Order | Filed: September 17, 2026
| Entered: September 17, 2026
McManus v. Tufts Medical Center, Inc.
Other Statutory Actions | Massachusetts
Order ~Util - Case Stayed
Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER ENTERED. Defendant supports, while Plaintiff opposes, entry of a stay pending the First Circuit’s decision in Goulart v. Cape Cod Healthcare, Inc., No. 25-1672 (1st Cir. filed July 23, 2025). [ECF No. 39 (Joint Status Report)]; see also [ECF No. 40 (Pl.’s Notice of Suppl. Authority)]. Plaintiff emphasizes that her claims are distinct from those in Goulart and that, at oral argument, the Goulart “panel appeared skeptical of two central premises” of Judge Stearns’s underlying decision, thus “appear[ing] to agree with this Court’s analysis” that (1) a plaintiff invoking the ECPA’s crime-tort exception need not allege a specific intent to commit a crime or tort, and (2) allegations of financial or commercial motives do not necessarily bar application of the exception. See [Joint Status Report at 5–8]. Plaintiff’s observations are valid, but do not properly lead to her subsequent conclusion that the First Circuit’s forthcoming decision will have no impact here. First, this Court will not presume that any skepticism the panel may have expressed during oral argument necessarily indicates the approach the First Circuit will take as to either specific intent or commercial motive. Second, Plaintiff overlooks that the Goulart panel pressed various other points concerning the proper interpretation and application of the crime-tort exception that are relevant here. See, e.g., [ECF No. 39-1 (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 15–16 (Judge Dunlap noting that, irrespective of the weakness of defendant’s argument surrounding specific intent, plaintiff still must contend with a second, more challenging, argument, “which is that the [criminal or tortious] act itself has to be [defendant’s] dominant purpose”)]; [id. at 18 (Judge Thompson questioning whether the “primary motivation or determinative factor” standard often recited by courts in the crime-tort exception context is a “factual determination that shouldn’t be decided on 12(b)”)]. In short, in considering whether there is “good cause” to stay these proceedings, Marquis v. F.D.I.C., 965 F.2d 1148, 1155 (1st Cir. 1992), the Court is mindful that the resolution of Defendant’s pending motion to dismiss will likely hinge on the First Circuit’s resolution of issues that it must grapple with in the Goulart appeal, despite differences between that case and this one. The Court acknowledges that the cost of the additional delay is borne by Plaintiff, but is not persuaded that it outweighs the cost of proceeding without the benefit of Goulart, especially considering that Plaintiff’s ECPA claim is the Court’s sole basis for jurisdiction over her action. In sum, having weighed the “competing equities,” Marquis, 965 F.2d at 1155, the Court STAYS this case pending the First Circuit’s issuance of the Goulart decision. Once that decision is issued, the parties shall, within 14 days, submit a joint status report stating their positions as to how this case should proceed.(CAM)