc. et al

   Personal Inj. Prod. Liability | Colorado

   Status Report

   Joint STATUS REPORT by Plaintiff Timothy Valdez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Conferral Correspondence, # 2 Exhibit Cover Sheet - Deposition Transcript, # 3 Exhibit Subpoena Duces Tecum to Lime, # 4 Exhibit Hearing Transcript, # 5 Exhibit Lime Response and Objections to Amended 30(b)(6), # 6 Exhibit Amended 30(b)(6) Notice, # 7 Exhibit Cover Sheet - Drawings, # 8 Exhibit Cover Sheet - Deposition Excerpts)(Dormer, Sean)

2. Order | Filed: October 01, 2026 | Entered: October 01, 2026 BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C. et al

   P.I.: Other | Massachusetts

   Order on Motion to Intervene

   Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 321 MOTION to Intervene. Having reviewed the motion to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 filed by Kopin Corporation ("Kopin"), D. 321, Kopin's memorandum and declaration in support of same, D. 322; D. 325, BlueRadios, Inc.'s ("BlueRadios") opposition, D. 330, and Kopin's reply, D. 338, the Court DENIES the motion, D. 321.

   Factual Background. Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C. ("HBSR") has served as Kopin's patent counsel for nearly two decades, both in patent applications arising from the "Golden-i project" between Kopin and BlueRadios, as well as other matters unrelated to BlueRadios. D. 322 at 5-6. The Golden-i project "arose out of a 2007 joint venture contract between Kopin and BlueRadios, and the two companies stopped working together in 2009." Id.

   On August 11, 2026, the Court (Levenson, Ch. Magistrate Judge) issued an order (the "Order"), D. 311, allowing BlueRadios’ motion to compel and enforcing compliance with this Court's prior discovery order, D. 296, which required HBSR to produce all documents "withheld (in whole or in part) on the basis of attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product between HBSR and Kopin," D. 311 at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting D. 296), and placed the onus on HBSR to "ensure that it withholds only documents that have no connection with BlueRadios' inventorship or ownership," id. at 7. 

   Discussion. Kopin now moves to intervene, both as of right and permissively, to "be heard on which of its communications with HBSR are privileged and outside the scope of the collaboration" for purposes of the Order. D. 322 at 13-14; see D. 325-1 at 2-27 (providing Kopin's proposed objections to the Order).

   1. Intervention as of Right Fails as Untimely. "To succeed on a motion to intervene as of right" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), "a putative intervenor must establish (i) the timeliness of its motion to intervene; (ii) the existence of an interest relating to the property or transaction that forms the basis of the pending action; (iii) a realistic threat that the disposition of the action will impede its ability to protect that interest; and (iv) the lack of adequate representation of its position by any existing party." R & G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009). The failure to satisfy any of these factors "'dooms intervention.'" Id. (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998)); see In re Efron, 746 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that "[t]he putative intervenor 'must run the table and fulfill all four of these preconditions'" (quoting Patch, 136 F.3d at 204)).

   Timeliness "is the sentinel that guards the gateway to intervention." In re Efron, 746 F.3d at 35. "The timeliness inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive and depends on the totality of the circumstances," with a particular focus on the "status of the litigation at the time of the request for intervention." R & G Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d at 7. Courts generally consider four factors: "(i) the length of time that the putative intervenor knew or reasonably should have known that his interests were at risk before he moved to intervene; (ii) the prejudice to existing parties should intervention be allowed; (iii) the prejudice to the putative intervenor should intervention be denied; and (iv) any special circumstances militating for or against intervention." Id. Relevant here, "[t]he First Circuit has held that 'the most important factor is' the first." See In re Porsche Auto. Holding SE, No. 19-mc-91129-LTS, 2020 WL 533023, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 2020) (quoting In re Efron, 746 F.3d at 35), adopted, No. 19-mc-91129-LTS, 2020 WL 814176 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2020), aff'd, No. 20-1239, 2021 WL 140638 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 2021). 

   a. Length of Time. Because Kopin knew or reasonably should have known that its interests were at risk prior to its motion to intervene, such motion is untimely. Seeid. First, although Kopin contends that its interests were not at risk prior to the Order because same altered the scope of production, D. 322 at 8-9; D. 338 at 6-10 (citing PDV USA, Inc. v. Communication Solutions, Inc., 2024 WL 5664668, at *3-*4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2024)), the Order considered and discounted Kopin's would-be arguments regarding such production, D. 311 at 4 (reasoning that what Kopin would argue "about the scope of its collaboration [with ... (truncated)

3. 523 additional result(s)