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Personal Inj. Prod. Liability | Massachusetts
Order on Motion in Limine
District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered Pending before the Court is Cincinnati’s Motion (Doc. No. 90 ) to exclude evidence regarding the service of and any changes made to the system sold by Cincinnati during the approximately one year or so following the system’s March 2001 delivery and installation. Cincinnati’s Motion as to this time period is now ALLOWED. The Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Alicea on all of the claims except negligent design because Alicea could not show that the decedent entered the gap via the unguarded wall-side opening. The Circuit reversed summary judgment as to negligent design, reasoning that Alicea’s expert opined that the system was not reasonably safe even with a wall-side barrier due to the absence of two additional safety features, the mat and the e stop. As to this claim, the Circuit also rejected the notion that Alicea could prove that Prieto entered the gap via the wall-side opening. Indeed, it focused on the expert’s opinion that the system was unsafe even with the barrier because there were other means to enter the gap. In so ruling, the Circuit implicitly rejected the notion that the design claim reached post-delivery events. For this reason, as well as the reasons articulated in open court earlier today and in the papers filed yesterday by Cincinnati, the Court excludes the evidence of this post-installation time period. Individual pieces of evidence from this period may be admissible for other purposes and this ruling does not reach such uses. One other reason supports this result. Given the Circuit’s ruling, Plaintiff cannot prove that the absence of the wall side barrier, even if part of “the design,” was a defect that caused the harm at issue in this case. Thus, such evidence is also excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 as confusing and cumulative and excluded under Fed. R. 401 as irrelevant. (SED)
Pending before the Court is Cincinnati’s Motion (Doc. No. 90 ) to exclude evidence regarding the service of and any changes made to the system sold by Cincinnati during the approximately one year or so following the system’s March 2001 delivery and installation. Cincinnati’s Motion as to this time period is now ALLOWED. The Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Alicea on all of the claims except negligent design because Alicea could not show that the decedent entered the gap via the unguarded wall-side opening. The Circuit reversed summary judgment as to negligent design, reasoning that Alicea’s expert opined that the system was not reasonably safe even with a wall-side barrier due to the absence of two additional safety features, the mat and the e stop. As to this claim, the Circuit also rejected the notion that Alicea could prove that Prieto entered the gap via the wall-side opening. Indeed, it focused on the expert’s opinion that the system was unsafe even with the barrier because there were other means to enter the gap. In so ruling, the Circuit implicitly rejected the notion that the design claim reached post-delivery events. For this reason, as well as the reasons articulated in open court earlier today and in the papers filed yesterday by Cincinnati, the Court excludes the evidence of this post-installation time period. Individual pieces of evidence from this period may be admissible for other purposes and this ruling does not reach such uses. One other reason supports this result. Given the Circuit’s ruling, Plaintiff cannot prove that the absence of the wall side barrier, even if part of “the design,” was a defect that caused the harm at issue in this case. Thus, such evidence is also excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 as confusing and cumulative and excluded under Fed. R. 401 as irrelevant. (SED)
District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered.Cincinnati’s Motion (Doc. No. 103) addresses several categories of OSHA documents. As to the director’s letter, the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT as Plaintiff is not offering the letter. As to the citations and violation worksheets, the Motion is DENIED. Rule 803(8) authorizes the admission of the factual findings, including “conclusions or opinions that flow from a factual investigation.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). That Cincinnati disputes some or all of these conclusions does not preclude their admission. And Cincinnati has otherwise failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the report is untrustworthy, e.g., that the author(s) lacked sufficient expertise or that other shortcomings infected the report. The witness statements are of a different nature. The statements are not factual findings, but rather “hearsay statements by third persons... [and] are not admissible under this exception merely because they appear within public records.” United States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1997). Moreover, these statements are cumulative of witness testimony, Fed. R. Evid. 403, and contrary to the general principle that jurors should hear directly from percipient witnesses. Thus, the Motion is ALLOWED as to these statements. The statements remain available for potential impeachment or similar uses. Any evidence which is deemed to be admitted under this order might require an explanatory instruction to the jury. (SED)
Cincinnati’s Motion (Doc. No. 103) addresses several categories of OSHA documents. As to the director’s letter, the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT as Plaintiff is not offering the letter. As to the citations and violation worksheets, the Motion is DENIED. Rule 803(8) authorizes the admission of the factual findings, including “conclusions or opinions that flow from a factual investigation.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). That Cincinnati disputes some or all of these conclusions does not preclude their admission. And Cincinnati has otherwise failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the report is untrustworthy, e.g., that the author(s) lacked sufficient expertise or that other shortcomings infected the report.
The witness statements are of a different nature. The statements are not factual findings, but rather “hearsay statements by third persons... [and] are not admissible under this exception merely because they appear within public records.” United States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1997). Moreover, these statements are cumulative of witness testimony, Fed. R. Evid. 403, and contrary to the general principle that jurors should hear directly from percipient witnesses. Thus, the Motion is ALLOWED as to these statements. The statements remain available for potential impeachment or similar uses.
Any evidence which is deemed to be admitted under this order might require an explanatory instruction to the jury. (SED)
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