Order | Filed: June 29, 2026
| Entered: June 30, 2026
Fecteau v. The City of Mount Vernon et al
Real Property: Other | New York Southern
Order on Motion for Conference
ORDER terminating 377 Letter Motion for Conference. The Court construes this letter as another Motion to Recuse. As explained in the Order addressing Plaintiff's earlier Motion to Recuse, the substance of a Court's legal rulings and case management decisions is not the proper basis for a recusal motion. United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 104, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the Court will not entertain a recusal motion based upon the substance of its rulings in this Action or its Action: if Plaintiff's claims ultimately do not succeed, then those are issues for appeal. But more generally, the Court would implore the Plaintiff to procedure as well as precedent. Where, for instance, allegations are not in the operative complaint or the standard for sanctions had not been met, the Court is not at liberty to disregard those deficiencies. Instead, it must adhere to Second Circuit precedent and the laws established by Congress. The very nature of the judicial role requires the Court to weigh fairly the arguments of every party, whether the party is a member of "a low-income community," "service member[]," "a pro se litigant," "a municipality," or "a large business" with ample resources. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 388 (1971). ("Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They are bound to do equal justice under law, to rich and poor alike."). The Court believes that the March 25, 2026 Opinion discharges this duty properly. Plaintiff raised a new claim not alleged in his operative complaint on summary judgment, and the Court granted him leave to amend to assert that claim properly. In the Court's view, Plaintiff did not carry his burden to show that summary judgment or sanctions were appropriate, and so those motions were denied without prejudice to their being made again on a proper showing. If future motions are made on these or other subjects, the Court will continue to apply binding procedural and substantive law, which applies equally to pro se and counseled parties. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (noting the right to self-representation does not provide "a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law"). While the Court has an obligation to treat all litigants fairly, it also has an obligation to ensure that the court system is not being used abusively. For the reasons laid out in this Court's opinion in the related action, the Court determined that Plaintiff's behavior in that action was sanctionable. See Fecteau v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., No. 25-CV-3821, 2026 WL 821567, at *21-28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026). Plaintiff may rest assured that the decision to impose the narrow sanction in that case was wholly unrelated tohis pro se status or Safety National's identity as an insurer. Nor do those identities have any relevance here. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to have his claims litigated fairly, he is advised to state his claims and arguments clearly and with patience. See Max Ehrmann, Desiderata (1927) ("Speak your truth quietly and clearly[,] and listen to others[.]"). Finally, the Court will not submit this letter to the Judicial Council on Plaintiff's behalf. Of course, he remains free to do so on his own time and through the procedures set out by the Council. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 6/29/2026) (mml)